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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to determine why U.S. Navy Sailors work longer hours than accounted
for in Navy manpower models. The study focuses on at-sea tasks of enlisted Sailors
aboard Guided Missile Destroyers. To address the question, we reviewed the full Navy
Manpower Analysis Center model for Destroyer task requirements, interviewed Destroyer
subject-matter experts knowledgeable about enlisted tasking, analyzed self-reported work-
load questionnaires administered to deployed Sailors, developed a comprehensive enlisted
at-sea task model, and contrasted that model with Navy task models. The thesis finds
that, over the past 25 years, Navy policy changes have resulted in decreased Destroyer
manning, insufficient training due to revised methodologies, and deficient maintenance.
Relying on technological advancements to reduce workload, the Navy cut manning levels.
These manning shortfalls, combined with higher operational tempos, resulted in misalign-
ment between actual at-sea tasks and manning models. The largest misalignment occurs in
training, including on-the-job training and qualifications, warfare training, and underway
drills. Additionally, the study finds that Navy-wide policy changes were not vetted through
OPNAVN1 to determine their effect on at-sea Sailor workload. This thesis recommends in-
stituting centralized policy analysis for new initiatives potentially affecting Sailor workload
and periodic reassessment of the Navy Availability Factor (afloat wartime workweek).
v
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Executive Summary
The goal of this research is to determine what workload is placed upon U.S. Navy Sailors
at sea that may not be included in Navy requirements documentation and manning models.
This study focuses on U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers (DDG 51) while on
deployment. Although examining specific ship departments with the highest workload is
important, this research concentrates on the workload of the entire crew of the Guided
Missile Destroyer (DDG).
Five recent studies of USN crews conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School determined
that Sailors work an average of 88.3 hours per week while underway –more than the average
of 81 hours of work per week planned by the Navy for enlisted Sailors. By determining
the levels and sources of the workload placed on enlisted Sailors, this thesis identifies the
reasons for such long working hours to potentially ascertain ways to remediate the excessive
burden. This thesis seeks to answer the following question. Why are Sailors working longer
hours than planned for in Navy manpower models and resourcing?
In 2016, the research sponsor, Surface Forces Pacific, requested the Naval Postgraduate
School conduct a study to determine fleet requirements creep due to the knowledge that
Sailors were working longer hours than planned for in Navy manpower models. No specific
event provided the impetus for this research. However, over the course of this study in 2017,
the Navy had three surface ship collisions and one grounding within the span of only eight
months. This study is the first phase of this effort and represents the first study of its kind.
This thesis began by extensively reviewing Navy manpower history and previous manning
studies. Then, a gap analysis was conducted to examine the disparity between the expected
working hours planned for by the Navy Availability Factor (Navy StandardWorkWeek) and
actual Sailor working hours. Despite multiple reports examining why accidents occurred
within the Navy surface force, no entity has yet looked at and assessed the excessive
workload of Sailors to determine why they are working more hours than planned within
Navy manpower models. To find the gap between planned and actual workload, we used a
behavioral approach for Sailor job analysis, reviewing the actual tasks performed at sea by
U.S. Navy Sailors.
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We created a baseline model of Sailor shipboard workload, the Mark I model, based upon
discussions with Surface Warfare Officers at Naval Postgraduate School. We then flew out
to five different commands (four in port and one on deployment) to refine the Mark I model,
including at-sea and in-port tasks Sailors must accomplish. This effort focused on those
tasks considered to take a “disproportionate amount of time,” i.e., greater than average,
defined as the Navy Availability Factor (Navy Standard Work Week) by the Navy. From
these interviews, we created the Mark II model. We then administered questionnaires to
Sailors at sea on deployedDDGs to assess individual crewmember perceptions of workload.
Using this information, we updated to the Mark III model prior to meeting with the Navy
Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC), the entity responsible for determining minimum
manpower requirements. The Mark III model was an attempt to determine which at-sea
tasks were specified in Navy manpower models. We provided the Mark III model to
the NAVMAC Afloat departmental personnel and NAVMAC leadership for review and
comment. From those comments, we made changes and created the Mark IV, representing
which tasks are included, partially included, or not included in Navy manpower models.
Interviews and questionnaires about sources of workload provided insight into areas of
greater concern. We followed up on these areas of concern, to include the increased Sailor
workload resulting fromdecreasedmanning from theminimal requirements listed in the Ship
Manpower Document, inadequate Food Service Attendant manning, excessiveMaintenance
andMaterial Management spot checks, and annual / semi-annual maintenance requirements
that are not included inNavymanpowermodels. We obtained data and reviewed instructions
for these areas of concern and confirmed issues for further Navy assessment and review.
The readiness and risk gaps created by reduced manning alone increase as tasks, both
warfare and non-warfare, are increasingly levied upon at-sea Sailors. Required tasks that
are not warfare related must still be completed-even though they are not included in the
NAVMAC models. Therefore, there will always be a workload disparity between Navy
manpower models and actual DDG workload.
Simply adding more Sailors to ships is not always an appropriate or feasible resolution.
We made several policy recommendations in order to improve at-sea safety and Sailor
quality of life. These recommendations include the implementation of analysis for Navy-
wide policy changes, instituting a policy of periodic assessment of the Navy Availability
xxx
Factor (Navy Standard Work Week) including departmental and divisional differences,
conducting a fleet-by-fleet review of Operations Orders in order to improve efficiencies
as Navy ships transit from fleet to fleet, initial training recommendations for new Sailors,
and providing Surface Warfare Officers with in-depth training on shipboard manpower and
manning processes.
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Pretending to be superhuman is very dangerous. In a well-led military, the self-
maintenance of the commander, the interests of his or her country, and the good
of the troops are incommensurable only when the enemy succeeds in making
them so. It is time to critically reexamine our love affair with stoic self-denial.
. . . If an adversary can turn our commanders into sleepwalking zombies, from
a moral point of view the adversary has done nothing fundamentally different
than destroying supplies of food, water, or ammunition. Such could be the
outcome, despite our best efforts to counter it. But we must stop doing it to
ourselves and handing the enemy a dangerous and unearned advantage.
- Johnathan Shay, M.D., Ph.D., Veterans’ Affairs Clinical Psychiatrist
Parameters, Summer 1998
1.1 Introduction
On January 31, 2017, USS Antietam (CG 54) ran aground while anchoring in Tokyo Bay
(U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF), 2017c). On May 9, 2017, USS Lake Champlain (CG 57)
collided with a South Korean fishing vessel east of the Korean peninsula (USFF, 2017c).
On June 17, 2017, USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) collided with a cargo vessel off the coast of
Japan, resulting in the deaths of seven Sailors and injury to three more (USFF, 2017c). On
August 21, 2017, USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) collided with a tanker in the approach to
the Singapore Strait, resulting in the deaths of ten Sailors and injury to five more (USFF,
2017c).
After all these events occurred within less than eight months, the country’s leaders asked
why. What was the root cause of these events? The Vice Chief of Naval Operations
(VCNO)directed a comprehensive reviewof the 2017 incidents and concernswithU.S. Navy
operations that may have led to these events.
The Commander, USFF (2017c) executed the review, which found Sailor workweeks and
“shortcuts,” due to a false sense of security, as the primary reasons. The report referenced
Sailors’ 100-plus hour workweeks cited by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
1
(2017b), concluding that such long workweeks lead to reduced recovery from fatigue and
limited crew endurance. It also noted that “shortcuts” had been rationalized by various
echelons of the U.S. Navy, including ship commanders and ship crews, due to pressures
associated with an increased Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO). Insufficient training time
due to maintenance delays and a higher OPTEMPO from dynamic operational tasking
also caused lapses in certifications (USFF, 2017c). USFF also found that rescheduled or
waivered training and certifications became the “new normal.” They continue, discussing
the fact that risk mitigation plans for these waivers or extended timelines became more of
an administrative notification of the existence of expired certifications, thereby becoming
a shortcut within the intended process in order to meet Fleet mission requirements. “As a
result of this increased demand and delays inmaintenance execution[,] training opportunities
were reduced and completed warfare area certifications across FDNF-J declined from 93
percent in 2014 to 62 percent in 2016” (USFF, 2017c, p. 67, emphasis added). The report
concluded that Fleet leadership was lulled into a “false sense of safety and security” (p. 93)
due to a decrease in mishaps prior to 2017. The leadership did not collect objective data to
ensure risk mitigation plans were appropriate and effective due to this false sense of safety
and security. Overall, the excessive OPTEMPO and long working hours resulted in crew
fatigue and decreased training and maintenance standards (USFF, 2017c).
In addition to possible shortcuts taken by leadership, similar shortcuts may have been taken
by individual Sailors faced with a much higher workload than expected. Since the 1990s,
numerous changes have taken place within the Surface Force. Many of these changes
have negatively impacted afloat manning and Sailor workload across the fleet. Contrary
to expectations, decreased manning was not offset through technology and an allocation
of work to shore commands. Because the improvements anticipated from technological
advancements and shore support were not fully realized, Sailors experienced unexpected
increases in workload. This thesis, therefore, analyzes Sailor workload in order to pinpoint
issues and determine solutions to prevent further loss, injury, and death.
1.2 Scope
The goal of this research is to determine what workload is placed upon U.S. Sailors at
sea that may not be included in Navy requirements documentation and manning models.
This research focuses only on U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers (DDG 51) while
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on deployment. During this portion of a Guided Missile Destroyer’s (DDG’s) three-year
cycle, a ship’s operational workload is at its highest, but the administrative workload is at
its lowest, level. Furthermore, during this phase, manning is stable, and off-ship personnel
are minimized. By focusing on the deployment phase, we present the “best case” scenario.
Any shortcomings or issues identified during the deployment phase would almost surely
be amplified during other phases of the ship’s cycle. Although a detailed examination of
specific ship departments with the highest workload demand is important, this research
focuses on the DDG crew’s workload as a whole. Of note, Guided Missile Cruiser (CG)
data is also used throughout the study due to the similar nature of ship tasks to that of a
DDG and because the pattern seen manifested in one surface ship will also manifest itself
in another surface ship within the same organization.
1.3 Motivation
Multiple empirical studies show that U.S. Navy Sailors work long hours (see Figure 1.1).
This figure was created with data adapted from DCNO (MPT&E) (2016); Green (2009);
Haynes (2007); Mason (2009); Moore, Gasch, et al. (2002); Shattuck and Matsangas
(2014b).
Figure 1.1. Actual Sailor Working Hours Compared to the Hours Planned
for in Navy Manpower Models.
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We analyzed five recent studies and determined that Sailors work an average of 88.3 hours
per week at a continuous Condition III or above level while underway. All five studies
concluded that Sailors are working more than 81 hours per week, the planned level for Navy
enlisted Sailor’s averageweeklyworking hours over the deployment period of approximately
six months (24 weeks). By determining the levels and sources of the workload placed on
enlisted Sailors, this thesis intends to identify the reasons for such long working hours and
to potentially identify ways to remediate the excessive burden.
1.4 Research Question
Why are Sailors working longer hours than planned for in Navy manpower models and
resourcing?
1.5 Thesis Outline
Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the study and its purpose. Chapter 2 presents an
in-depth review of pertinent background information, history and methodology of fleet
requirements, and literature. Chapter 3 details the thesis’s methodology before Chapter 4
details the results. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion, recommendations, and sugges-
tions for future work.
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CHAPTER 2:
Background and Literature Review
A large individual workload that creates excessive working hours can, in turn, create
corresponding fatigue factors that can damage unit readiness and the Sailors experiencing
such conditions. Regardless of pay grade or position, excess workload places additional
risk on the team as a whole. Excess workload can be imposed by the command or imposed
by an external echelon, whether directly through additional tasking or indirectly through
manning shortfalls. No matter the source, Sailors must adjust to excess workload. Manning
shortfalls exacerbate excess workload as shortages mean a smaller team to handle the
workload. The Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) is a vessel where Sailors experience
excess workload. DDGs are not the smallest ships in the U.S. fleet, but, with a high
Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and with 65 ships in the DDG 51 class (Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA), 2017a), the DDG comprises the largest class of any of the U.S. Navy
surface forces.
This chapter details the step-by-step process by which the Navy determines authorized
billets, from Navy end strength and congressionally authorized budget to actually manning
the ship, identifying the origin of the readiness gap studied in the rest of the thesis. In
order to provide an in-depth analysis of manpower issues, this chapter also reviews the
history of changes and planning that affected workload for U.S. Navy Sailors, including
the breakdown of work and factors that affect calculations, including accuracy, technology,
sleep, and physiological effects of excessive workload. Last, through analysis of prior
studies, the chapter examines workweek standards and how those standards compare to
actual Sailor Available work time.
2.1 U.S. Navy Budget and End Strength
The ability to man a DDG begins with the Navy budget and congressionally authorized end
strength. The process of determining Navy end strength, specifically the actual number of
Sailors on active duty, begins with both the Congressional and Navy view of the nation’s
future along with Navy needs based on U.S. national security strategies. Together with
national security goals, end strength is also determined by the Navy’s budget. Every
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year, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) provides a budget request to the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF), who, in turn, provides a budget request to the President. This request
is vetted and validated through Navy processes to assure the appropriate demand signal for
all portions of the Navy’s budget. The planning process for any specific year’s budget takes
more than five years. Every year, the outlook provided as a part of the Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) includes an update to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
The complexity of the process, the need for procurement (alongwith appropriate adjustments
of manpower and personnel), and innovation requires planning ahead. The FYDP, provided
to the SECDEF each year, is the Navy’s five year plan, including the next two years’ budgets
and the plan for the following three years in order to program the needs of the Navy.
Internally, plans actually extend out 10, 15, and 20+ years in order to address national
strategy objectives and to provide guidance to the budget process in the coming years. A
simplistic budget timeline for Fiscal Year (FY) 19 and corresponding updates to the FYDP
can help to understand the complexity and overlap (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1. The Notional U.S. Budget Timeline for FY 19.
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The Navy must set an appropriate manpower demand signal to meet the service mission.
Naval personnel, especially leadership, must ensure their requirements are met, whether as
a part of the procurement process, maintenance execution, or personnel management. As
part of the budget process, Personnel Strengths: Requirement for Annual Authorization,
10 U.S.C. §115 (2006) states that “Congress shall authorize personnel strength levels for
each fiscal year for ... The end strength for each of the armed forces ... for active duty
personnel ... [and] The end strength for the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of
the armed forces” (p. 79). Furthermore, Permanent End Strength Levels to Support Two
Major Regional Contingencies, 10 U.S.C. §691 (2011) provides the minimum required end
strength for each service in order to fight two regional wars simultaneously. Although end
strength is congressionally mandated, the numbers approved are based on an end strength
justification provided by the SECDEF within 45 days of the release of the President’s
budget (Annual Defense Manpower Requirements Report, 10 U.S.C. §115a, 2006), which
is provided by the services within the anticipated budget constraints. Internally, the Navy
budget must be balanced between Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, Military
Personnel, Research and Development, and Infrastructure in order to meet all mission area
needs, both now and in preparation for the future (for a breakdown of the Navy’s FY 18
budget request, see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2. The Navy FY 18 Budget Request. Source: DASN (M&B)
(2017).
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The FY 18 budget request highlights an increase in maintenance costs to improve fleet
readiness through the “funding [of] one hundred percent of projected ship depot mainte-
nance” (DASN (M&B), 2017) and full funding for the procurement of eight new ships as
the Navy prepares to increase from 278 “deployable battle force ships” (NAVSEA, 2017a)
to the current Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) goal of 355.
Significantly, military personnel are expensive, making up approximately 28% of the FY
18 budget request (for a further breakdown, see Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3. The Navy FY 18 Military Personnel Budget Request. Source:
DASN (M&B) (2017).
That 28% then is made up of 41% for basic pay, meaning that basic pay accounts for over
11% of the total budget for the FY 18 request.
2.2 From Approved Navy End Strength to Navy-Funded
Billets
Once end strength has been approved and budgeted,“manpower reconciliation” is the next
step. The end strength request, submitted by the SECNAV, is built through the “man-
power programming process ... [within the office of the] Deputy Chief of Naval Operation
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for Integration of Capabilities and Resources, CNO N8” (Deputy Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (DCNO) (Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPT&E)), 2016, p. 1-4).
This instruction, the Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, continues with
the process: any changes to end strength must be performed through the programming
process. The reconciliation thus matches funded personnel billets, both active and reserve,
to approved end strength. These funded billets form “the basis for military personnel
end strength planning, recruiting, training, promotion, and personnel distribution” (DCNO
(MPT&E), 2016, p. 1-5). Once a billet is funded, it is characterized as an “authorized
billet.”
There are several steps in reconciliation before a billet is authorized. First, the DCNO
(MPT&E), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N1, oversees manpower
requirements for all fleet, operational, and shore units. Within OPNAV N1, the require-
ments process is accomplished through the Director, Total Force MPT&E, (Director, Total
Force Manpower Requirements (OPNAV N12)). OPNAV N12 oversees Navy Manpower
Analysis Center (NAVMAC), the command directed to “develop and document manpower
requirements for all fleet activities within the Navy” (DCNO (MPT&E), 2016, p. 1-6).
Their command mission is to “define, translate, and classify the Navy’s work into a work-
force structure and position demand signal to sustain a combat ready force” (NAVMAC,
2016b, para. 1). Therefore, in order to meet the DCNO’s goal of determining requirements,
NAVMACdetermines theminimum requirements (or “spaces”) necessary to ensure mission
accomplishment. The Budget Submitting Office (BSO) for the U.S. Navy fleet, U.S. Fleet
Forces (USFF) command, “are authorized manpower resources” by the CNO in order to
accomplish task and mission requirements (NAVMAC, 2017a, p. 28-2). Their coordination
and approved Navy end strength determine what required billets within a manpower docu-
ment to fund. The foundation of these billets is created through the process of determining
fleet manpower needs so that appropriate funding decisions can be made.
2.2.1 Basis for Fleet Manpower Requirements
The primary guidance for NAVMACand the BSO to determine authorized billets is based on
U.S. Code of Law and Department of Defense (DoD) instruction. According to U.S. Code,
“the Secretary of Defense shall establish a comprehensive readiness reporting system for
the DoD. The readiness reporting system shall measure in an objective, accurate, and timely
9
manner, the capability of ... units to conduct their assigned wartime missions” (Readiness
Reporting System: Establishment; Reporting to Congressional Committees, 10U.S.C. §117,
2003, p. 89). In addition, United States Navy: Composition; Functions, 10 U.S.C. §5062
(2006) directs that “the Navy shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt
and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation
of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned
and ... for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of
war” (p. 1933, emphasis added). Moreover, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness (USD (P&R)) (2005) states, “it is DoD policy that national military objectives
shall be accomplished with a minimum of manpower that is organized and employed to
provide maximum effectiveness and combat power ... Manpower requirements are driven
byworkload and shall be established at theminimum levels necessary to accomplish mission
and performance objectives” (p. 2, emphasis added). Therefore, under U.S. law, the Navy is
responsible to authorize only the minimum billets, minimum being the ongoing challenge.
Cut back too much and workloads, as well as risk to mission, escalate.
2.2.2 History of Manpower Requirements
After World War II, the Navy began to study manning issues. In 1963, “a sustained effort
was implemented to define the work functions required in the Navy and to develop and
promulgate staffing criteria as a means of improving the allocation of manpower resources”
(Bright et al., 1969, p. v). Artis I. Plato was a project engineer in the Naval Ship Engineering
Design Work Study Section within the offices of the Secretary of the Navy. In 1966, he
worked on several manning projects to include the creation of the “ManpowerDetermination
Model,” developed to accurately predict the adequacy of crew size for U.S. Navy vessels
(Plato, 1974). In his paper, he discussed the background and rationale for the development
of a Navy Ship Manpower Document (SMD), attributing the manning issues for all U.S.
military services to the extensive economic growth after World War II.
According to Plato (1974), rapid technological advancements after the second world war
necessitated increasing numbers of technically skilled personnel, and it was in the late
1950s that the Navy began to take into account crew living conditions during the ship
design process. The article notes that the Navy built ships to specifications created with
poorly projected manning needs given the installation of more sophisticated technologies.
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In addition, the only input to shipboard habitability up to this point was through past
experience (Plato, 1974). Plato assessed that manning underestimates ranged from 6.7% to
30.5% of crew size, depending on ship class (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Crew Underestimates for New Construction due to Technological
Expectations. Adapted from Plato (1974).
POST WORLDWAR II EXAMPLES OF
INITIAL CREW (SAILOR) UNDERESTIMATES FOR
NEW CONSTRUCTION SHIPS
SHIP INITIAL ACTUAL %
CLASS ESTIMATE REQUIREMENTS INCREASE
CVA–59 3826 4582 19.8
CVA–63 4295 4582 6.7
CGN–9 857 1119 30.5
DLGN–25 459 524 14.1
DE–1040 195 245 25.5
Plato also noted that, as more personnel were added to compensate for underestimates,
habitability decreased due to a lack of design margin to add berthing facilities. Plato (1974)
states, “all of this led to a decision that in the futuremanning had to be determined accurately
to avoid underestimating and to utilize better the available manpower resources” (p. 35). He
continues by noting that standards for habitability were first directed in 1957 by the CNO,
but, without the ability to accurately forecast manning, these standards proved difficult to
achieve.
The Navy addressed the issue in the 1960s. In 1966, “an attempt was made ... to develop
a special manning algorithm for the ‘DD07’ Program based on a study of DD 710 Class
destroyers” (Plato, 1975, p. 52). Plato notes the fact that this original simplistic model was
only applicable to the specific ship and was found to be inaccurate for any other destroyer
or ship type. Without the ability to generalize, the algorithm was extremely limited. Soon
thereafter, Plato determined that shipboard workload factors needed to be included and, due
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to the complicated nature of modeling fleet requirements, a computerized algorithm would
be necessary in order to generate results.
By the late 1960s, the CNO mandated a study to determine unit configurations. The CNO
also determined that the “Design Work Study” needed to develop a prototype “Ship Man-
ning Document” (now known as the “Ship Manpower Document” in order to differentiate
manpower requirements and manning) with the goal of accurately reflecting fleet man-
power needs using analytic documentation (Bright et al., 1969; CNO, 1967; Plato, 1974).
The study was undertaken by the Personnel Research and Development Laboratory, docu-
mented by Bright et al. (1969), to establish the fleet-wide SMDs in order to determine the
requirements for each class of ship (e.g., CVA–59, DE–1040, etc.).
For this study, theDCNOforManpower andNavalReserve outlined theworking hours for the
baseline Sailor day, called theNavy StandardWorkWeek (NSWW), in amemorandumdated
September 13, 1967. This memorandum set the workweek at 74 hours for watchstanders,
including a breakdown of work, a six-day routine plus a day of watch, direction for an
in-port routine, a productivity factor, utilities tasks (tasks other than work, maintenance,
and service diversion), service diversion, personal needs, and messing (Bright et al., 1969;
Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), 1967). This memorandum, obtained from Plato
(1974), is provided in Appendix A. The hours for the NSWW could then be applied to the
total workload hours in order to determine the required number of Sailors.
The study would prove invaluable, especially as the Navy transitioned away from conscrip-
tion. “The primary objective of this study was accomplished in that it established a baseline
for use in future analyses of the Navy’s manpower planning system” (Wedding & Hutchins,
1974, p. vi). On July 1, 1973, the mandatory military draft expired, and the DoD became an
all-volunteer force (Chambers, 2004). By that time, the U.S. Navy had finished their studies
toward the minimization of shipboard manpower. The implementation of the SMDwas pre-
scient due to the increased costs associated with an all-volunteer force (Comptroller General
of the United States, 1978; Plato, 1974). The Navy needed to ensure manpower require-
ments at sea were minimized, the goal being “a more precise measure of enlisted manpower
requirements ... [in order to] improve the allocation of manpower resources” (Bright et al.,
1969, pp. iii–v). By 1984, the Navy had implemented the Ship Manpower Document for
91 percent of their active surface ships (Government Accountability Office (GAO), 1986).
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2.2.3 Manpower Requirements Methodology
Currently, the Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operational Environment
(ROC\POE) is generated by the DCNO for Warfare Systems, OPNAV N9 (specifically the
Director of Surface Warfare (N96)) for the Arleigh Burke class DDG (DDG 51), the key
document for determiningNavymanpower needs. Navy surface ship requirements are based
heavily on operational needs, technical publications for each individual platform, mainte-
nance requirements, enlisted personnel specialties, positional requirements, and shipboard
data. These items are consolidated by the NAVMAC staff. Sometime between 1969 and
1972, the CNO initiated the Required Operational Capabilities (ROC), providing the re-
quired shipboard mission, task, and readiness parameters to ship designers, which, in turn,
helped with planning for manpower (Plato, 1974). This robust document is now the greatest
driver for any change in a ship’s manpower related to changes in operational requirements.
If the ROC\POE does not accurately reflect the requirements of the ship class mission sets,
including watch requirements for ship operations, then the ship could suffer from a lack of
manpower in required mission areas and, potentially, expend too much manpower in areas
that do not require it.
Based on the ROC\POE, NAVMAC determines the minimum authorized billets to meet
Condition I and Condition III readiness, which does not necessarily account for in-port
workload. NAVMAC defines “manpower requirements” as “the minimum billets required
to accomplish 100% of the scenario based mission defined by the ROC\POE” (NAVMAC,
2016a, slide 2, emphasis added). In order to minimize manpower and meet the needs of the
unit, specific positions must be filled to meet watch requirements for readiness Condition I
and account for readiness Condition III wartime workload as defined in the ROC\POE (for
a summarized view of “readiness” conditions for U.S. Navy ships, see Table 2.2).
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Table 2.2. Navy Readiness Conditions as Defined by the Navy. Adapted
from Cutler (1902/2002); N96 (2017).
CONDITION I
Battle Readiness. Also known as General Quarters. All battlesta-
tions are fully manned. This condition is set for combat situations
or in cases of emergency. Expected continuous endurance is 24
hours.
CONDITION II
Modified Battle Readiness. A modified CONDITION I state of
readiness necessary for an extended period of time. Expected
continuous endurance is 10 days.
CONDITION III
Wartime, Increased Tension and Forward-Deployed Cruising
Readiness. Systems are manned in order to ensure defense against
pop-up threats. The expectation is for approximately one-third
of the crew to be on watch. The manning of weapon stations is
situation dependent. When deployed, a Naval vessel is considered
to be in this condition. “To determine manpower requirements,”
expected sustainability is 60 days or less.
CONDITION IV
Peacetime Training Cruising Readiness. Normal peacetime cruis-
ing. Ready to change to CONDITION I, II, or III readiness as
necessary.
CONDITION V
In Port Readiness. Capable of meeting any in-port requirement or
emergency.
Inasmuch as ship Condition I and III are underway conditions, Navy ship manning models,
by definition, do not account for in-port workload.
As for all Navy ships, NAVMAC measures the DDG workload based on the ROC\POE
description of the operational work required to meet Condition I and III requirements. The
breakdown of operational work for the DDG includes: operational manning, maintenance,
support services, and other directed requirements necessary to meet the mission. Oper-
ational manning (OM), also known as watch stations, is defined as an operating station
manned on a continuing basis for a specific amount of time in order to satisfy the ROC for
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the given condition of readiness. In other words, OM are positions that must be manned 24
hours per day (N96, 2017) in Condition III or positions (such as Condition I watches) that
are infrequent in nature and, though less than 24 hours, undefined in length and necessary
in a threat-imminent environment. Maintenance, both routine and non-routine, includes
planned maintenance (PM), corrective maintenance (CM), and facility maintenance (FM).
Support requirements, described as own unit support (OUS), includes supply support, cler-
ical, disbursing, post office, food service, inventory, and custodial services (N96, 2017).
N96 (2017) also notes that these requirements include the manning necessary for ship ser-
vice facilities, messing facilities, living space maintenance, area command security, and
fuels support. Directed requirements include manpower expected to meet specific man-
power functions as directed by the CNO, including the CommandMaster Chief, 3M System
Coordinator (3MC), or other specific positional need. The following shipboard workload
information, unless otherwise noted, was attained through personal communications with
NAVMAC as noted in NAVMAC Code 20 (2018); NAVMAC Code 40 (2017); NAVMAC,
Codes 20 and 40 (2017); NAVMAC Commanding Officer (CO) (2018).
Personal Needs, Fatigue, and Delay (PF&D)
A fundamental understanding of workload breakdown first requires a detailed understanding
of basic industrial engineering allowances that must be included in the analysis of work-
load. Konz (2001b) discusses these allowances, along with industry standards, including:
personal needs, fatigue, and delays. Together, the allowances are known as the personal
needs, fatigue, and delay (PF&D) allowance.
The first part of PF&D, personal needs, includes such things as drinking water, using the
restroom, refilling a coffee mug, and taking a smoke break. Konz states that five percent is
a typical standard value to account for personal needs (p. 1394).
Fatigue includes three areas: environmental, physical, and mental. Accounting for fatigue
means there must be some sort of reason for it. According to Konz (2001b), if the position
does not require a fatigue allowance (i.e., productivity or efficiency losses due to fatigue),
then it should not be given, however, as noted by Konz, the International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO) charts begin with a 10% fatigue allowance. The IMO (2001) provides
ship-specific factors for fatigue affecting workload, physical stress, and sleep:
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• Ship design
• Level of Automation
• Level of Redundancy
• Equipment reliability
• Inspection and Maintenance
• Age of vessel
• Physical comfort in work spaces
• Location of quarters
• Ship motion
• Physical comfort of accommodation spaces. (IMO, 2001, pp. 6–7)
The IMO notes that physical stress can also come from working long hours, common
practice on board maritime vessels (p. 9). Fatigue likely affects every Sailor on board the
ship. The amount of fatigue incorporated into the allowance needs to be dependent on the
working environments for that Sailor. Charts are included in Kanawaty (1992) to determine
an appropriate fatigue allowance based upon workload and work conditions.
Delay is the last allowance in PF&D. Konz (2001b) describes delay as an allowance that
is task-dependent, not based on the Sailor. This is to account for delays from work-related
conversations, maintenance or breakdowns on relative machinery, interrupted work flow,
and other standardworkplace happenings. The correctmethodology formeasurementwould
be to sample entire workdays. For example, if there was a six minute delay for every 100
minutes, then the delay allowance would be six percent (Konz, 2001b). Konz recommends
reevaluation of fatigue allowances approximately every two years due to changing conditions
(p. 1400).
Overall, with all three components, PF&D can quickly add up with a potential minimum
as calculated: 5% + 1% + 4% = 10%. This would assume the 5% personal standard, 1%
fatigue for only ship-specific factors (likely underestimated based on a quick review of the
IMO tables as cited in Konz (2001b)), and 4% delay (this will be position dependent), a
range minimum could easily start around 10%. More arduous shipboard work could easily
reach closer to 20% once ship-specific factors are included. It is important that standard
engineering allowances be taken into account in Navy manpower models.
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Asof 2002, shipmanpower requirements changed to assume less than 20%PF&Dallowance,
meaning that on-paper requirements may not match actual work time requirements. When
the SMD was created, a flat 20% productivity allowance (now referred to as personal
needs, fatigue, and delay) was included as a part of the “other work, [consisting of] service
diversions, productivity allowance, and training” (Bright et al., 1969, p. A-7). The 20%
was a combination of “a 15-percent relaxation [personal and fatigue] allowance and a 5-
percent contingency [delay] allowance ... based on studies of private industry as well as
on activity sampling on several classes of ships” (GAO, 1986, pp. 32–33). In 2002, the
PF&D/productivity allowance (PA) was decreased from 20% to a range of 2–8% for all
ship classes to calculate manpower requirements (OPNAV N12, 2002). This allowance is
only applied to FM, CM, and OUS to account for the inability of personnel to be 100%
productive 100% of the time (watch stations are expected to be 100% productive at all
times). A decrease in PF&D/PA directly affects the amount of time allotted for direct work
requirements of FM, CM, and OUS. With a decrease in this allowance by just 10%, it
amounts to about 10 minutes more time available for work. Therefore, ship manpower
requirements decrease assuming a constant workload.
The allowance was changed to a new range of 2–20% in 2016 for the DDG, Guided Missile
Cruiser (CG), Amphibious Assault Ship (LHD), Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD), and
Dock Landing Ship (LSD) ship classes (OPNAV N12, 2016). The new PF&D/PA range
is still being implemented using Industrial Engineering Standards as the ship classes are
reviewed. A “range” is not provided in this revision in order to allow study and determination
of actual conditions for each ship’s division. The prior range of PF&D/PA will be utilized
until officially assessed. The review for the listed ship classes was the first milestone in a
multi-phased assessment by OPNAV N12 and NAVMAC. Phase Two will be completed for
aircraft carriers (CVNs) in late 2018 or early 2019. Phase Three, the last phase, will target
the remaining ship classes. Policy changes for the PF&D/PA have happened over time (see
Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3. NAVMAC Historical Guidelines for Personal Needs, Fatigue, and
Delay (PF&D) / Productivity Allowance (PA).
1967–2002 2002–2016 2016–Present
2%
Administrative in nature, temperature controlled,
minimal maintenance, and low noise levels
20% 4%
Light to moderate maintenance, minimal exposure
2–20%
(P, F: 15%,
to weather, and situational awareness required
(Under
D: 5%) 6%
Light industrial environment, partial
revision)
exposure to weather, noise, and heat monitoring
8%
Heavy industrial environment, continued
exposure to weather, and hazardous conditions
Adapted from OPNAV N12 (2002, 2016); GAO (1986); Moore, Hattiangadi, et
al. (2002); 2002–2016 descriptors summarized from NAVMAC Afloat Programs
Department Director (2009b).
In sum, for 35 years until 2002, the Navy considered a 20% PF&D allowance, matching
studies and engineering standards, when assessing manpower requirements. That 20%
decreased to 2–8% from 2002–2016, and a new range, 2–20%, is now under revision and
partial implementation.
Operational Manning (OM)
In the process of determining the number of personnel required for a Navy ship, of primary
concern are the watch stations required for Condition I and III. As stated, the station
must require the full attention of the personnel standing that watch with 24 hour manning
(N96, 2017) in Condition III or positions (such as Condition I watches) that are infrequent in
nature and, though less than 24 hours, undefined in length and necessary in a threat imminent
environment. These operating stations, manned on a continuing basis for a specific amount
of time, satisfy the ROC for the given condition of readiness and are a function of the ship
design, ROCs, and operating procedures. Condition I watch stations are reflected directly
in the SMD as a base manpower requirement. For Condition III watches, the planned
manpower is determined by calculating 24 hours of watch among three people (i.e., three
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watch-sections) for each station, assuming the most intensive workload scenario in order to
meet an at-sea, at-war scenario. The qualitative requirements for these positions ensure the
right person with the necessary experience and specialty is at the right station in order to
assure effective performance.
Planned Maintenance (PM)
Plannedmaintenance (PM) is the maintenance required by the PlannedMaintenance System
(PMS) component of the Navy’s Maintenance and Material Management (3M) system and
provides the necessary workload, or man-hours, expected for completing maintenance
actions. This workload is based on the operating systems, equipment, and associated
components on board the ship. Normally, only maintenance not in excess of quarterly and
not in port is included in the workload calculations for Condition III. Due to the fact that
the ROC\POE identifies the longest crew endurance of Condition III as 60 days, there is an
assumption that most semi-annual and annual maintenance can be deferred until the ship is
in-port or post Condition III operations (i.e., a reduced threat environment).
The man-hours that NAVMAC associates with PM include the three components of each
action item: Make Ready, Maintenance, and Put Away. The fourth component is own unit
support (OUS), which will be fully discussed later.
Make Ready includes the gathering of materials, including the Maintenance Requirement
Card (MRC), manuals, tools, transiting requirements, HazardousMaterial (HAZMAT), and
any tag-outs that may be required.
The MRC provides the expected time for the maintenance itself and is itemized by the
Maintenance Index Page (MIP). If no MIP is provided, then research is needed from
manufacturer’s directions or similar documentation in order to accurately identify the time
required for maintenance. For new systems or equipment, PM requirements are accom-
plished through a Maintenance Engineering Analysis and documented appropriately. The
maintenance times are then converted to the appropriate “weekly” equivalent for manpower
hours.
The time provided is only the amount of time expected for the givenMRC. Make Ready/Put
Away (MRPA) allowances are not included and, therefore, must be calculated in order to
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adjust for actual workload. Prior to 2002, MRPA was set at 30% (Bright et al., 1969). In
2001, OPNAV N12 gave direction to change the standard to 15%, applied to all PM. In
2013, OPNAV N12 (2013) gave new direction to change the standard back to 30%, which
is now the figure used for PM calculations.
PF&D/PA is not applied to this formulation. The GAO determined that including the
PF&D/PA, which at the time was a blanket 20%, in addition to MRPA was double counting
as such an allowance should only be used with raw productivity numbers, which would
not include MRPA (GAO, 1986). They stated, “applying allowances to times based only
on analysts’ personal judgment and experience, workers’ estimates of the time required to
complete each task, or historical records is inappropriate because it is likely to result in a
double counting of time ... [without] precise engineering methods” (p. 33). Therefore,
PF&D/PA was removed from the PM calculation at that time and has remained that way
since then. Of note, since the time of the report, NAVMAC has diligently conducted field
activities to accurately time MRPA to account for all aspects of the required PM process.
Corrective Maintenance (CM)
Corrective maintenance (CM) is unscheduled maintenance due to system or component
failure, malfunction, or deterioration, currently calculated by a general planning ratio. When
collecting data, NAVMAC has found a lack of CM records within the system, ranging from
none to very little, a problem that has plagued the Navy since they implemented official
maintenance logging systems in 1964 (Bright et al., 1969; GAO, 1986). Without actual
man-hour data, NAVMAC applies a general planning rule. Prior to 1968, a blanket 4:1
PM to CM ratio was used but then was changed to the ratios currently in use (GAO,
1986). NAVMAC now applies the post-1968 planning rules depending on the rating of
the personnel maintaining the equipment, whether an electrical or mechanical specialty.
Electronic and electrical systems receive a 1:1 PM to CM ratio while mechanical systems
receive a 2:1 PM to CM ratio. The expectation is that the ratio accounts for troubleshooting
and obtaining replacement parts from Supply. In addition, CM allowance provides for aging
ships. In 2001, OPNAV N12 provided direction for these calculations. CM allowance must
“increase by 40% (1.4 ratio) for ships less than 20 years old ...[and] 80% (1.8 ratio) for ships
older than 20 years” (p. 1). Finally, NAVMAC utilizes PF&D/PA for this formulation as
appropriate for the work environment.
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Facility Maintenance (FM)
FM is the cleaning and preservation of the basic volume of the ship in order to maintain
the ship’s materiel condition. NAVMAC calculates the overall workload through actual
space measurements and square footage of all ship areas. FM work ensures sanitation and
cleanliness requirements are met as well as preservation from corrosion and deterioration.
The development of this requirement includes an allowance for FM-specific MRPA includ-
ing obtaining the required tools, transits to and from the work site, and necessary cleanup.
The action includes sweeping, swabbing, overhead and compartment cleaning, touch-up
painting, and polishing bright work. NAVMAC utilizes a PF&D/PA for this formulation as
appropriate for the work environment.
Own Unit Support (OUS)
NAVMAC also calculates some manpower for OUS. OUS is defined as “The work actions
required of personnel which are not within the categories of watch, maintenance, or service
diversions, but which are essential to the operation of the unit or activity. Typical examples
for ships ... are replenishment evolution, supervision, and working parties” (NAVMAC,
n.d., p. 14, emphasis added). This category provides for the extra personnel needed
to complete the administrative requirements for the ship and excess requirements due to
special evolutions. Such OUS includes the Flight Deck Fire Fighting Team, Food Service
Attendants, time formoderating the advancement exam, appropriate collateral duties, supply
and medical support, and more.
Defining “appropriate” collateral duties is important for calculating workload because some
collateral duties contribute to the work center or command mission while others do not.
Therefore, collateral duties are considered either Productive or Nonproductive. NAVMAC
(2000) defines Productive collateral duties as “duties that are useful and essential to the
command’s mission and directly support the work center or organizational mission ...
[these duties] are considered productive and should be measured and captured” (p. 4-8).
Furthermore, as discussedwithin the NAVMAChandbook, the productive hours determined
for these collateral duties apply only to the work center of the primary representative. For
example, productive collateral duties include the Damage Control Petty Officer (DCPO)
and training petty officer (TPO). NAVMAC also defines Nonproductive collateral duties
as those duties that do not contribute to the work center. The command may benefit from
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the Nonproductive collateral duty, but it “does not directly support the work center or the
organizational mission” (p. 4-8). Therefore, nonproductive hours are not captured as a part
of OUS. For example, a member of theMorale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) committee
is considered a nonproductive collateral duty, and the time for such a duty is expected to be
captured under service diversion.
The overall productive OUS workload determination is made through task analysis, inter-
views, and work sampling. A PF&D/PA is utilized for this formulation as appropriate for
the work environment.
Directed Requirements
Directed Requirements include personnel who are mandatory by position to include the
Command Master Chief, 3MC, or other positions that are directed via a written directive
from an appropriate authority. Additional directed requirements are applied once direction
is received.
Occupational Standards (OCCSTDs)
Also of note in NAVMAC’s work breakdown are OCCSTDs. The OCCSTDs provide the
details of exactly what a specific rate and pay grade does or can do (NAVMAC Code 40,
2017). NAVMAC utilizes the OCCSTDs to determine the minimum pay grade for work
ability. For example, an E-5 in a given rate will be able to do some of the tasks listed for
an E-6 if the tasks are listed for both the E-5 and E-6 within the OCCSTDs. However, the
E-5 is considered to be unable to perform the work for the tasks listed for the E-6 that do
not cross over into the E-5 OCCSTDs.
2.3 Navy Availability Factor (NAF) / Navy StandardWork
Week (NSWW)
As stated in Section 2.2.3, NAVMAC utilizes the ROC\POE to determine the required
Condition I positions, shipboard watch requirements, Condition III workload, and directed
requirements. The NAF, previously (and still commonly) known as the NSWW (henceforth
referred to as NAF/NSWW), provides the notional standard enlisted Sailor workday at
sea. The “available” working hours within this workday are used in order to disperse the
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workload and minimize the manpower requirements for the ship. The required specialties
and experience levels necessary to successfully accomplish the mission are also a part of
this determination. NAVMAC then uses the minimum manpower requirements to build the
SMD.
Definition of Navy Availability Factor (NAF) / Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW)
The Navy Availability Factor (NAF)/Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW) provides the
number of hours the Navy plans for Sailors to be available for work at sea, broken down
by the categories of watch, maintenance and/or OUS, training, and service diversion.
Manpower requirements are built upon this expectation of working hours, based on the unit’s
mission and associated workload. Outlined by theNavy Total Force Manpower Policies and
Procedures instruction, the “average weekly hours” for U.S. Navy at-sea enlisted Sailors
are “guidelines for sustained personnel utilization” (DCNO (MPT&E), 2016, p. D-2).
Although the instruction provides weekly hours, according to DCNO (MPT&E) (2016, pp.
D-1, D-3), the expectation is for enlisted Sailors at sea to work a “long-term” average of 81
available (on-duty) hours with the belief that commands will ensure the management of the
Sailor work schedules. Watchstander’s 81 hours consists of 56 hours available for watch
and 14 hours available for maintenance and OUS (or 70 hours available for maintenance and
OUS for the non-watchstander) as discussed in Section 2.2.3, seven hours of training, and
four hours of service diversion. Within the instruction, training is defined as “an activity of
an instructional nature, which contributes directly to combat readiness ... factored to reflect
those scheduled events (e.g., general drills, engineering casualty damage control) for all
hands” (p. D-3). Furthermore, service diversion is defined as “actions required of military
personnel by regulations or the nature of shipboard or staff routine” (p. D-3). The working
hours set within the instruction reflect at-sea hours in readiness Condition III, “based upon
operational requirements under projected wartime conditions ... and are not intended to
reflect the limits of personnel endurance” (p. D-1).
The NAF/NSWWmakes a few important assumptions. The goal is to minimize manpower
requirements (USD (P&R), 2005). This is accomplished by complying with OCCSTDs, or-
ganizing workload at the appropriate level (i.e., departmental, divisional, and work center),
and accurately defining the scope of the work (whether one or more ratings are required).
Therefore, the baseline assumptions are optimal conditions for manning: (1) all require-
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ments are funded and filled, (2) the Sailors: (a) are on board, (b) are fully trained, and
(c) work at an “average” level of performance. “Average” is defined as the average ability
“between experienced and inexperienced personnel as well as average physical and mental
capacity, all across a spectrum of observations” (NAVMAC CO, 2018). As manning is
reduced by deliberate action or by lack of distributable inventory, the workload is trans-
ferred to the remaining crew. Without being fully trained, the Sailor will not know how
to, or may require more time to, complete their tasks. Though the reader may be surprised
by these assumptions, it is nearly impossible to provide objective manpower requirements
using anything other than those assumptions.
History of Navy Availability Factor (NAF)/Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW)
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, the NAF/NSWW gained traction in 1963 and was adopted
by the VCNO in 1967 (Bright et al., 1969; VCNO, 1967). Since the adoption of the
NAF/NSWW, several changes have been made (see Table 2.4).
Table 2.4. Navy Availability Factor, Formerly Known as the Navy Standard
Work Week, Historical Changes (in Hours). Adapted from Bright et al.
(1969); DCNO (MPT&E) (2002); VCNO (1967); as cited in Moore et al.
(2001).
Available Training and Productive Personal





(DCNO (M&RA)) (including “Work”) (Watch only)
August 1970 74 4.5 69.5 94
Between
Changed work week definition from “maximum” to “average”
1970 to 1981
August 1986
81 14 67 87
Change from watchstanders only to all of ship’s enlisted Sailors
June 2002 81 11 70 87
June 2015
Change from “Navy Standard Work Week” to
“Navy Availability Factor”
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The changes include an update to the workweek definition to “average” from a “maximum”
sometime between 1970 and 1981 and the dissolution of distinct watchstander and non-
watchstander hours in the August 1986 revision of the NSWW (Moore et al., 2001). The
study notes that one of the largest changes that took place also happened in the August 1986
revision: a decrease in personal time by 7 hours, moving that 7 hours to available working
time for a total of 81 working hours.
Officer manpower requirements are not built through the NAF/NSWW. In a 1978 tasker
from theDCNO(MPT&E), theNavalManpower andMaterial Analysis Center, Atlantic, was
directed to develop and submit an approach to determine officer requirements (Lull, 1981).
Eight potential methodologies were submitted at the time. Today, officer requirements are
considered “directed requirements” and are based solely on required numbers for shipboard
operational manning billets, promotion opportunity, and community health.
2.4 Fleet Manning
It is not possible to man all funded requirements at once due to the availability and transfer
process of personnel (for a snapshot of FY 17, see Table 2.5).
Table 2.5. Defense Report FY 17: U.S. Navy Enlisted Military Manpower
Totals / Strength Estimates (in Thousands). Adapted from Total Force
Planning and Requirements Directorate (2016).
Service Account
FY 15 FY 16 FY 17
Actual Estimate Estimate
Navy
In Units [Fleet and Shore Commands] 231.9 232.2 232.0
Individuals:
Transients 8.6 8.6 6.8
Trainees/Students 27.2 26.1 24.1
Midshipmen 0.0 0.0 0.0
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees 1.5 1.5 1.5
Undistributed Manning 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total End Strength 269.2 268.5 264.4
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This table is from the defense report explaining the DoD requirements request, built into the
President’s budget request for FY 17 (Total Force Planning and Requirements Directorate,
2016). The report was provided within 45 days from submission of the President’s Budget
as required in Section 115 of Title 10 (Annual Defense Manpower Requirements Report,
10 U.S.C. §115a, 2006), discussed in Section 2.1. The definitions for each category are
provided by the USD (P&R) (2015).
Looking at actual FY 15 data, 8,600 Sailors were in transition. Transients include “all
military personnel in a travel, proceed, leave en route, or temporary duty en route status
on permanent change of station (PCS) orders to execute an accession, separation, training,
operational, or rotational move ... [or] who are not available for duty during a no-cost move
because of leave or temporary duty en route” (USD (P&R), 2015, p. 3). Combined with
1,500 who were either patients, prisoners, or holdees, at least 10,100 Sailors were not at a
specific command conducting work.
2.4.1 Friction in the Fleet: Sea/Shore Imbalances
In addition to those Sailors not conducting work at a specific command, some surface ship
personnel may be still working at a shore command due to lack of funding for the transients,
prisoners, patients, and holdees (TPPH) and Student funding accounts. The imbalance of
Naval personnel and the reasons for it are discussed by Belcher et al. (2014) and Belcher,
Reese, and Lawler (2016). They state that personnel must be available to man the fleet
when it is required, but, in reality, personnel may be waiting for their orders to conduct a
Permanent Change of Station (PCS) or waiting to enter (“class up”) into a required school.
As further discussed by Belcher et al. (2014), this imbalance also includes those who
may be augmenting another force, cannot deploy due to medical issues, or have a family
situation prohibiting them from PCSing to a particular station. Such situations cause Sailor
distribution friction to occur, which, in turn, leads to gapped, or unfilled, billets at sea.
In a perfect world, a Sailor conducting a PCS arrives to relieve another and has about two
weeks to turn over the position before the second Sailor departs, transitioning to his or
her next command. This transition takes a total of about 44 days if the member takes the
30 days of leave generally authorized prior to arrival at the new command. However, this
process does not always occur, especially within U.S. Navy fleet commands. At times,
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positions are gapped prior to the arrival of a relief. The gap may be due to retirement
with the retiring Sailor taking 30 to 60 days of terminal leave, a delay of the replacement’s
arrival, or unplanned losses due to medical, disciplinary, or other issues. Another reason
for positions to be left gapped is a lack of specifically qualified personnel to fill the position
(e.g., a student is unable to begin class instruction or sea/shore rotation issues within the
specific enlisted rating). These problems result in fewer Sailors at a fleet command than
billets funded.
According to OPNAV Force Manpower and Assessments (OPNAV N122), an average of
8.4 Sailors out of 100 were not available due to this friction in 2009. OPNAV N122
(2009) notes that, across the Navy, shore billets were reduced in parallel with decreases
in Navy end strength, which reduced the ability to fill billet gaps at sea. Belcher et al.
(2016) note that available personnel for sea and shore duty depends on the total number of
U.S. Navy personnel. As seen in Table 2.5, the number of available personnel is the total
end strength minus the transients, trainees, students, patients, prisoners, and holdees. There
were imbalances of Navy fleet personnel distribution from FY 06 through FY 13 (Belcher
et al., 2014) (see Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4. Fleet Imbalances from FY 06 through FY 13. Adapted from
Belcher et al. (2014).
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The horizontal red line represents total end strength. Shortfalls due to Individual Aug-
mentees (IAs) and limited duty (LIMDU) personnel, seen in orange and purple, show
excess overhead, reducing the availability of Sailors for sea and shore duty, seen in blue and
green (Belcher et al., 2014). The imbalance at sea begins to grow between December 2006
and March 2007, indicated by the dotted red line, and continues to progressively increase.
With fewer Sailors aboard the surface ships, whether due to a mismatch between billet
authorizations and the availability of Sailors, PCS gaps, or gaps due to rating rotations
(sea/shore friction), the Manning Control Authority (MCA) Fleet (USFF Command for the
Navy fleet and operational units) must manage ship manning to assure ship priorities are
met (Manning Control Authority Bureau (MCAB), n.d.). To meet these priorities, the MCA
may divert personnel from one command to another depending on required mission priority.
The ability to divert personnel provides flexibility to ensure that the ships with the greatest
priority get filled.
2.4.2 Personnel Attached but not on Board
Besides gapped billets, a Sailor currently attached to a command may not necessarily be
available for work on board. There may be one of several reasons why that Sailor may
not be on board or working on any specific day. Individuals in this situation are known
as non-available personnel (USD (P&R), 2015). The reasons for their non-availability can
vary from a few days of sickness to a long termmedical or family issue causing their removal
from the unit. Other reasons personnel may not be on the ship while deployed at sea are
listed below. This list is not all-inclusive.
• Emergency Leave: Commanding officers may authorize up to 30 days of emergency
leave, defined as “Leave granted for a personal or family emergency involving mem-
bers of their household, immediate family, or a sole surviving relative which requires
the Service member’s presence whenever the circumstances warrant and the military
situation permits” (Navy Personnel Command, PERS-91, 2013, p. 2).
• IndividualAugmentee (IA): Temporarily assigned to a different unit due to the Sailor’s
specialty. This assignment is typically in support of a specific military campaign.
The Sailor is still attached to the surface ship, also known as their “parent command,”
but are only performing work for the other command.
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• Dwell Time: “The period of time between operational deployments” (CNO, 2014, p.
2). Due to PERSTEMPO [Personnel Tempo] thresholds and necessary dwell time,
a Sailor who returns home from an IA deployment may not be able to fly out to the
deployed parent command without a period of time to recover, reunite with family,
and catch up on personal business.
• Short Term Hospitalization, Medical Diagnosis, or Injury: Not all medical issues and
injuries can be resolved at sea on a DDG or another ship within the Strike Group. In
such a case, the Sailor is sent ashore for treatment. The Sailor “will remain assigned
to their units ... when they are projected to heal, recover, and return to full duty within
... 30 days for sea-based units” (USD (P&R), 2015, Enc. 2, p. 9). If longer than 30
days, then the member will be transferred out of the command.
• Billet Gap: Personnel who have transferred for reasons other than standard rotation.
Examples include sexual assault expedited transfer, relief failed to screen for sea duty,
pregnancy, and administrative separation due to misconduct.
• Desertion: A Sailor is not declared a deserter until 30 days after being in an unau-
thorized absence (UA) status, facts indicate a desertion, or the Sailor is UA with the
intention or action of going to a foreign country (Navy Personnel Command (NPC),
2015b). Once declared a deserter, the Sailor remains attached to the command until
120 days thereafter when he or she is administratively transferred to the deserter com-
mand, Navy Absentee Collection and Information Center (NPC, 2015a). Therefore,
it could take as much as 150 days before the command administratively removes the
Sailor and can work to attain a new Sailor for the position. By the time a replacement
arrives, the gap can easily be one year or more.
The first three items are temporary in nature. Emergency leave is approximately two to
four weeks without the Sailor on board depending on the reason. The IA and Dwell Time
combined can easily keep a Sailor away from the command anywhere from six months to a
year and a half depending on the parent command’s and augmented command’s deployment
schedule. Medical issues may or may not be permanent, lasting anywhere from two weeks
to being permanently removed from the command due to LIMDU status. However, the
need for LIMDU status may not be known until almost 30 days of the Sailor being off ship.
Unplanned permanent departures cause a disruption in the billet due to a resulting billet
gap (time between departure of one Sailor and the arrival of the relief). This disruption
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is due to administrative paperwork processing time to remove the Sailor from the billet, to
identify a relief, and for the relief to arrive at the command. The resulting gap can easily
be between six months to a year, if not more. For most of these issues, the end result is
Type Commander (TYCOM) “unidentified” manning shortfalls (i.e., shortfalls that are not
easily seen on the command’s manning document). The resultant workload is passed on to
the command’s remaining personnel until a replacement arrives.
2.5 Manpower Historical Changes
We need to figure out how to have the fewest number of people possible, and
then build [ships] to make them as effective as they need to be.
- Admiral J. M. Boorda, CNO, U.S. Navy
(Winston et al., 1995, p. i)
With the DoD requirement to minimize military personnel, as previously discussed in
Section 2.3, the assumption is made in manpower models that all personnel are on board,
are fully trained, and work at an “average” level of performance. The minimal manpower
for the DDG is built upon these assumptions. However, from 2002 through 2009, the DDG
was the U.S. Navy surface platform with the greatest reduction in manpower. The DDG
reduction was about 23% below what was thought to be minimal manning prior to 2002,
mostly affecting lower pay grades (Rodney et al., 2009). The study found that, during this
time frame, due to increased U.S. military efforts, IAs were increased, affecting as much as
1% of enlisted manning. For a crew of 280, that is a single source average decrease of 2.8
enlisted Sailors.
TheNavymade numerous changes (mostly independently) from 2000 through 2009, causing
such manpower decreases. As a result, the GAO report (2010) noted the fact that the Navy
did not have a good analytic basis for reductions made to surface ship crew sizes. The GAO
report noted that the lack of analysis for Cruisers and Destroyers resulted in the lack of
assurance that the Navy “had appropriately sized its crews to maintain materiel readiness
and accomplish necessary tasks aboard its ships” (GAO, 2011, p. 1).
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2.5.1 Smart Ship Program, 1996–2000: A Test of Optimized Manning
From 1985 to 2000, the Navy budget was reduced by about 40% (Spindel et al., 2000).
With such budgetary reductions, the Navy needed to revise the way it considered shipboard
manpower. Because personnel are one of the most costly portions of the Navy budget,
cutting back personnel made sense. Additionally, numerous publications in the 1990s dis-
cuss excessive U.S. Navy warship manning and associated personnel cost (whether direct
or indirect) concerns, to include Bost, Mellis, and Dent (1995), Winston et al. (1995), along
with seven more studies cited by Spindel et al. (2000, p. 13). These papers indicated
concerns that manpower was not being calculated properly. Overall, the papers concluded
that NAVMAC was overstating the minimal manpower requirements necessary to complete
the Navy Strategic Plan and mission; they recommended review of watchstation consoli-
dation and/or technology investment. “Military transformation” was the phrase being used
throughout these 1990s manning discussions, which continued with President Bush’s secu-
rity strategy of 2001 and the Secretary of Defense 2002 Annual Report to the President and
the Congress.
Papers in the early 2000s pointed to the need for better training and elimination of redundant
staff, as well as misleading comparisons to foreign navies, as solutions to what they saw
as excessive personnel. In a review of reduced manning initiatives, Hinkle and Glover
(2004) noted in their paper that U.S. Navy leaders know “a smaller, better-trained, more
stabilized crew could mean a more capable, more professional warfighting team” (p. 2,
emphasis added). Bost et al. (1995) provide a historical illustration of unnecessary manning
in the U.S. Army where five personnel were needed to fire weapons, but a sixth soldier just
stood there. In the end, they determined that the sixth was previously used to hold the
horses (“horse-holder”) and, in fact, was no longer needed. The authors also point out that
it took several more years before the U.S. Army removed the sixth person. They made
the point that due to “resistance to change,” the U.S. Navy does not actually minimize
required manning. They stated that the U.S. Navy is overmanned compared to the practice
of foreign navies. When comparing to other navies, however, they did not account for
overall requirements above and beyond the base mission of the vessels for each country. On
a dissenting note, Hinkle and Glover (2004), in their review, found that foreign navies had
a need to significantly augment crews when forward deployed due to increased workload
(p. 17).
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In addition to the concern of potentially overstating the manpower requirement, between
1990 and 2000, Navy end strength steeply declined, with the Navy losing more than
200,000 Sailors (Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), 2017). Furthermore, Moore,
Hattiangadi, Gasch, and Sicilia (2002) determined there were “concerns that the standard
process may be overly affected by culture or hindered by outdated policies and business
processes” (p. 8) as discussed in Bost et al.’s “horse-holder” article (1995).
The combination of suggested manpower reduction and technology increase had been
suggested in 1995. Bost et al. (1995) reviewed the workload used in the creation of
ship requirements using such terms as previously laid out in manpower methodology,
Section 2.2.3 (i.e., operational manning, planned maintenance, corrective maintenance,
own unit support, etc.). They also noted that certain portions of the NAF/NSWW could
be pared down through automated systems. They end with a brief comment, “Reduced
shipboard manning effectively will require this total organization effort” (p. 93).
Navy leadership heard the concerns and implemented a “smart ship” program. A 1997Navy
letter from Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet stated that the report by
theWinston et al. (1995), specifically, was the impetus for Navy leadership to begin a “smart
ship” program on USS Yorktown (CG 48) in 1996 (Moore, Hattiangadi, et al., 2002). This
program included cutting approximately 15% of ship’s company and augmenting shipboard
systems with greater automation (Spindel et al., 2000). The program meant to determine
manpower reductions “without impacting mission readiness, ship integrity, or quality of
service” (Hinkle & Glover, 2004, p. 9). This singular vessel program showed a reduction in
personnel on board surface ships to be possible. It demonstrated “how technology insertion
and changes in procedure can reduce manning, maintain capability and improve shipboard
quality of life” (p. 3).
In 2000, the Naval Research Advisory Committee examined the “smart ship” program re-
sults and other worldwide sources of shipboard optimized manning and found potentials
for cost reduction. Technological advances, both current and expected, along with highly
educated Sailors, were expected to enhance the shipboard environment and allow for re-
duced manpower. This goal to optimize manning has an overarching construct to ensure
warfighting capability with a minimum number of Sailors (see Figure 2.5).
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Figure 2.5. Graphical Description of Optimized Manning–Lowering Total
Ownership Cost while Maintaining the Necessary Warfighting Capabilities.
Source: Spindel et al. (2000).
Both the “smart ship” program results as well as research of foreign navy optimized man-
ning provided considerable evidence that a reduction in manning held realistic potential.
This evidence and validation of optimized manning along with budgetary concerns gave
U.S. Navy leadership the foundation necessary to begin reducing shipboard manning. In
order to achieve OptimizedManning as discussed by Spindel et al. (2000), multiple support-
ing requirements must be in place, to include expected systems automation, 100% manning
of billet requirements, more extensive support facilities ashore, consolidation of ratings,
and other factors (p. 27).
2.5.2 Optimal Manning Initiative: 2001–2006
Optimized manning discussions in the early 2000s indicate that not only was the Navy
interested in improving technology in order to achieve smaller crew sizes, but they were also
greatly interested in reducing the surface Navy operating costs by eliminating the “horse-
holders.” In 2001, the Navy proceeded forward with an initiative called “Optimal Manning”
that cut billets considered to be duplicative or unnecessary. The Commander, Naval Surface
Forces (COMNAVSURFOR) (2004), directed the implementation of Optimal Manning via
Naval message; called the “Optimal Manning Experiment,” the Navy designated USS
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Milius (DDG 69), USSMobile Bay (CG 53), and USS Boxer (LHD 4) as the test platforms
for optimal manning with USS George Washington (CVN 73) battlegroup testing the same
efficiencies while on their 2002 deployment. The experiment continued throughout an entire
operational cycle (COMNAVSURFOR, 2004). The message also discussed implemented
changes in watchstationmanning as well as lessons learned through the process. With a goal
of meeting a specific number of allowed billets, OPNAV N1 and USFF identified certain
billets as unnecessary and implemented cuts primarily through changing the ROC\POE
(NAVMAC Code 20, personal communication, January 7, 2018). Other policies, including
the Repair Party Manual (Naval Surface Forces, 2009), also saw changes. These changes
directly affected the corresponding manpower requirements within the SMD.
2.5.3 Navy Standard Workweek Available Working Time: 2002
In June of 2002, NAVMAC increased the time available for work, including watch, mainte-
nance and/or daily workload, for the NAF/NSWW from 67 to 70 hours (DCNO (MPT&E),
2002). Taken from the time allotted for service diversion, these three hours did not increase
the total available time as shown in Table 2.4.
While annual savings seem to accrue quickly with even a small change in manpower, we
must remember that one Sailor does not automatically equal another in terms of training
and capability. Navy manpower requirements rely on the NAF/NSWW to optimize the
personnel necessary to accomplish the ship’s mission. Adding three hours per week of
available working time for each position on board the ship makes a significant difference in
enlisted manning. For example, say a DDG is manned with 280 personnel; using simplistic
calculations and assuming constant workload billets, an increase of three hours available for
work could reduce manning requirements by approximately 12 to 14 Sailors throughout the
ship. Across the fleet, a cut of 12 to 13 Sailors would result in the reduction of approximately
815 Sailors. The 2018 E-5 burdened rate is $86,531.39 per year, which includes base
pay, allowances (Cost of Living, CONUS/OCONUS Housing, Uniform, and Subsistence),
retired pay accrual, Social Security, health care (Defense Health Care Accrual), special
and/or incentive pay, and change of station costs (OPNAVN100B, personal communication,
October 6, 2017). Based on the 2018 E-5 burdened rate, increasing work available time
across the fleet could mean that one single simplistic change in manpower saves the Navy
more than $70.5 Million USD annually. While this example demonstrates potential cost
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savings, it cannot be assumed that any one of the Sailors on board can complete any of the
Ship’s tasks, let alone account for gapped billets. .
2.5.4 Personal needs, Fatigue, and Delay (PF&D) / Productivity
Allowance (PA) Reduction: 2002
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, leadership changed the PF&D/PA in 2002, reducing the
allowance from 20% to a range of 2–8%. This reduction, though somewhat small in nature,
effectively eliminates as many as 5 to 8 personnel due to the application of decreased
PF&D/PA to OUS (NAVMAC Code 40, 2017). Along with the other changes made during
this time frame, the PF&D/PA reduction appeared to create greater hardships for crew
members by artificially raising productivity assumptions without any corresponding policy
changes or technological improvements.
2.5.5 Make Ready / Put Away (MRPA) Reduction: 2002
Getting ready for and finishing up maintenance tasks can, at times, take longer than the
maintenance itself, making MRPA an essential manpower calculation. In the same letter
directing a revision to the PF&D/PA in 2002, leadership also directed a reduction in the
MRPA, from 30% to 15%. Therefore, for all PM, the revision affected the time provided
to take care of the collection of tools, tag-out requirements, and complete the evolution.
Again, this artificial increase in productivity assumptions happened without any policy or
technological improvements. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, leadership changed the MRPA
back to 30% in 2013.
2.5.6 Pay and Personnel Afloat (PAPA) Detachments: 2003
Pay and Personnel Afloat (PAPA) Detachments were intended to consolidate the workload
for surface ship pay and personnel support from each individual ship to a dedicated shore
facility. The formation of detachments allowed a two-thirds cut of the Personnelman (PN)
andDisbursingClerk (DK) personnel (merged to form the Personnel Specialist (PS) rating in
2005) from surface ships. Additionally, the consolidation required fewer support personnel
and, due to the locality, civilians could be utilized (Rodney et al., 2009). Therefore, the
consolidation was seen as a win-win effort: cut manning, improve accuracy, and obtain
efficiency all at the same time. According to Rodney et al., experiments were run in 2001
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and implemented from 2003 to 2007 for all surface ships except CVNs, showing a nominal
change for DDGs (see Table 2.6).
Table 2.6. DDG Manpower Reductions in the PS (DK / PN) Ratings due to
PAPA Detachments, September 2003 through March 2009. Adapted from
Rodney et al. (2009).
Ship class averages Sep 2003 March 2009 Delta
BA 5 2 -3
DDG Flights I & II
COB 6 2 -4
Previously having six personnel current on board (COB) for pay and personnel matters, the
DDGs decreased to two.
2.5.7 Individual Augmentees (IAs): 2006–2010
Though the call for Navy IA support to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan began in 2003,
IAs increased dramatically between 2006 and 2010. According to Golfin et al. (2011), in
2006, the Navy had 424 enlisted personnel in an IA status. In 2010, that IA number had
increased to 2,211 enlisted personnel. Billets authorized (BA) that were lost to IAs in FY 08
and FY 09 in select enlisted ratings reached as much as 5.8% (see Table 2.7).
Table 2.7. Percent of Sea-Duty Billets Authorized Lost to Active Component
Individual Augmentees. Adapted from Golfin et al. (2011).
Enlisted Rating FY 2008 FY 2009
Electronics Technician (ET) 2.1 2.0
Fire Controlman (FC) 3.2 4.7
Information System Technician (IT) 5.8 5.5
Operations Specialist (OS) 3.0 3.6
Aviation Electronics Technician (AT) 1.1 3.0
Aviation Structural Mechanic (AM) 1.1 1.9
Aviation Ordnanceman (AO) 1.0 1.7
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As discussed in Section 2.4.2, because the IAs are still administratively attached to their
command and are not replaced, Sailors left on board the DDG, which is already “optimally”
manned, end up covering the workload of the absent Sailor.
2.5.8 Top Six Alignment: 2006
The 2000s also saw changes in the “Top Six,” the Navy’s E-4 through E-9 pay grades.
According to OPNAV N1 (2009), starting in 2000, the Navy purposely increased seniority
in order to improve technological knowledge and experience across the fleet due to the
advanced systems on board vessels. Therefore, the Top Six pay grades saw an increase in
authorized billets from FY 00 to FY 06 from 69% to 73.25% of the entire Navy enlisted
force (OPNAV N1, 2009). Combined with force restructures, the Top Six increases caused
the Navy to exceed the Top Six percentage for which they had budgeted (OPNAVN1, 2009).
In 2006, the Navy began the “Top Six Alignment,” also known as the “Top Six Rolldown,” a
manning initiative to reduce these costs by rolling down approximately 5,175 at-sea surface
ship billets from the required pay grade to the next lower pay grade (Rodney et al., 2009). In
addition, the alignment would have the benefit of improved sea/shore rotation (considered
a critical factor in the alignment decision-making process) along with increased promotion
opportunities (OPNAV N1, 2009).
The effects of such a reversal can be problematic, especially without review of the initial
billet upgrades made in 2000. The Top Six Alignment focused more on improving sea/shore
rotations than on “reversing” the effects of changes made in 2000. For a particular billet,
the result of the alignment has the effect of decreased experience; take, for example, an
E-8 billet which is rolled down to be an E-7 billet. With the Navy detailing standard of
“one up - one down,” an E-8 billet can be filled by an E-7, E-8, or E-9. However, once a
billet is rolled down to E-7, the billet can now only be filled by an E-6, E-7, or E-8. The
difference between an E-6 and an E-8 is a large gap in experience, as much as six or more
years (Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, 2014).
Though smaller crews require an overall more highly trained and experienced crew, with
the Top Six Alignment in 2006, Navy ships saw a decrease in seniority, effecting an overall
decrease in crew expertise (Readiness and Sustainment of the Navy’s Surface Fleet, 2009b).
With a decrease in experience comes a decrease in on-the-job training (OJT) quality for
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more junior Sailors, and an increase in expected time for task completion. Essentially, if
indirectly, the Top Six Alignment increased the individual Sailor workload.
2.5.9 Afloat Training Group (ATG) Manning Reductions: 2007
The Afloat Training Group (ATG) provides training to the U.S. Navy Surface Fleet. They
“serve as the TYCOM’s executive agent for training and assessment” (Commander, Naval
Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVSURFPAC) & Commander, Naval Surface
Force Atlantic (COMNAVSURFLANT), 2012, p. 1-2). From 2003 to 2009, there was
a definite disparity between billets authorized (BA) and current on board (COB) of ATG
manning (see Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.6. Afloat Training Group Enlisted Manning, 2003–2009. Source:
Rodney et al. (2009).
COB, represented by the red line, is continually below the BA, represented by the blue
line. FY 06 shows a difference of more than 300 Sailors. The difference affected ATG’s
ability to provide training and support to the fleet as a whole. Additionally, according to
Rodney et al. (2009), this graph does not provide the entire gap. The authors note that
the workload increase resulting from decreased manning was exacerbated by the increased
workload resulting from the merging of commands, changes made to requirements for ship
workups, and high OPTEMPOs (Rodney et al., 2009).
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According to Rodney et al. (2009), ATG could still perform their certification mission but
emergent events and unit-level training became low priority. Unit-level training is where
surface Sailors need the most guidance due to high personnel turnover prior to the Basic
Phase of the training cycle (Rodney et al., 2009). Due to ATGmanning decreases, it became
necessary to plan two to three months in advance in order to meet tasking requirements.
Furthermore, the 2009CNA study points out an increase in certification extensionswhich, in
their analysis, tends to indicate lessATG support due to the timeline tomeet requirements. In
testimony, the Director, Force Structure and Readiness Issues, Government Accountability
Office (2017) stated, “as of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser
and destroyer crews homeported in Japan had expired – including mobility-seamanship and
air warfare – had been expired for 5 months or more ... more than a fivefold increase ... since
... 2015” (p. 7). A reduction in manning in one area, such as training commands, can easily
affect the surface fleet as a whole; add to this mix an intense OPTEMPO for Japan-based
ships, and even what seem slight manpower reductions, if not strategically planned with an
eye to the larger picture, can have far-reaching consequences.
2.5.10 Rating Mergers: 2000–2008
Another impact onmanning in the 2000s came in the form of Sailor rating mergers, of which
there were ten from 2000–2008. These mergers had minimal impact on SMD requirements
but did serve to reduce some requirements through the optimization ofworkload (NAVMAC,
2008, Tab G). For details of what ratings were merged and when, see Table 2.8.
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Table 2.8. History of Rating Mergers, 2000–2008. Adapted from CNO
(2008); NAVMAC (2008).
Final Rating Merged Ratings Year NAVADMIN
CTT EW/CTT 2000 045/00
AM AMS/AMH 2000 153/00
SK SK/AK 2002 418/02
PS PN/DK 2004 295/04
HM HM/DT 2005 214/05
IT IT/CTO 2005 338/05
MC JO/PH/LI/DM 2005 339/05
GM GM/TM 2007 049/07
YN CTA/YN 2007 118/07
LS SK/PC 2008 326/08
The optimization of workload through merged ratings (i.e., centralization of work) sounds
good, but, in practice, an increased workload overhead (OJT) during the merger period,
while the merging personnel learn the specialty of the other rating(s), means that the
optimized workload is not realized right away and, in fact, creates a ship burden until
personnel are fully trained.
2.5.11 Manning Effects on Maintenance
According to GAO (2017b), Navy officials have determined that smaller crews due to
optimal manning initiatives are partly responsible for long-term increased maintenance
costs due to deferred maintenance. Beland and Quester (1991) studied the duration of
Navy ship downtime as a response variable against various explanatory variables that could
possibly lead to maintenance issues. They found that “better material [sic] condition of
ships was consistently associated with higher levels of manning relative to requirements
and with smaller proportions of new crew” (p. 120). Rodney et al. (2009) also addressed
what changes and what maintenance issues reduced manpower in surface ships from 2002
to 2009 created and how that affected reporting. These maintenance issues included an
increase in the backlog of the Current Ship’s Maintenance Project, 2008 Cruiser-Destroyer
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(CRUDES) Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) failures and an increase in Casualty
Reports (CASREPs). They also reported a high correlation between manning changes
and an increase in CASREPs, the only highly correlated change. They specifically noted,
however, that CASREP increases could be caused by more than just manning changes.
For example, there was a concerted effort to have the ships report CASREPs due to prior
low/inaccurate reporting. This was likely due to how the Commanding Officers felt about
CASREPs as discussed by Ponce (2004). Ponce stated that until “recently,” Commanding
Officers felt a sense of failure if their ship was unable to get underway to complete a mission
due to a materiel failure due to Navy culture that views the number of CASREPs “as [a]
measure of how ‘squared away’ a ship was” (Ponce, 2004, p. 53).
Unsurprisingly, the Navy made many of its manpower changes since the turn of the century
with an eye to cutting costs. A report by the GAO (2017b) attempted to assess if any
correlation between maintenance costs to personnel costs exists by gathering data on the
change in costs for personnel and maintenance over each ship class’s optimal manning
period (see Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7. Average Annual Ship Personnel and Maintenance Cost Changes
for the Indicated Surface Ship Class’ Optimal Manning Period (2004–2010
for the DDG Ship Class). Source: GAO (2017b).
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The DDG ship class includes costs from 2004 through 2010 (GAO, 2017b). The GAO study
concluded that the lack of shipboard personnel due to Optimal Manning directly increased
the maintenance costs. During the time frame of Optimal Manning, however, many other
changes had the potential to drive up maintenance costs for the DDGs, to include: further
changes to the manning structure, changes that lowered maintenance requirements, and an
increased OPTEMPO which decreased maintenance availability (VCNO, 2017). Though
there appears to be a direct correlation to Optimal Manning years, it is surprising that the
GAO only briefly discussed other potential contributors to the increased maintenance costs
since it is difficult to directly attribute the changes in maintenance costs only to Optimized
Manning. Clearly, however, linkages exist between manning levels and maintenance per-
formance. The maintenance changes during that time frame will be further reviewed in
Section 2.8.
2.6 Risk to the Fleet
Gaps between true manning requirements, Condition I and III surface ship requirements
known as “spaces,” and actual manning cause risk to the fleet. The gap can be created
during several processes, including funding/budget, personnel assignments, and actual
Sailors currently on board, known as “faces.” Those four processes are known as pillars of
manpower (see Figure 2.8).
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Figure 2.8. “Levels of Risk.” Adapted from NAVMAC (2017b).
NAVMAC describes the disparities between the pillars as “Levels of Risk” (2017b). This
divergence between a vessel’s minimum manpower requirement and actual manning be-
comes a fleet risk. The direct changes to manpower requirements, discussed in Section 2.5,
reduce the “spaces.” The “spaces” reduction, in turn, decreases each of the other pillars.
The ultimate decrease in personnel exacerbates workload for the remaining Sailors on board.
2.7 Navy Training Historical Changes
When Sailors think of Navy training, they tend to consider any of the following, likely
dependent on the individual’s particular command (not all-inclusive).
• Annual training requirements: General Military Training (GMT), Information As-
surance, Bystander Intervention, etc.
• Emergent Navy-wide training
• Emergent command-focused training
• “A”- and “C”- Schools
• Warfare qualification (Personnel Qualification Standard [PQS])
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• Ship-specific Job Qualification Requirements (JQR)
• On-the-job training for a given watchstation or position
• In-rate training, in general
• Surface ship workups: Basic, Intermediate, and Advanced Phases
• General Quarters (GQ)
• Shipboard departmental and team drills
• Shipboard departmental and divisional training
In essence, “training” is broadly defined, with different expectations depending on the Navy
echelon and current command focus. The definition, as it applies to the NAF/NSWW, has
also changed over time. Currently, the NAF/NSWW allots for seven training hours, which
includes only ship-wide drills. The training allotment does not encompass all levels of
training requirements.
2.7.1 Navy Standard WorkWeek (NSWW) Training Definition (1969)
Ideally, if we are to match time allotments to the real world, training time would adapt
as training requirements adapted and would include all stages of training, giving Sailors
adequate time to complete their requirements. When the Navy initially drafted and assessed
the SMD, training included “three elements: Formal Training, Proficiency Training, and
Drills and Practices” (Bright et al., 1969, p. 25). The report points out that training
requirements are mandated for completion, so including such a category is necessary.
Furthermore, Bright et al. separated out the training requirements for watchstanders and
non-watchstanders, the (appropriate) assumption being that watchstanders are in continual
training. Non-watchstanders were expected to train 1.0 hour per week for ship-wide training
and 2.0 hours per week for practice and drills, while watchstanders were expected to train
0.67 and 1.33 hours per week respectively (Bright et al., 1969). Bright et al. concluded
by defining “training allowance” to account for “proficiency training ... normal day-to-day
on watch [training], on station [training], or on-the-job practice” (p. 26). The “training
allowance” added up to 1.5 hours per week in 1970 (as cited in Moore et al., 2001).
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2.7.2 Navy Availability Factor (NAF) / Navy Standard Work Week
(NSWW) Training Definition (2018)
Currently, training time includes only the largest training, that required of all hands, and
Sailors must adjust their schedules, sometimes sacrificing personal time or time for other
work, to meet mandatory training requirements. The current Navy manpower policy de-
scribes the “training” portion of the NAF/NSWW as “factored to reflect those scheduled
events (e.g., general drills, engineering casualty drills, damage control) for all hands”
(DCNO (MPT&E), 2016, p. D-3). As the references have changed over the years, the
guidelines have clearly departed from accounting for a training allowance beyond warfare
ship-wide drills and practice drills. Because training time no longer includes anything
beyond GQ, other aspects of training are now included in the service diversion and / or
personal time allotments. This shift directly moves the burden of training workload to the
Sailor who must take the time needed to meet training requirements through time man-
agement and prioritization. Depending on how well the Sailor can manage their time and
prioritize efficiently, they may be forced to sacrifice in other areas, whether in their work
performance or sleep.
2.7.3 Revolution in Training (RIT): 2001-2006
The revolution is inevitable; it is underway outside the Navy; we must harness
it, focus it, and bend it to the Navy’s needs.
- Revolution in Training Executive Review Team
(CNO Staff, 2001, p. ix)
In October 2000, the CNO directed a panel to conduct a full review of Navy training
with the goal of overall improvement. He directed the panel to review the alignment of
Navy organizations, review new technology and its potential use, realize civilian sector
collaboration opportunities, and take a look at how to best develop learning opportunities
for Sailor professional and personal improvement (CNO Staff, 2001). The Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) had shown a shortfall for student billets from FY 02 to FY 07
that affected the ability to man the fleet. The review found that, by FY 07, the student
shortfall would cause a gap of 9,366 billets at sea. By modernizing schoolhouse training
programs and using technology where appropriate, the Navy would potentially be able to
fill the gapped billets (CNO Staff, 2001).
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Background
The review team found inefficiencies with funding flow to training requirements, meaning
something did not quite add up (see Figure 2.9).
Figure 2.9. Flow of Training Funds, 2000–2001. Source: CNO Staff (2001).
Similarly, the training organizations showed fragmentation due to a lack of centralization
(CNO Staff, 2001). The CNO Staff also found five training reorganizations since 1971 with
numerous studies notating the need for a centralized training organization (p. 19). Due to
these findings, the Navy determined alignment of training organizations as an appropriate
next step, creating an “integrated training organization,” also known as a Revolution in
Training (RIT) (CNO Staff, 2001).
The review team found and suggested several other aspects prior to RIT implementation in
2001. Some of the solutions found were based upon experiences seen both in the U.S. Navy
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and the civilian industry (CNO Staff, 2001). Most Sailors interviewed by the CNO Staff
expressed concerns about needing more time to train. The team found that industry leaders
had shown that e-learning and distance learning could partially solve the training time issue
(CNOStaff, 2001). In addition, they found that the private sector experienced “extraordinary
leaps in effectiveness, efficiency, and performance” through technology (CNO Staff, 2001,
p. 36). Sailors reported to the review team that OJT, specifically, was the most effective
training. Considering the review team’s findings, that RIT encompassed, in large part, a
move to computer-based training (CBT) and OJT, makes a lot of sense as does the core
of RIT: the science of learning. The CNO Staff (2001) stated that part of this process
would require buy-in from khaki leadership to include their understanding that “Sailors
must be able to learn while in their commands and on the job” (p. 36). The review team
encompassed their findings and solutions (see Figure 2.10).
Figure 2.10. Navy Learning Model, 2001. Adapted from CNO Staff (2001).
This model illustrates how learning can be enhanced through multiple teaching sources,
whether through a computer, peers, or an instructor. However, the learning model will
likely fail when only one piece of the model is used without the comprehensive whole.
Results
The Inspector General received fleet concerns about Sailor knowledge levels when departing
“A”-Schools and anecdotal reports about CBT (Navy Inspector General (IG), 2009). Due to
this, they began a “Review and Assessment on ‘Computer Based Training’ inMay 2008” (p.
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ii). For their report, they defined CBT as “individual or group self-paced instruction using
a computer as a primary training medium, to include web-delivered Navy E-Learning” (p.
ii). The study found that by 2008, 34% of Navy “A”-School curriculumwas CBT. They also
note that RIT provided funding for planning and updating curriculum, decreasing timelines
for curriculum updates. Even with this funding, the Navy IG found that course update
timeframes did not decrease, and, in fact, increased for some curricula. Due to the need
for contracting, developing, and delivering updated curricula, the process could easily take
eighteen months (Navy IG, 2009).
The Navy IG noted numerous additional problems. Learning theory was not capitalized in
the move to CBT curricula (i.e., blended instructor and technology training is better than
relying only on technology), and a link was not being made from the learning material
to Sailor work (Navy IG, 2009). The Navy IG also found that quality of Navy curricula
varied widely. Some curricula were placed in a computer forum with no front-end analysis
(as required by Navy instruction) while different government contractors developed others
without a centralized standard, resulting in varying quality (Navy IG, 2009). In addition,
the Navy IG found that no centralized agency existed to verify the validity of the CBT
instituted.
The Navy IG’s report cited several ways in which technology growth outpaced real-world
training abilities and locations. The review found that the growth of technology outpaced
funding (Navy IG, 2009). The schools fell behind in their ability to consistently meet the
needs of the students while using CBT. Additionally, the Navy IG (2009) found that more
than half of the training commands’ 26,000 computer workstations were more than six years
old and suffered from insufficient bandwidth. These issues contributed to course “time out”
complications requiring frequent computer reloads and downtime.
The Navy IG’s report also noted that RIT realized significant efficiencies in Sailor transition
time from Basic Training to the fleet (“street to fleet”) as well as resources, to include
manpower and infrastructure. The Navy gained some cost savings through the replacement
of the schoolhouse cadre of subject-matter experts (SMEs) with instructors who had less
expertise (Navy IG, 2009). The Navy IG (2009) found that CBT reduced the time junior
Sailors were being led by an instructor. Combined with a lack of expertise in those who
were at the command, the Navy IG saw a decrease in Sailorization during the CBT review
48
through reduced communication skills, military bearing, and wearing of the uniform (p.
16).
Inherent assumptions challenged RIT, further decreasing manning capacity and increasing
pressure on Sailors. The first inherent assumption was that new Sailors would all be well-
versed in computer technology (Navy IG, 2009). Second, the Navy IG found that the RIT
assumed that the young Sailor would be able to competently learn from computers on their
own. Third, RIT assumed that Sailors would prefer CBT over classroom instruction (Navy
IG, 2009). However, the Inspector General found that most junior Sailors did not have
any experience in learning from only a computer terminal all day for five days a week (p.
6). In the end, CBT resulted in sending “operators” instead of the high-need “maintainers”
to the fleet (Navy IG, 2009). With an increased OPTEMPO along with fewer personnel,
RIT’s dependence on CBT decreased the time to train new personnel, pressurizing the OJT
system.
Navy leadership noted decreases in Sailor ability while requirements increased, which also
concerned Congress. In his congressional testimony, the Deputy Commander for Surface
Warfare, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 21) stated:
Blended Training Solution (combination of instructor lead training, lab training,
computer-based training, simulation training, etc.) requires assessment if a
Sailor’s knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) are not adequate to support the
work assigned ... there is some concern that the pendulum has swung too far
away from traditional schoolhouse based training and there needs to be a better
balance between the two forms. (Readiness and Sustainment of the Navy’s
Surface Fleet, 2009a, p. 19)
The Navy IG (2009) discussed the need to assess KSAs within training programs to ensure
Sailors arrive to the fleet ready to meet their work requirements. The Navy IG found that
the necessary skill sets were not necessarily being completely provided due to a lack of
specific learning objectives, finding that Sailors arrived at the fleet missing basic knowledge
about their jobs, which, in turn, demonstrated that the pendulum had swung too far with
CBT. Sailors now needed to arrive to the fleet with the ability to operate and maintain their
equipment. Instead, theNavy IG noted, “fleet feedback indicates Sailors reporting from “A”-
School have only a marginal ability to recognize equipment and operate its components” (p.
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10) (specific ratings were not provided in the report). The Navy IG (2009) found that some
Sailors required twice as much time to qualify for watches, placing greater strain on the
ship’s personnel. In the end, without hands-on training and discussion, RIT’s dependence
on CBT resulted in a long-term lack of critical thinking and ability to troubleshoot, whether
with mechanical or electrical systems.
2.7.4 On-the-Job Training (OJT)
Training new Sailors while they fill their role on the ship, or OJT, is a way to provide
effective training to an individual while reducing costs and to obtain efficiencies through
sending personnel to their command earlier. In this situation, an informed and (preferably)
proficient Sailor guides the new Sailor in their work, helping them learn their required
skills through daily side-by-side instruction, which provides the structure of the training. If
implemented correctly, OJT’s hands-on approach provides a lot of benefits. As its definition
requires, OJT is provided by a Sailor’s more experienced peers. As noted by USFF (2017c),
“The quality of that OJT is largely dependent upon the ship, its Commanding Officer, and
the level of knowledge of the individuals assigned to that ship” (p. 48). However, for OJT to
work properly, both the experienced and new Sailor need adequate materials. USFF noted
that “no one interviewed could identify a resource available to them to learn how installed
equipment was intended for use together in various operational scenarios. Not surprisingly,
practices vary substantially” (pp. 82–83).
Missing the Basics
RIT was meant to enhance but, in some cases, replaced basics, over-burdening the ship as a
whole. In 2003, as a part of RIT, untrained officers arrived at the fleet with a set of CDs to
learn SurfaceWarfare Officer skills and initial knowledge in lieu of the traditional six month
Division Officers’ Course (USFF, 2017c, p. 162). Due to this change, the ship’s Wardroom
and Chief’s Mess became burdened with training to the very basics every time a new Ensign
arrived. The same happens when enlisted Sailors arrive to the fleet with less knowledge of
the basics; they are forced to rely on their peers and resident leadership, increasing pressure
and needed time for requirements all around, furthering the gap between manpower models
and actual work time required.
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Peers
In the case of the Navy, peers are not necessarily trained to provide training to another
person nor eager to do so. The way the Navy resolves some of these issues is through
advancement examinations to assure knowledge levels. A Sailor, however, learns only as
much as their trainer provides at whatever quality is provided. Even though the training is
through an MRC, JQR, or a PQS, the quality ranges since various individuals have differing
capacities as well as available time to train others. The cost benefits are high, but, as Sisson
(2001) states, “The cost of doing it properly in the first place may be obvious, but this is far
outweighed by the even higher (but hidden) cost of workers who are poorly trained through
unrealistic time limits” (p. 75). OJT is an excellent way to train personnel as they learn by
doing. However, Sisson notes that OJT is not always successful if the leadership on board
the ship does not remain engaged in the process by supporting the trainers (pp. 91–92).
2.7.5 Retention of Information
The Navy is aware of the importance of regular sleep, including for the retention of informa-
tion. Research shows that rapid eye movement (REM) sleep is important for the retention
of information (Fogel, Smith, & Cote, 2007; Karni, Tanne, Rubenstein, Askenasy, & Sagi,
1994). Sailors need the time to sleep in order to retain the information they learn, whether as
a new Sailor or one who is in a leadership position. As discussed further in Section 2.11.3,
direction has been provided and training has begun in order to transition the entire Surface
Navy to circadian watchbills instead of rotating shift watchbills (COMNAVSURFPAC &
COMNAVSURFLANT, 2017). As stated in the instruction, the expectation is a greater
amount of sleep for Sailors.
2.7.6 Accuracy in Reporting
Increased fleet training requirements, whether due to OJT or a change in training method-
ologies, leads to longer hours, and, when those hours exceed available work time let alone
actual available time in a day, Sailors may find themselves in a position where they face an
ethical decision as to whether to falsely report training completion for which they simply
did not have the available time. In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017, the
House of Representatives expressed concern about a recent report written by the Strategic
Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College. In this report, Wong and Gerras (2015) dis-
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cussed the extent of Army training requirements and how the number of required training
hours exceeded available working hours. The House mandated that the military services
review training requirements because “the committee is concerned that the ever-increasing
training demand forces military leaders at multiple levels in the chain of command to make
ethical decisions between actually training to standard or falsifying reporting, as well as
choosing between training for mission essential tasks and those perceived to be of lesser
value” (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, 2016, p. 121). When
pressed for time as discussed in Section 2.7.2, U.S. Navy Sailors will potentially sacrifice
their integrity through false documentation. This study asks a follow-up question. Is the
Navy also fooling itself when it comes to training? Beyond concern over false reporting,
lack of time for training creates numerous other concerns.
2.7.7 Warfare Qualifications: 1977, 2010
Personal time being used for voluntary training, to advance one’s own knowledge, would
understandably fall under Personal Time; however, warfare qualification is no longer vol-
untary. After the 1969 advent of the SMD, the Navy introduced a Surface Warfare (officer)
qualification in 1975 and an enlisted version followed in 1977. For the next 33 years, enlisted
warfare qualification remained voluntary and considered “above and beyond” the normal
requirements, hence presumed to be accounted for in Sailor personal (Non-Available) time.
However, in 2010, warfare qualification became mandatory for enlisted personnel (CNO,
2010a) and continues to be mandatory (CNO, 2018). There has been no corresponding
change made to the NAF/NSWW allowances.
2.8 Historical Changes to Surface Ship Maintenance
Undergoing several shifts over the years, currently, Navy ship maintenance falls into one of
three levels of maintenance for the U.S. Navy surface fleet: Organizational, Intermediate,
and Depot level maintenance. Organizational maintenance is completed by the Sailors on
board the ship. Intermediate maintenance is currently completed by Regional Maintenance
Centers (RMCs). Depot maintenance is completed by a shipyard, either public or private.
Regular maintenance, whether by shipboard personnel or an intermediate maintenance
facility, is crucial for keeping the Navy’s fleet viable throughout the projected service life
of its ships. In an attempt to ensure the efficiency and flexibility of the fleet’s maintenance
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resources, the U.S. Navy has made several process changes over the years. The hope is that,
by providing better shore support for ship’s maintenance, the ship’s company can have a
greater focus on their daily work and the primary mission.
2.8.1 Ship Life Cyle Management: 1995–2009
From 1995 to 2009, no entity was responsible for ship life cycle management; the lack
of ship life cycle management results in the opposite effect on Sailors: decreased time
to focus on daily work and mission completion. The Navy abandoned ship life cycle
management in 1995 with the disestablishment of Planning and Engineering for Repairs and
Alterations (PERA), the entity responsible for the management (planning and execution)
of life cycle maintenance for each class of ship in the U.S. Navy (Kern, 1969). The
organization was disestablished during military Base Realignment and Closures (Balisle,
2010), resulting in a lack of centralized life cycle management. Therefore, the technical
requirements necessary in order to meet expected ship service life were not being met 100%
of the time (Readiness and Sustainment of the Navy’s Surface Fleet, 2009b). The loss of life
cycle maintenance planning to assure the ship makes it to the expected end of life “limits
the ability to accurately forecast maintenance requirements and translate them into credible
budget requests” (Readiness and Sustainment of the Navy’s Surface Fleet, 2009b, p. 22).
In addition, the lack of life cycle management causes the ships to deteriorate at a faster rate,
resulting in an increased burden on the Sailors at sea.
In May 2009, 14 years after the disestablishment of PERA, the Navy stood up the Sur-
face Ship Lifecycle Management (SSLCM) in order to meet the gap of tracking. Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) (2017b) shows that the SSLCM transitioned in 2010
to the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP). As of 2017,
SURFMEPP has nine detachments across the world with the mission of providing “central-
ized surface ship life cycle maintenance engineering, class maintenance and modernization
planning, and management of maintenance strategies” (Bauer, 2016, Slide 3). This techni-
cal support enables better planning for maintenance funding requirements and helps extend
the life of the surface ships.
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2.8.2 A Change in Planned Maintenance: 1996
In 1996, leadership determined to reduce PMS in order to initiate Optimal Manning.
Instead of shifting PMS requirements to shore as initially intended, the periodicity for
maintenance requirements were extended or eliminated altogether beginning with the CG
47 class (Baseman, 2000). In 1996, as much as 50% of required PMS was reduced for
ship’s force (Button, Martin, Sollinger, & Tidwell, 2015), resulting in decreased PMS man
hours across force revisions (see Figure 2.11).
Figure 2.11. PMS Man-Hour Reductions across Force Revisions. Adapted
from Baseman (2000).
Subsequently, the Navy saw evidence that a portion of materiel deficiencies resulted due to
this reduced maintenance (Balisle, 2010). Thus, reductions in PM workload were at least
partially offset by increases in CM workload.
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2.8.3 Removal of External Command Materiel and Readiness Assess-
ments: 1994–2009
A change in surface ship support took place between the years of 1994 and 2002, resulting
in ship deterioration and increased Sailor burden. During this time frame, materiel and
readiness assessments decreased from 73 in 1994 to 35 in 2002 (Fleet Review Panel,
2009). As of 2009, the requirement stood at 41. Most of these assessments were built
into the ship’s inter-deployment training cycle; only a handful were from 18 to 24 months
in periodicity regardless of Inter-Deployment Training Cycle. Though tedious and taxing,
external command materiel and readiness assessments, through the provision of training
and system expert direction, can help the crew. A decrease in materiel readiness can easily
result if an assist visit or assessment is removed without the assurance that the ship will, in
fact, self-assess appropriately or a different entity already covers or has taken the task for
that particular area of assessment. With a decrease in materiel readiness, the ships continue
to deteriorate, and Sailor burden continues to increase.
2.8.4 Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA) / Regional
Maintenance Center (RMC) Reorganization and Manning Re-
duction: 1997–2008
The closure of Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs) began in the 1990s
and continued at the turn of the century as bases closed or were integrated with the ship-
yards (GAO, 2017a). Leadership established seven RMCs in order to support intermediate
maintenance in 2004 and 2005 while absorbing four of the SIMAs, standing up the RMCs
integrated waterfront maintenance activity in order to reduce redundancies between multi-
ple commands (Rodney et al., 2009). Of the commands absorbed at each RMC, the SIMAs
had the largest number of military personnel assigned. Rodney et al. discuss that, over time,
the RMCs decreased military personnel, replacing the work with contractor support. The
RMCs now primarily contract out maintenance work instead of using Sailor labor as with
the old maintenance model.
The changes to on-shore maintenance resulted in fewer onshore billets, which can, in turn,
result in negative career progression, knowledge degradation, and maintenance backlogs
(see Figure 2.12 and Table 2.9).
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Figure 2.12. Combined Representation of BA and COB for Combined SIMA
and RMC Personnel through the Transition. Source: Rodney et al. (2009).
Table 2.9. Changes in Sea and Shore Billets: SIMA and RMC Personnel,
2004–2008. Adapted from Rodney et al. (2009).
SIMAs/RMCs ALNAV Change in Shore Billets ALNAV 2004 to 2008
Billets Shore Billets 2004 to 2008 Sea Billets Change %
RATING 2004 2008 2004 2008 SIMA/RMC ALNAV 2004 2008 Shore Sea
HT 667 73 1856 846 -594 -1010 2147 1709 -54% -20%
MM 660 338 6705 5399 -322 -1306 12212 9649 -19% -21%
EN 473 149 2354 1521 -324 -833 4076 3709 -35% -9%
EM 427 162 3576 2662 -265 -914 5230 4746 -26% -9%
BM 364 49 3081 1630 -315 -1451 4113 3772 -47% -8%
ET 291 199 7531 5525 -92 -2006 8196 7741 -27% -6%
GSM 227 60 1046 689 -167 -357 2209 2097 -34% -5%
MR 177 47 572 317 -130 -255 511 412 -45% -19%
FC 113 40 3348 2101 -73 -1247 4398 4137 -37% -6%
DC 105 9 1456 978 -96 -478 2655 2156 -33% -19%
IC 102 38 1077 708 -64 -369 1728 1520 -34% -12%
SK 96 17 5364 4272 -79 -1092 5486 5620 -20% 2%
As Rodney et al. (2009) point out, there is a lot of variation between the percent change of
sea and shore billets for most of the ratings, causing a disparity between the billet types.
This can potentially affect Sailor career progression (Rodney et al., 2009). As discussed
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by Rodney et al., this disparity (friction) causes a continued knowledge degradation for the
personnel returning to sea duty. Also, since 2004, with high OPTEMPOs, a majority of CM
was not completed on time. From 2011 to 2016 as discussed by the GAO (2016): “high
deployment rates have led to shortened, eliminated, or deferred maintenance periods and
a growth in maintenance backlogs” (p. 22). Such backlogs would have exacerbated the
effects of manning cuts within the intermediate maintenance facilities.
2.8.5 Fleet Degradation: High Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO),
Backlogs, and Maintenance Overruns
Combining with maintenance backlogs, maintenance overruns also combine with the cur-
rent high OPTEMPOs to overburden Sailors. The VCNO (2017) discussed the struggle
the U.S. Navy has experienced in regard to maintenance turmoil in the midst of a high
OPTEMPO during his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee.
The need to support the fight against ISIS in 2016 led us to extend the de-
ployments of the Harry S. Truman and Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike
Groups (CSGs) to eight and eight and a half months, respectively. Similar
extensions apply to the Amphibious Ready Groups which support Marine Ex-
peditionary Units. This collective pace of operations has increased wear and
tear on ships, aircraft and crews and, adding to the downward readiness spiral,
has decreased the time available for maintenance and modernization. Deferred
maintenance has led to equipment failures, and to larger-than-projected work
packages for our shipyards and aviation depots. This has forced us to remove
ships and aircraft from service for extended periods, which in turn increases
the tempo for the rest of the fleet, which causes the fleets to use their ships
and airframes at higher-than-projected rates, which increases the maintenance
work, which adds to the backlogs, and so on. (pp. 2–3)
The GAO, in their May 2017 report, also recognized an excessive maintenance backlog,
due to a high OPTEMPO as cited by VCNO (2017). During congressional testimony,
the Director, Force Structure and Readiness Issues, Government Accountability Office
(2017) stated, “in 2011 through 2014 only 28 percent of scheduled maintenance for surface
combatants was completed on time ... [furthermore,] in fiscal years 2011 through 2016,
maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 (63 percent) surface combatants resulted in a total
of 6,603 lost operational days—the equivalent of losing the use of 3.0 surface combatants
57
each year” (pp. 13–14). The overruns are likely due to a combination of factors, but the
increased maintenance requirements due to high OPTEMPOs are not only seen through
more maintenance overruns, but increased Sailor-at-sea workload.
The numerous changes for U.S. Navy maintenance since the 1990s, compounded by a high
OPTEMPO after the turn of the century, directly affected the fleet and the required Sailor
workload. In addition to the notes made during the 2017 congressional testimony, the GAO
(2015) reported the effect on casualty reports in the fleet. They analyzed CASREP data
from January 2009 through July 2014 and found an increasing average number of CASREPs
for both overseas- and U.S.-based ships, nearly doubling (see Figure 2.13).
Figure 2.13. Average Number of Casualty Reports (CASREPs) per Ship for
U.S.- and Overseas-Homeported Ships, January 2009–July 2014. Source:
GAO (2015).
They also found statistical significance between the rates of increase, with ships based
overseas increasing at a higher rate than those based in the U.S. Such increases in the
number of CASREPs mean higher levels of CM, increased administrative tasks such as
drafting and routing the reports, mandated periodic updates to the reports, as well as
tracking each CASREP to completion.
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2.9 Technology
The age of technology makes command and control even more difficult. Without improving
communications and consolidating resources as technology develops, instead of technology
alleviating work for the personnel, it can actually increase workload. McGuinness and
Ebbage (2002) note that:
experience in various domains shows that bringing new technology into an
‘old system’ can introduce unforeseen side-effects on workload and SA, such
as a sense of being out-of-the-loop, which can have an underlying negative
effect on performance. One conceivable risk, for instance, is the possibility
that by dramatically increasing the sheer volume of low-level data available to
HQs [headquarters] and their sub-units, this could actually confuse rather than
enhance the SAof commanders aswell as their subordinates. Additionally, if the
rate of incoming data is high, the HQ staff could conceivably be over-burdened
with the task of having to make sense of it all, thereby raising workload levels.
(p. 3)
The possibility of data overwhelm happens aboard DDGs just as it can occur anywhere in
the Navy. Data overwhelm can actually increase Sailor burden. Hart, Battiste, and Lester
(1984) also note, “a potential consequence of adding automation could be a substantial
increase in mental workload to replace the reduced physical workload, due, in part, to the
added burden of supervising or monitoring the automation itself” (p. 432). The key point
here is that workload does not necessarily decrease with an addition of technology.
Furthermore, the expectations for nascent or not yet developed technology may be unreal-
istically high, and decisions could be made using such expectations. Making decisions too
soon based on technology that does not exist creates a risk (Koopman & Golding, 1999).
Among the definitions of risk in a Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) report from 1997,
high risk is where “technology does not exist or will involve high R&D and implementation
costs” (as cited in Koopman & Golding, 1999, p. 18). As the report states, not only the
existence of the technology but also high costs further increase the risk.
Since 1994, the Armed Forces has made an effort to increase Commercial-off-the-Shelf
(COTS) purchases in hopes of reducing the costs while implementing improved technolo-
gies, which can work well but can also backfire in terms of actually increasing costs.
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Technological advances are pushed within the commercial sector in order to remain suc-
cessful (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2008). It is to the military’s advantage to take advantage
of COTS when it makes sense, considering COTS can reduce procurement time, decrease
development and logistic costs, and increase capabilities (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2008).
However, if care is not taken while creating contracts to purchase COTS technologies, the
costs can outweigh the benefits.
Gansler and Lucyshyn (2008) discuss some of the issues the DoD may experience with
COTS contracts, some of which may increase costs and add to Sailor burden. The issues
Gansler and Lucyshyn mention include: a lack of knowledge of the underlying code re-
quiring continued commercial support or even loss of that support if the company folds,
concerns regarding what money can be used (e.g., if a company needs to make a military-
related change to an existing system, procurement funds can not be used for the developmen-
tal testing), and unhelpful contract lock, meaning the military command could potentially
lock themselves into technology that is owned by a particular company, making it costly to
change to a different vendor.
If the Navy does not take such potential situations into account or spend the time to
fully investigate their decisions to procure COTS technologies, COTS contract issues can
affect the Sailors at sea. Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition) (2000) stated, “In another program, the end users found that the training,
guidance, and help-desk support provided by the program office were not adequate to allow
the end users to integrate the system into their site-unique environments” (p. 19). They
go on to note that, because of the unique environments at each site, multiple contracts
were made with the vendor in order to support what each site specifically needed. Though
individual sites shouldered the cost, overall, the cost increased significantly, and the desired
standardization did not take place (Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development
and Acquisition), 2000). Such situations not only increase costs, but if it is a technology
at sea, the Sailors may not have the ability to request such assistance. The Sailors must
spend an increased amount of time beyond “normal” maintenance requirements without
appropriate preparation. They must troubleshoot the systems on their own and, whether
through lack of training support or the lack of vendor guidance at sea, may or may not be
able to resolve any underlying technological problems.
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2.10 Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO)
Over the span of the reductions in manpower and billet changes along with changes to
training and maintenance Navy-wide, the Navy also experienced an increased OPTEMPO.
For surface combatants, time spent at sea between 2001 and 2009 increased by 18% (Clark
& Sloman, 2015). Furthermore, they state, “between 1998 and 2014, the number of ships
deployed overseas remained roughly constant at 100. The fleet, however, shrank by about
20 percent. As a result, each ship is working harder to maintain the same level of presence”
(p. 5). Yardley, Raman, Riposo, Chiesa, and Schank (2006) indicated that, post-9/11, the
U.S. Navy saw the “largest deployment in recent history, with more than 70 percent of U.S.
surface ships and 50 percent of U.S. submarines underway including seven CSGs, three
amphibious readiness groups, two amphibious task forces, and more than 77,000 Sailors
participating” (p. 3).
No matter the manning level or any degredation in capabilities, Sailors must complete
their operations, maintaining a “can do” attitude throughout. The military is tasked with
numerous operations, and the Navy must carry out its assigned missions. The DoD (2017)
defines Operations as, “1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or
unifying theme ... 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational,
tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission” (p. 172). With restricted
funding, it is no surprise that leadership and Sailors both maintain a “do more with less”
attitude, which combines badly with increased OPTEMPO, giving Sailors less time to
maintain, train, and reset. This results in increased workload “crowding,” less sleep, and
increased fatigue.
HighOPTEMPOhas other associated risks. “Operations tempo has been linked to retention,
family stability, and medical readiness” (Castro & Adler, 1999, p. 94). Castro and Adler
demonstrated how high OPTEMPO can affect unit readiness (see Figure 2.14).
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Figure 2.14. OPTEMPO Effects on Unit Readiness. Source: Castro and
Adler (1999).
The authors also note unit readiness predictors, including retention, unit cohesion, health,
and effects on the service member’s family. Though contributors to a high OPTEMPO
effectively increase unit readiness, leadership must balance readiness and the potentially
detrimental effects due to an OPTEMPO that places undue burden on Sailors, increasing
risk.
In response to the 2017 accidents, the CNO briefed the House and the Senate on the Navy’s
failings and resolution of potential influences, including increased OPTEMPO needs. The
CNO (2017) stated,
I have testified several times about the “triple whammy” - the corrosive con-
fluence of high operational tempo, constrained funding levels, and budget
uncertainty. Although warfighting capabilities of ships have dramatically in-
creased in the last century, the size and scope of U.S. responsibilities around
the world have also increased, and the Navy is feeling the strains of consistently
high operational tempo. Added to this challenge, eight years of continuing
resolutions and the 2011 Budget Control Act have impacted the ability to plan
and schedule training, ship maintenance, and modernization. (p. 4)
As the CNO alludes to, in the review of the Seventh fleet accidents in 2017, demands for
U.S. Navy Japan-based ships within the Western Pacific for operational support, both high-
priority tasking as well as exercise and experimentation support, far exceeded availability
within the given readiness cycle (USFF, 2017c). In an effort to meet demands, the CNO’s
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report continues, the Navy reduced training time for ships based in Yokosuka, which, in turn,
caused degraded materiel readiness and training standards of Japan-based ships. Training
reductions made in an effort to meet the increased demands of an OPTEMPO environment
“resulted in an increase to the operational risk to mission accomplishment” (p. 70).
2.11 Workload and Workload Creep
Coming back to basics, the thesis examines, in detail, Sailor workload. Workload is defined
as “the amount of work or of working time expected or assigned” (“Workload,” n.d.). In
order to meet the planned average workload for a U.S. Navy Sailor, there must be some
sort of measurement. NAVMAC utilizes the ship’s ROC\POE in order to determine the
ship’s baseline requirements, assigning the minimum, or optimal manning to the SMD, as
discussed in Section 2.2.3.
The difficulty in objectively observing workload furthers complexity in the workplace,
especially on a surface ship with reduced manning. Anderson, Oberman, Malone, and
Baker describe the inability to observe systemic workload (1997): “The greatest uncertainty
lies in the area of defining workload in tasks which do not require much physical effort but,
rather, load the operator in terms of perceptual, cognitive and decision making skills. One
problem that exists is that workload is not directly observable” (pp. 68–69). In other words,
it is impossible to, with accurate precision, observe the time necessary to complete each
task.
In addition to basic tendencies for work to pile on, workload “creep” also factors in. Work-
load creep is defined as “to ... advance gradually so as to be almost unnoticed” (“Creep,”
n.d.). Like any aspect of workload and possibly more so, workload creep is not directly
observable without a command and control authority directly vetting the requirements
for surface ships, which exacerbates the uncertainty. The greatest amount of workload
creep affecting surface ship Sailors originates from organizations other than their TYCOM.
Whether meaning to or not, almost all administrative organizations within the U.S. Navy
add to Sailor workload in some way. Examples include:
• Decisions made in Congress for Navy end strength
• Budgets or budget uncertainty, due to such things as Continuing Resolutions, not
meeting the needs of the Sailors who must “make it work”
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• Decisions made by the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff who must all make the hard military decisions with a focus
on the needs of the country and foreign policy
• An external court system placing extra watchstanding requirements on shipboard
personnel, such as the required citing of whales from January 2008 through January
2009 through a decision made at a U.S. District Court in California (Department of
the Navy, 2008)
• The SECNAV and CNO who must ensure Navy functions across the world meet the
intended missions as set forth by those for whom they work
• The combatant commanders who must meet the missions of the nation within their
Area of Responsibility (AOR)
• The fleet commanders who must meet their missions and provide guidance for ships
within their AOR
• OPNAV who must make the difficult funding decisions
• The Navy Supply Systems Command who make supply availability and distribution
decisions, potentially affecting the ability for a ship to pass an inspection or conduct
CM
• Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) who must assure the Sailors obtain
the best training they can prior to arrival to the ship using what may or may not be
the best technology and must update curriculum through an arduous process
• Fleet-wide training requirements due to policy changes
• Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP) requirements that increase the number of
watchstanders and their training requirements while the ship is in port
• Organizations who evaluate the ships for certifications and assessments and desire
to ensure their checklists are fully up to date, addressing current fleet administrative
issues or concerns, potentially adding yet another requirement to a checklist
• Some of the personnel from the shipyard who work aboard the Navy’s ships who may
drop their trash or fail to clean up after they finish their work, who may require regular
ship Sailor supervision to assure the hole that was required to be made in the hull
of the ship for newly installed equipment is correctly patched up, or who may make
a mistake that Sailors must fix while underway in order to meet the Navy’s mission
demands.
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This list is only a sample of workload creep the Navy surface ships experience. Policies
created at higher leadership levels must be implemented by USFF and the TYCOM. These
policies put into place by the TYCOM do not necessarily come from that level but indirectly
as a result of a decision made from a higher authority. The complex DoD and U.S. Navy
network has numerous decision makers with different focuses in order to meet their goals.
Each of those decisions affect the Sailors on board the ships, often creating extra work.
Ronen, Lechler, and Stohr (2012) call for greater awareness andmitigation ofworkload creep
to lessen risk. In their discussion of workload creep and its effect on an organization, Ronen
et al. note, “management should be aware that taking on too much work can adversely affect
the organization’s ability to execute - with a resulting, sometimes catastrophic, reduction in
efficiency and profitability” (p. 4). They also discuss that workload creep can be mitigated
at either end. Ronen et al. go on to say, “When the organization’s workload is within
its execution capacity, the adverse effects due to overloaded resources ... disappear and
throughput, response times and quality of work improve” (p. 6). The management, or in the
Navy’s case, the leadership, must throttle back on the number of missions or “commitments”
accepted until the Naval forces can be supplemented in order to carry out the mission set
(CNO, 2017). Doing so results in better “output” for these Navy missions. The ship’s
Sailors can then focus on what is important: completing the mission safely and to the best
of their ability. When workload is increased beyond capacity, the result is less focus with
reduced efficiency and, as pointed out by Ronen et al. (2012), may eventually reach the
point of catastrophe.
2.11.1 Overload (Task Saturation)
Like anyone, Sailors can experience work overload. Overload is defined as “to give too
much of something to (someone or something): to supply with an excess of something”
(“Overload,” n.d.). Wickens and Tsang (2015) demonstrate what they see as happening
with work overload in what they call the “Supply-Demand Function” (see Figure 2.15).
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Figure 2.15. “Supply-Demand Function.” Adapted from Wickens and Tsang
(2015).
As workload increases or becomes excessive, too much of an increase enters a red zone
where the level of performance starts to decrease and, eventually, with too much workload,
dips down below the resources required to provide in order to accomplish their work.
It is important to note that a person’s workload is primarily determined by how much time
that person has. The required time to complete a task and the time available are in constant
competition. When strain is placed on Sailors, they must determine what is most important
for their focus (Parks & Boucek, 1989). Parks and Boucek further note that the breaking
point for errors in pilots was at an 80% workload.
With excessive workload and lack of time, the temptation to cut corners and do just enough
to meet the requirement arrives (Turner, Hershcovis, Reich, & Totterdell, 2014). Ideally, a
Sailor will utilize a form of risk management in order to manage tasks and work with their
chain of command. Operational Risk Management (ORM) is intended to reduce potential
issues that could cause a failure and mitigate risk. It is designed as a way for all personnel
to manage decisions “by identifying, assessing, and managing risks” (CNO, 2010b, Enc. 1,
p. 1). Informed decisions can then be made by the personnel and the appropriate level of
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leadership. The instruction cites one of the primary tenants of ORM: “accept risks when
benefits outweigh the costs” (Enc. 1, p. 1). Appropriately using ORM, however, does not
always happen nor is it really always feasible. Sometimes, there is simply too much work,
and something must be cut.
In maintenance, cutting corners can cause unexpected future issues and expenses. Cutting
corners becomes a safety issue due to a lack of attention to procedures (including safety
procedures) and trying to work too fast, increasing the chance of injury (Halbesleben, 2010).
Halbesleben’s research showed the results of cutting corners to be very similar to that seen
with rule and safety violations (p. 8). Knowingly sending ships out to sea on missions with
known problems will condition U.S. Navy personnel to accept greater risk, going out to sea
when the ship is not ready to do so (USFF, 2017c) and, in turn, standing watch when they
are not ready to do so.
2.11.2 Underload
Underload can affect Navy Sailors asmuch as overload and also has inherent risk. Underload
is defined as “a load markedly below full capacity: an inadequate or insufficient load”
(“Underload”, n.d.). Boredom has been shown in numerous studies to relate to several
negative effects to include distress and depression (Fisher, 1993; Game, 2007; Sommers
& Vodanovich, 2000; Wiesner, Windle, & Freeman, 2005). It can also have negative
effects on the company or organization as a whole (Spector & Fox, 2002; van Hooff & van
Hooft, 2014). Discussing boredom in the military context, Ender (2012) notes, “boredom
is both social and psychological and involves an absence of flow of human experience,
no future, and unmet social expectations ... potential links with boredom and military
training include mission success, morale, cohesion, loneliness, deprivation, discipline, and
operational tempos” (pp. 313–314).
Low task demands may not only cause boredom but an associated fatigue as well. Research
shows that, the lower the task demand, the greater the fatigue effect on a person’s ability
to respond (Desmond & Matthews, 1997). Desmond and Matthews go on to discuss how
the lack of activity and the progressive fatigue can lead a driver to leave the road, causing
an abrupt wake up or startle to the driver. Thus, we need balanced tasking as shown in
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what is now called the Yerkes-Dodson Law as presented by Hebb (1955, Figure 2) (see
Figure 2.16).
Figure 2.16. “Level of ‘Arousal Function.” ’ Adapted from Hebb (1955).
This illustration differs from Figure 2.15, which discusses an overload response in regard to
singular visual, auditory, or tactile resources. The Yerkes-Dodson Law inverted-U shows
effects of arousal, which can be related to workload, on performance.
2.11.3 Working Hours
As illustrated in Figure 2.8, “Levels of Risk,” inadequate manning for shipboard require-
ments causes an increased workload for the remaining Sailors. When Sailors work longer
hours to make up for inadequate manning, whether departmental or divisional, their work-
days become excessively long aswill be illustrated in Section 2.13, Case Studies. Inadequate
manning causes a perpetual condition of Sailor overload.
As the U.S. Navy resolves to change watchstanding and shipboard schedule methodology,
other agencies have laid out working standards to allow Sailors to get the “crew rest” they
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need. These civilian maritime regulations focus on maximum hours of work, instead of a
long term average weekly expectation, in order to assure crew rest and, hopefully, reduce
fatigue (International Labour Conference (ILC), 2014; IMO, 2010). The IMO (2001) states
the reason for the concern about maritime fatigue.
Human error resulting from fatigue is now widely perceived as the cause
of numerous marine casualties ... The negative effects of fatigue present a
disastrous risk to the safety of human life, damage to the environment, and
property ... The seafarer is a captive of the work environment ... spends
between three to six months working and living away from home ... subject
to unpredictable environmental factors ... The most common causes of fatigue
known to seafarers are lack of sleep, poor quality of rest, stress and excessive
workload. (pp. 4–5)
This concern of fatigue from poor sleep, rest, stress, and workload at sea is a relevant
concern not only the commercial vessels, but to U.S. Navy vessels as well.
Sailor work hours for commercial vessels are mandated by U.S. law. The summarized re-
quirements (see Table 2.10) listed are minimal and do not account for emergency situations.
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Table 2.10. Maritime Regulation Provisions.
Provision NAF/NSWW
46 U.S.C. §8104 /
MLC STCW VIII/1
46 CFR §15.1111
Agency U.S. Navy U.S. Law ILO (UN) IMO (UN)
Attributes
Manpower > 100 Gross Tons Int’l Water Int’l Water
Planning (incl. Oilers) Vessels Vessels
≤ 12 hrs/24 hrs;
Working Planned for: ≤ 36 hrs/3 days ≤ 14 hrs/24 hrs; Same as
Hours 81 hrs/7 days [ENG/DECK: ≤ 72 hrs/7 days MLC
≤ 8 hrs/day]
-or- -or-
≥ 10 hrs/24 hrs ≥ 10 hrs/24 hrs
Rest Not in ≤ 2 periods w/ in ≤ 2 periods w/ Same as
Hours regulated** one ≥ 6 hrs one ≥ 6 hrs; MLC
[OIC/ENG/DECK] ≥ 77 hrs/7 days
Minimum







24 JUN 2015 1996 / 1997
Effective Align to MLC
Update 20 AUG 2013 3 AUG 2010
** The NSWW included a rest allotment but with the change to the NAF in 2016, this
allotment was removed and left to the command / individual to figure out how to use their
unavailable / off-work time or the regulation thereof (DCNO (MPT&E), 2007, 2016).
The Provisions of the NAF/NSWW and Civilian Maritime Regulations. Adapted
from DCNO (MPT&E) (2016); ILC (2014); IMO (2010); Shipping: Watches, 46
U.S.C. §8104 (1996); Shipping: Work hours and rest periods, 46 CFR §15.1111
(1997); USCG (2013).
In addition, “Rest Hours” do not include short breaks during working hours. The Mar-
itime Labour Convention (MLC) is a convention under the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO), an agency of the United Nations (UN), that sets maritime requirements on
international vessels adopted by those countries who have ratified it (USCG, 2013). Ac-
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cording to the USCG (2013), the United States does not belong to this convention but has
aligned with it as of 2013 (p. 2). The International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) provides seafarer requirements un-
der the IMO, also an agency of the UN to which the United States has belonged since 1950
(IMO, 2018).
U.S. Regulationsmandate requirements for commercial shipping in order tomitigate fatigue,
increasing overhead business costs. Shipping: Work hours and rest periods, 46 CFR
§15.1111 (1997) notes, “The minimum period of rest required ... may not be devoted to
watchkeeping or other duties” (p. 268). Understandably, U.S. Navy warships do not fall
under these requirements. It is ironic, however, that the concern for fatigue and crew rest,
which these regulations are based upon, is a requirement for merchant mariners but is not
addressed for the most critically important vessels working in dangerous environments,
Navy surface vessels.
2.12 Effects of Workload Imbalances
Workload imbalances, as discussed in Section 2.11, can cause potential physiological
effects on personnel. Extensive research of underload and overload of tasks highlights
causes for concern. The following information represents a small portion of the research
available to provide some degree of the significant potential effects on a Sailor when the
individual workload is not appropriately monitored or managed, whether because the Sailor
is addressing command workload requirements or because of overarching U.S. Navy policy
that affects Sailor workload requirements.
The Navy has been paying attention to fatigue and the need to ensure proper sleep for
Sailors. Note, the TYCOMs for DDGs, COMNAVSURFPAC, and COMNAVSURFLANT,
recently implemented a “Comprehensive Fatigue and Endurance Management Policy”
(COMNAVSURFPAC & COMNAVSURFLANT, 2017). The TYCOMs had previously
provided information on circadian routines via messages in 2013 and 2016 with en-
couragement for experimentation along with information on Sailor exercise, nutrition,
and sleep (Naval Surface Forces, 2013, 2016). In May 2017, COMNAVSURFPAC and
COMNAVSURFLANT issued a message to all fleet ships encouraging leadership to take
a look at circadian watchbills and how they afford better sleep (Crew Endurance Team,
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2017), followed up with a message in September, and finalized a policy in November
(COMNAVSURFPAC & COMNAVSURFLANT, 2017). Up until that date, the Surface
Navy had continued to operate on daily rotating watchbills, which have been shown to
degrade sleep and effectiveness (Osborn, 2004; Roberts, 2012; Shattuck & Matsangas,
2014b).
The 2017 instruction implements a mandate for circadian watchbills with appropriate
ship-wide schedule implementation in order to provide “protected sleep” to Sailors. In
a Comprehensive Fatigue and Endurance Management Policy implementation brief, COM-
NAVSURFPAC and COMNAVSURFLANT Commander Action Groups and Detachment
Monterey (2018) notes that such protected sleep should not be affected by internal ship
requirements but cannot prevent externally imposed operational requirements in order to
achieve the overall mission. No matter the mandate for protected sleep time, if workload is
more than a Sailor can complete outside that time, it will creep into those protected hours
and increase Sailor stress while lowering Sailor resiliency.
2.12.1 Stress
Stress can also have positive effects on Naval personnel. Positive effects include both
professional and personal experience in solving a problem or achieving a goal. Personnel
can gain confidence from the induced stress and the knowledge of an ability to cope, adapt,
and learn from an experience to apply to future issues or problems. This confidence and
knowledge can ease the induced stress experienced in the future (Glendon & Coles, 2001).
The stressors in such cases help personnel to learn from experience, enabling the Sailor to
grow in their area of expertise.
However, one negative side of stress, a decrease in desire to perform, can particularly affect
a command. A study by Milgram, Orenstein, and Zafrir (1989) demonstrates a decline
in perseverance, indicating that, with an increase in stressors, “soldiers reported a marked
decline in their personal endorsement of the official goals of the military operation, in the
endorsement of soldiers and officers in their unit, and in that of the nation as a whole” (p.
192). Such a lack of endorsement can lower morale and potentially affect others in the
command. Several studies show that the primary negative stressor is a lack of time (Weaver,
Bowers, & Salas, 2001), a significant point of concern for the U.S. Navy.
72
Studies have found that an increase in workplace stress–including emotional and cognitive
demands, higher work demands as well as conflicts between work and goals–can negatively
affect sleep and sleep behaviors (van Hooff, Geurts, Beckers, & Kompier, 2011). In a study
by Loft and Cameron (2014), negative emotions related to work tended to increase the need
for sleep potentially due to poor sleep quality, further exacerbating sleep issues caused by
stress. With an increased individual workload, the Sailor will be unable to self-regulate and
obtain more sleep, creating a negative cycle and building fatigue.
2.12.2 Sleep
Like stress, lack of sleep can affect the normal functions of the Sailors. Separate studies
show that a lack of sleep can decrease vigilance or the ability to react; when a person
“catches up” on sleep for a night, the individual’s vigilance does increase, but does not
return the individual to the initial levels of vigilance (Dinges et al., 1997; R. Wilkinson,
Edwards, & Haines, 1966). When U.S. Sailors are standing watch, vigilance is a necessity;
lack of sleep reduces their ability to remain vigilant.
The number of hours a Sailor is awake can affect their capabilities much like alcohol does.
Dawson and Reid (1997) compared hours of wakefulness against relative blood alcohol
concentration (see Figure 2.17).
Figure 2.17. Performance in the Sustained Wakefulness Condition Expressed
as Mean Relative Performance and the Percentage Blood Alcohol Concen-
tration Equivalent. Error Bars ± s.e.m. Source: Dawson and Reid (1997).
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They showed that a continued wakefulness causes impairment in reaction times similar to
the effects of drinking alcohol.
Reaction times also decrease with lack of adequate sleep. Belenky et al. (2003) studied
restricted sleep over a seven-day period (see Figure 2.18).
Figure 2.18. Mean Psychomotor Vigilance Task (PVT) Speed (and Standard
Error) across Days as a Function of Time in Bed Group. Adapted from
Belenky et al. (2003).
The reaction times of the subjects decreased dramatically with a reduction of sleep to three
to five hours per night, never recovering to their initial reaction time after the study with
three days of rest.
Concerns of Sailors managing to procure enough sleep have been exacerbated by many
U.S. Navy traditional watch rotations that result in effective work days other than 24 hours
in length. These watchbills rotate shifts each day, imposing shift lag and build-up of chronic
sleep debt and disrupted circadian rhythms (Arendt, Middleton, Williams, Francis, & Luke,
2006; Folkard, 1992; Shattuck & Matsangas, 2015; R. T. Wilkinson, 1992).
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As discussed at the beginning of the section, COMNAVSURFPAC and COMNAVSUR-
FLANT finalized policy in November 2017 with the goal of providing protected sleep to
at-sea Sailors (COMNAVSURFPAC & COMNAVSURFLANT, 2017). Since the finalized
policy was issued, circadian watch rotations are starting to become the fleet standard. Sleep
is a critical factor in vigilance and fatigue avoidance. Such reported effects due to the lack
of sleep directly relate to the ability of a Sailor to stand a watch. The hope is that circadian
watchbills can help alleviate such concerns.
2.12.3 Fatigue
The culmination of increased workload, and its association with reduced sleep, results in a
fatigued Sailor. Konz divides fatigue into five factors.
1. Physical exertion (e.g., bicycle ergonometer work; descriptions such as
“warm,” “sweaty,” “out of breath,” “breathing heavily,” “palpitations”)
2. Physical discomfort (e.g., static load on small-muscle groups; descriptions
such as “tense muscles,” “aching,” “numbness,” “hurting,” “stiff joints”)
3. Lack of energy (mental plus physical; descriptions such as “exhausted,”
“spent,” “overworked,” “worn out,” “drained”)
4. Lack of motivation (mental; descriptions such as “lack of initiative,”
“listless,” “passive,” “indifferent,” “uninterested”)
5. Sleepiness (mental; descriptions such as “sleepy,” “yawning,” “drowsy,”
“falling asleep,” “lazy”). (Konz, 2001a, p. 1365)
Frone and Tidwell (2015) also note the impact of fatigue on an individual’s capacity to
function: “Work fatigue represents extreme tiredness and reduced functional capacity that
is experienced during and at the end of the workday” (p. 3). Desmond and Matthews
(1997) found a decrease in task motivation due to complacency and showed that “increased
subjective tiredness and physical and perceptual fatigue symptoms ... [resulted in] increased
tension, annoyance and cognitive interference” (p. 521). Finally, numerous studies have
found that long shipboard working hours and reduced personnel on board result in greater
fatigue (Arendt et al., 2006; Houtman et al., 2005; Miller & Eddy, 2008; Murphy, 2002;
Smith, Lane, & Bloor, 2002).
TheNavy recognizes fatigue as a factor in collisions. Fatiguewas found to be a “contributing
factor in the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain collisions” (USFF, 2017c, p. 38).
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Knowing how detrimental fatigue can be, it is important to understand the individual
workload that may cause a lack of sleep. Murphy (2002) notes that, to prevent fatigue,
Sailors need “sustained work limits and minimum sleep schedules ... The scheduling of
work and sleep/rest periods is a key aspect of fatigue prevention” (p. 69). USFF (2017c)
further discusses concernwith fatigue in crewmembers. Though they tend to focus on safety
awareness, Sailor self-assessment of fatigue is known to be poor. Sailors tend to believe
they can “push through” with energy drinks or caffeine. Not surprisingly, in a survey of
service members serving in Afghanistan, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(2012) found that, when three or more energy drinks were consumed, the service member
was more likely to sleep less than four hours and more likely to fall asleep while on watch.
2.12.4 Burnout
Burnout is also a real concern for personnel at sea. Burnout is defined as “exhaustion
of physical or emotional strength or motivation usually as a result of prolonged stress
or frustration” (“Burnout”, n.d.). Chung et al. (2017) cites that personnel at sea who are
suffering from burnout are actually suffering from a disorder that rest does not easily resolve.
He discusses the fact that, through a lack of energy or interest, such personnel are more
likely to contribute to an accident at sea.
Demerouti, Bakker, Vardakou, and Kantas (2003) discuss burnout as the central element
of exhaustion. The authors define exhaustion as “a consequence of intensive physical,
affective, and cognitive strain, i.e., as a longterm consequence of prolonged exposure to
certain job demands” (p. 14). The comparison of two studies included elements other
than exhaustion. They found it more difficult to determine if those elements cause or are
a result of burnout. The factors include disengagment, or depersonalization: an emotional
distancing from work, general cynicism, dissatisfaction, and a desire to leave their current
occupation (Demerouti et al., 2003). A high OPTEMPO for the Sailors in the Surface Navy
without the dispersion of duties and responsibilities results in these factors, whether they
are caused by or resulting from burnout.
Younger people are actually more likely to experience burnout. Alarcon also notes that
turnover is strongly related to emotional exhaustion, a central component of burnout. Alar-
con (2011) found, through a meta-analysis of numerous burnout studies, that consistent
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significant variables related to burnout include attitudes within the workplace, the demands
placed upon the subject (also highly correlated to exhaustion), and the resources available
to that individual. In a study on seafarers experiencing burnout and their relationships
to incidents at sea, Chung et al. (2017) found direct effects of Work-Related Burnout and
Sleepiness (if combined with the burnout disorder) to incidents at sea (see Figure 2.19).
Figure 2.19. Simultaneous Equation Analysis Results of Incidents at Sea.
Source: Chung et al. (2017).
Statistically significant results show that younger seafarers are more likely to experience
burnout. With 64.6% of U.S. Navy Sailors being 30 years of age or less (Statistic Brain,
2017), the potential for a Navy Sailor to experience burnout is higher.
2.12.5 Potential Medical Concern
Discussing the relationship between burnout and illness, Melamed, Shirom, Toker, Berliner,
and Shapira (2006) cite numerous studies through a meta-analytic study with evidence of
illness due to burnout. Such illnesses, according to Melamed et al., include: depression,
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cardiovascular disease, stroke, the suppression of the immune system, and inflammatory
reactions. They also found that heart-related diseases are shown in some studies to have
a higher correlation to stress than what are considered the “normal” indicators: smoking,
body mass index, age, lipids, and blood pressure (p. 331). Other potential concerns include
“an unpleasant sensation of tension and restlessness at work, postwork irritability, sleep
disturbances, and complaints of waking up exhausted” (Melamed et al., 2006, p. 335).
2.12.6 Decision Making, Error, and Results
The impacts of a high workload and resulting fatigue impact personnel in a negative way.
A study completed by Joint Commission [for health care] (2011) discussed how long-term
fatigue can lead to attention lapse, lower motivation, and difficulty with problem-solving.
In addition, fatigue has been shown as one of the greatest contributors of accidents for all
transportation modes (National Transportation and Safety Board, 2016). The report also
notes that “mariners should recognize the effects of sleep loss on performance and should
never take a watch while too fatigued to be fit for duty” (p. 60). Additionally, McCallum,
Raby, and Rothblum (1996) from the U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center,
conducted a study of incidents at sea. Reviewing 279 incidents that posed some sort of risk
to the crew’s safety or where the ship had significant damage, they determined “that fatigue
was a contributing factor in 16% of critical vessel casualties and 33% of personnel injuries,
making fatigue a significant causal factor in marine casualties” (p. iii).
In a study by Larsen (2001), Norwegian military academy students with at least two years
of military experience trained on a course with “human-like targets,” and, after being
sleep-deprived, found frightening results. After five days of little sleep, Larsen had the
students repeat the training evolution, except this time, the targets were replaced by actual
humans. These human targets, upon the start of the attack, began moving normally, even
standing up (Larsen, 2001). During this repeated evolution, the students were ordered
to fire although the weapons provided to the students did not contain live ammunition.
Larsen found that during the practice course, 59% of the sleep-deprived students fired at
the human targets. Even though it could be clearly seen that there were actual humans
on the course, and something unusual had occurred, 42% of those who fired continued to
follow orders even when they realized something was different (p. 94). Following orders
is not necessarily unusual for military personnel, however, with an expectation of targets
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and, instead, seeing real humans, it is notable that such a large percentage of the military
academy students continued to fire. Even those who did not fire their weapon due to unusual
circumstances failed to notify the others of what they saw happening, though they realized
the potential repercussions of killing or severely injuring real humans. After the evolution,
those personnel were concerned or even shocked by the fact that they did not warn the others
(Larsen, 2001).
2.13 Case Studies
Numerous studies of surface ships within the past 20 years show an estimate of how many
hours the U.S. Navy Sailor is working, many of which we found had valid methodology,
and, therefore, used in Section 2.13. Of the prior nine studies conducted on CGs, DDGs,
and GuidedMissile Frigates (FFGs), one was conducted through the offices of the Secretary
of the Navy in order to create the SMD, four were completed by entities outside of the Navy
through interviews and surveys, and four were completed through the Naval Postgraduate
School using daily activity logs. Thesemethods are excellent ways to collect data (Anderson
et al., 1997; Gilbreth & Gilbreth, 1919; Taylor, 1967). Anderson et al. (1997) discuss
the various analytic methods that should be used to determine workload as well as the
difficulty of doing so with Sailors. All of these studies use the components these authors
review and recommend, whether through interviews, work logs, or reaction time tests (e.g.,
Psychomotor Vigilance Tests).
Other studies either had questionable methodology or the data was limited or unavailable
and, thus, are not represented in Section 2.13. Navy Personnel Research and Development
Center (NPRDC) conducted a study in 1975; however, the study was unobtainable. NPRDC
data presented are a result of data provided through citations byMoore, Gasch, et al. (2002).
Research and Development Corporation (RAND) completed a study in 1979. In a sample
of 18,871 enlisted Naval personnel, Doering, Hutzler, Francisco, and Sanchez (1982) did
not delineate working hours based on Sailor working location (i.e., sea, shore, overseas,
et cetera). Therefore, the study does not meet the intent of this review or any other study
of afloat working hours. However, it is important to note that, during the study, many
participants believed that their working schedule did not affect their actual working hours:
“From their perspective, the official work is complete ‘when the work is completed”’
(Doering, Perry, & Shishko, 1979, p. 23). The document refers to a study completed by the
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Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center in Norfolk, Virginia during February 1979
in order to review the Non-Availability Time (e.g., personal time, sleep, Sunday free time,
etc.) for Sailors. Details for the results of this study are unavailable.
2.13.1 A Study for the Basis of the Ship Manpower Document (SMD)
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, the DCNO, in 1967, originally outlined the NSWW, setting
the Sailor workday at 74 hours. The team, Bright et al. (1969), applied these hours to
wartime cruising readiness (Condition III), as was discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.3,
and assumed that the calculations collected for each portion of the NSWW represented the
proportion of time each Sailor spent on that task type year round. The resulting recommen-
dations were provided by industrial engineers, management analysts, and military personnel
who had experience in the projection of manpower needs within the Navy (Bright et al.,
1969). With the complete results from the NSWW, the CNO expanded the determination of
manpower requirements to the other surface ship classes fleet-wide, implemented through
the SMD (Plato, 1975).
2.13.2 Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC):
1975
Seven years later, as cited in Moore, Gasch, et al. (2002), NPRDC conducted a study of the
NAF/NSWW in 1975, which found disparities between the 74 hours planned for and the
actual Sailor workweek. The results show an average available working hours for U.S. Navy
personnel at sea of 91.8 hours. According to Sorenson (1982), the purpose of the report was
to determine whether all afloat Sailors should have the same standard workweek, and, if
so determined, whether actual observations within appropriate operating conditions should
establish the workweek standard. Sorenson’s summary of NPRDC’s report recommended
that a standard workweek for both air and surface enlisted personnel should be, “76 hours
in length. Within that total, 7.5 hours should be allocated to drills and training; 5.5 hours,
to service diversion activities; and 63 hours, to primary duties, watches, and other work
activities” (p. 123). Due to a failure to report sample size within available documents,
comparison of working hours to other studies and the current NAF/NSWW is not possible.
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2.13.3 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA): 2001
In 2001, OPNAV N12, the Director for Total Force Programming Manpower, and Informa-
tion Resource Management, asked the CNA to study afloat working hours and determine
the average number of hours the Sailors work at sea (Moore, Gasch, et al., 2002). The
study notes that it had been more than 20 years since the last study of the NSWW and, with
considerable changes in technology, management and Sailor quality over that timeframe,
the U.S. Navy determined that a study should be completed.
The methodology for the CNA study, conducted in 2001 and reported in 2002, used “one-
on-one interviews with Sailors at sea” (p. 6). This methodology was recommended by
Doering et al. (1979) within their discussion of how to study the Sailor’s work week in
order to obtain the most accuracy. They state that the personal interaction involved with
interviews alleviates some of the issues with information recall and the concern of being
asked personal or threatening questions.
The CNA team had specific methodology that focused on interviews. The CNA team con-
ducted interviews with either 100% of a work group who stood the same watch throughout
the day or through random selection within each department (Moore, Gasch, et al., 2002).
Each interview only involved the Sailor’s input as to what their activities had been over the
past 24 hours (considered by the team as a period the Sailor could recall) and were later
interpreted by the research team (Moore, Gasch, et al., 2002). The report noted that the
DDG studied was conducting operations in the Indian Ocean, and manning was at 91%.
The research team conducted 108 interviews with a total of 67 respondents (22% of the
crew) (p. 9). By conducting interviews this way, the team gathered data on actual activities
and determined the corresponding category within the NAF/NSWW. This approach helped
to ensure the appropriate categorization of work.
The CNA team may have been the first to realize the gray area between “personal time” and
“service diversion.” CNA team noted that definitions of what activities were considered
“personal time” and “service diversion” were major determinants in actual total work or
personal time. The report noted that such scenarios included e-mail, education, and physical
fitness. In the end, they determined that it was important to make an “apples to apples”
comparison and use the definitions provided by NAVMAC (Moore, Gasch, et al., 2002).
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The CNA study detailed some potential reasons that Sailors worked more hours than
expected in the planned long term average. First, the CNA team hypothesized improper
accounting for manpower requirements (e.g., differences in mission and shipboard activities
such as messing and berthing inspections, identified as requiring 70 Sailors to complete on a
U.S. Navy Cruiser) (p. 13). Second, the CNA team thought undermanning may be a reason
for Sailors working more than the SMD planned. If ship manning is less than planned for
in the SMD, whether due to funding or personnel not currently on board, it follows that the
workday for the remaining Sailors increase.
The CNA study also found inconsistencies across departments. They found that “poorly
manned departments (or ratings) did not work consistently more hours than Sailors working
in well-manned departments (or ratings)” (p. 19) and found no correlation betweenmanning
and working hours. The study found no compelling explanation for this. It seems likely
that poorly manned departments accomplish a smaller percentage of their work than well-
manned departments. The lower task completion rates result in deferred, incomplete, or
mediocre work. Digging deeper into department comparisons, the CNA team found that
the two departments with the most working hours were Navigation and Medical. Overall,
the CNA team found that the average work week consisted of 84.4 hours (see Table 2.11).
Table 2.11. Center for Naval Analyses Navy Standard Work Week Study:
Average Weekly Available (Working) Hours Breakdown, 2002. Adapted from
Moore, Gasch, et al. (2002).
DDG Findings
n = 67
Work and Watch 74.9 Hours
Other duty 6.4 Hours
Training 3.1 Hours
Average Available Working Hours 84.4 Hours
The average available working hours for the DDG was 84.4 hours consisting of 74.9 hours
for work and watch, 6.4 hours for “other duty,” and 3.1 hours for training.
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2.13.4 USS Chung-Hoon: 2007
In 2007, the Haynes study found a higher average, 92.8 hours. Haynes conducted a study
of USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) during their underway pre-deployment workups (training).
Each participant filled out a daily Sleep and Activity Log broken down into 15 minute
increments for each day the Sailor participated in the study, up to two weeks (Haynes,
2007). The report notes that they also wore wrist activity monitors to assess their movement
and verify sleep time. Haynes detailed Sailor available working time across the ship (see
Figure 2.20) and offered consolidated study results for enlisted participant working hours
(see Table 2.12).
Figure 2.20. Weekly Average Available Time (Work), USS Chung-Hoon,
Including Officers. Source: Haynes (2007).
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Table 2.12. USS Chung-Hoon Study: Average Weekly Available (Working)
Hours Breakdown, Enlisted only, 2007. Adapted from Haynes (2007).
USS Chung-Hoon Findings
n = 21 enlisted
Work and Watch 85.48 Hours
Service Diversion 2.75 Hours
Training 4.58 Hours
Average Available Working Hours 92.8 Hours
Based upon the activity logs, the average working hours or “available time” ranged from
71.85 hours to 117.97 hours with a standard deviation of 11.86 hours (p. 26). Eighty-six
percent of the participants exceeded the 81 hours planned for in Navy manpower models.
Haynes (2007) noted that Combat Systems had the greatest deviation (11 hours) from the
standardworkweek because ofmaintenance, suggesting a disparity between themaintenance
included in the NSWW.
2.13.5 USS Port Royal and USS Lake Erie: 2009
In 2009, comparing a Cruiser workweek to the NSWW, Mason (2009) found the average
workweek to be 90.90 hours. In a Cruiser-specific study during the Rim of the Pacific
Exercise, Mason (2009) obtained data from 39 participants on USS Port Royal (CG 73) and
USS Lake Erie (CG 70) over a period of three weeks. Each participant logged their day
on a Sleep and Activity Log in 15-minute increments for each day they participated in the
study, making the data able to be parsed by available working hours and non-available hours
in order to correspond to the NSWW. The report notes that they also wore wrist activity
monitors to assess their movement and verify sleep time.
Mason (2009) provided a detailed account of Sailor Available working time across the
ship (see Figure 2.21) and the consolidated study results for enlisted participant Available
working hours (see Table 2.13).
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Figure 2.21. Weekly Average Available Time (Work), USS Port Royal and
USS Lake Erie, Enlisted Only. Source: Mason (2009).
Table 2.13. USS Port Royal and USS Lake Erie Study: Average Weekly
Available (Working) Hours Breakdown, Enlisted only, 2009. Adapted from
Mason (2009).
USS Port Royal and USS Lake Erie Findings
n = 33 enlisted
Average Available Working Hours 90.90 Hours
Mason states that the enlisted working hours averaged 90.90 hours ranging from 64.58
hours to 129.63 hours with a standard deviation of 15.33 hours (p. 73). Eighty-five percent
of the participants exceeded the average available working hours as planned for within the
NSWW.
2.13.6 USS Rentz: 2009
Also in 2009, Green (2009) found an average of 87.12 hours in a study aboard the frigate,
USS Rentz (FFG 46), during pre-deployment underway workups (training). Green (2009)
compared actual daily activity, including sleep, to the NSWW average workweek standard.
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This study involved detailing each subject’s 24-hour day through a 15-minute increment
daily activity log (Green, 2009). The report notes that they also wore wrist activity monitors
to assess their movement and verify sleep time. Of the 24 participants, 21 were enlisted and
completed the study (Green, 2009).
Green (2009) provided the detail across the ship for Sailor Available working time (see
Figure 2.22) and the consolidated study results for enlisted participant working hours (see
Table 2.14).
Figure 2.22. Weekly Average Available Time (Work), USS Rentz, Enlisted
Only. Source: Green (2009).
Table 2.14. USS Rentz Study: Average Weekly Available (Working) Hours
Breakdown, Enlisted only, 2009. Adapted from Green (2009).
USS Rentz Findings
n = 21 enlisted
Work and Watch 73.68 Hours
Service Diversion 11.93 Hours
Training 2.08 Hours
Average Available Working Hours 87.69 Hours
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Enlisted participant available working hours averaged 87.12 hours ranging from 52.85 hours
to 123.34 hours with a standard deviation of 19.89 hours (p. 78). Sixty-one percent of
enlisted participants exceeded the NSWW model available working hours.
2.13.7 USS Jason Dunham: 2012
Conducting their study on board USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109) during independent
steaming in the ArabianGulf, Shattuck andMatsangas (2014b) compared various watchbills
and their effects on the Sailors. They also compared actual daily activity, including sleep as
it related to the NSWW. This process involved detailing each subject’s 24-hour day using a
15-minute increment daily activity log. Some subjects wore wrist activity monitors in order
to verify activity and sleep time. Of the 122 participants, 72 were enlisted and completed
the study.
The data provided by Shattuck and Matsangas (2014a) provides the detail across the ship
for Sailor Available working time (see Figure 2.23) and the consolidated study results for
enlisted participant working hours (see Table 2.15).
Figure 2.23. Weekly Average Available Time (Work), USS Jason Dunham,
Enlisted Only. Adapted from Shattuck and Matsangas (2014a).
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Table 2.15. USS Jason Dunham Study: Average Weekly Available (Work-
ing) Hours Breakdown, Enlisted only, 2012. Adapted from Shattuck and
Matsangas (2014a).
USS Jason Dunham Findings
n = 72 Enlisted
Work and Watch 66.79 Hours
Service Diversion 14.25 Hours
Training 4.55 Hours
Average Available Working Hours 85.59 Hours
The average enlisted participant’s available working hours was 85.58 hours, ranging from
32.96 hours to 125.42 hours, with a standard deviation of 16.35 hours. Of the enlisted
participants, 62.5% exceeded the NSWW model for available working hours.
2.13.8 The Big Picture
Data have shown that Sailors are working longer days than is modeled by the NAF/NSWW.
The Naval Postgraduate School studies provided enough detail to determine that, over
four studies of five ships (two CGs, two DDGs, and one FFG), 107 (of 151) or 71%
of Sailors worked a greater number of hours than that planned for in Navy manpower
models. The maximum workweek values recorded from the four studies ranged from 36.97
to 48.63 hours more than 81 hours. Additionally, across the four studies, the Operations
and Combat Systems departments consistently worked some of the longest days on board
the ship, consistent with the key underlying assumption of the NAF/NSWW: a workload
determination based upon at-seaCondition III readiness. These resultsmay not be consistent
with in-port workload, which is beyond the scope of both this thesis and theNAF as presently
defined. Looking at the workload of the crew is vital in order to determine why the Sailors
are working such long days. Personnel can experience detrimental effects with such long
working hours, which, in turn, creates fleet-wide risks.
2.14 The Unresourced Burden
Each Sailor on U.S. Navy surface ships is affected in some way due to workload that is
not included in Navy manpower models. Some departments may feel those effects more
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than others. This thesis, having extensively reviewed Navy manpower history and previous
studies, conducts a gap analysis to determine the cause of the disparity between the expected
working hours planned for by the NAF/NSWW and actual working hours. Despite multiple
reports as to why incidents occurred with concern about surface force readiness for the
U.S. Navy (Balisle, 2010; USFF, 2017c), no entity has yet looked at and assessed the
gap between the Condition I and III workload planned for and the actual workload of the
U.S. Navy Sailor at sea to determine why Sailors are working longer hours than planned
within Navy manpower models. The rest of this thesis does exactly that.
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Chapter 2 offered an extensive review of U.S. Navy manpower history, planning, and factors
that affect Sailor workload; it also partially demonstrated the complexity of assessing
Sailor workload and how many ways the analysis of it can be approached. The Navy
Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) takes a task-based analysis approach to determine
the time requirements for planned maintenance (PM) (which directly affects corrective
maintenance (CM)) and own unit support (OUS). A task-based analysis breaks down the
steps required for a task to determine the relative amount of time a Sailor spends on a given
task (Mitchell & Driskill, 1996). During this process, NAVMAC analysts ask questions
specific to the task (e.g., frequency, minimum time, average time, and maximum time for
completion). In addition, they use industrial engineering methods in order to calculate the
timing of the Make Ready/Put Away (MRPA) allowance (NAVMAC, Codes 20 and 40,
2017).
This thesis intends to account for all Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) enlisted Sailor tasks
that, when combined together, result in longer workdays than are modeled by the Navy.
Therefore, the thesis attempted to identify all enlisted Sailor tasks, both warfare and non-
warfare related, that are required of Sailors while at sea. To find the gap between planned and
actual workload, we used a behavioral approach for Sailor job analysis, meaning identifying
what the Sailors actually do while working at sea (Mitchell & Driskill, 1996). This chapter
details our methodology.
3.1 Study Limitations
The thesis had limits in terms of duration and resources; therefore, we could not conduct a
full job analysis for each person on board a deployed DDG. Ideally, Sailor at-sea workload
would be compiled and departmental differences determined by using a combination of
task- and behavioral-based analyses.
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3.2 Phase I: The Shipboard Workload Model
The initial, or Mark I model, was a concept map or mind map (i.e., a visual representation)
of the enlisted tasks accomplished at sea and in port (see Appendix B for the model
and close-ups of two sections within the model). We constructed this mapping through
personal knowledge and brainstorming with Naval Postgraduate School Surface Warfare
Officer students who had previously served on either DDGs or Guided Missile Cruisers
(CGs). The mapping reflects detailed Navy training requirements, department-specific
tasks, and a preliminary breakdown of tasks using a broad stroke of Navy Availability
Factor (NAF)/Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW) categories.
3.3 Institutional Review Board
Once we completed the base model, we created interview questions in order to guide
discussions with subject-matter experts (SMEs) in the fleet. Appendix C contains these
questions. We then submitted the questions to the Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB), in order to determine whether the interview questions constituted
human subject research (HSR). The IRB subsequently determined that the research was
not HSR.
We also created a questionnaire for underway DDG Sailors on deployment, included as
Appendix D. We also submitted the questionnaire for IRB review, and, as they had with the
interview questions, the IRB determined that the questionnaire was not HSR.
3.4 Phase II Data Collection: Subject-Matter Expert In-
terviews
We provided each interview participant with the interview questions as well as with a break-
down of the NAF/NSWW from Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) (Manpower,
Personnel, Training and Education (MPT&E)) (2016, p. D-3), included as Appendix E.
The NAF/NSWW served to provide a definition of “average” work in order to provide a
baseline across interview sessions.
We conducted interviews with shipboard leadership, both officer and senior enlisted, on
board USS Higgins (DDG 76) and USS Lake Champlain (CG 57), the department heads
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of USS Mobile Bay (CG 53), the command triad (Commanding Officer, Executive Officer,
and CommandMaster Chief) of USS Russell (DDG 59), and the leadership (E-6 and above)
of USS Kidd (DDG 100) while deployed underway. We interviewed both CG and DDG
leadership because the pattern seen manifested in one surface ship should also manifest
itself in another surface ship within the same organization. Using the interview questions as
a guide, a discussion of Sailor task requirements and sources of organizational frustration,
both ashore and at sea, took place. Upon completion of the Phase I interviews, we updated
the Mark I model to include enlisted tasks, both ashore and at sea, not previously identified.
The updated model, the Mark II, is contained in Appendix F.
3.5 Phase III Data Collection: Sailor Surveys
We provided Sailors who volunteered to participate with an anonymous survey. Sailors
completed surveys on USS Kidd and USS Chafee (DDG 90) during an underway deploy-
ment. The goal for the surveys was to assess Sailors’ perceptions of workload. Once
completed, we analyzed the data to assess at-sea perceptions. We identified task percep-
tions by analyzing the average hours for required tasks provided by the participants, and we
made minor changes to the model from Phase III.
3.6 Phase IV: Navy Manpower Analysis Center
Understanding the processes of manpower determination and the Navy model was vital to
this study. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, NAVMACmodels Sailor workload and documents
the minimum manpower requirements for each class of ship. Because NAVMAC does not
make policy but, instead, follows it, the models and studies produced by NAVMAC include
workload categories prescribed by the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of
the Navy (DoN), and U.S. Navy policy.
3.6.1 Communication and Correspondence
The first of two visits to NAVMACwas focused on understanding the entire Navymanpower
and manning modeling process from the Required Operational Capabilities and Projected
Operational Environment (ROC\POE) document to details and working papers of the final
Ship Manpower Document (SMD). The meetings included a full review of NAVMAC
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methodologies for on site studies as well as the policies, directives, and other documen-
tation that drive manpower requirements. We reviewed the output generated from Navy
optimizationmodels alongwithmodel inputs and calculations for crewworkload dispersion.
The next step was to update the model, indicating which tasks were and were not included
in the NAF/NSWW. We engaged in regular communication with NAVMAC staff as the
model matured. To verify the model, we needed to categorize the tasks appropriately. First,
we removed all ashore task requirements from the model because the focus of the study
was Sailor workload at sea. We then separated the remaining tasks into the categories of
operational manning (OM), OUS, PM, CM, facility maintenance (FM), service diversion,
training, and personal time. We listed areas of concern not applicable to enlisted Sailor tasks
separately, and we also notated shore-based requirements that creep into at-sea workload
separately. The model used to prepare for the NAVMAC meeting, the Mark III, is included
in Appendix G.
3.6.2 Feedback
We provided the Mark III to NAVMAC in preparation for the second visit. NAVMAC
personnel methodically reviewed each task with us; we then further categorized and iden-
tified the tasks as inclusive or exclusive to the Navy model. Discussion ensued about what
category each task belonged to and why. We then integrated findings from the second visit
into the model. After concluding the visit, NAVMAC leadership, including all department
heads, reviewed the updated model, the Mark IV, and provided feedback. The Mark IV,
including details, is provided in Appendix H. We drew our conclusions from the interviews,




Good leaders help prevent “gundecking” by ensuring that subordinates are
qualified to do their jobs, have time to do their jobs, and do their jobs correctly.
- Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations
Proceedings, September 2015
Chapter 3 provided a review of the methodologies used in the creation of the shipboard
workload model, the Mark IV. Using this behavioral analysis approach, we created a
shipboard workload model and accomplished an in depth look at the work completed by
U.S. Navy Sailors. The model matured and changed, focusing on Sailor tasks completed at
sea in order to have an equal comparison to what is included in Navy manpower models.
The process provided insight into areas for further study.
The Shipboard Workload model went through several revisions in four phases. In Phase I,
we created the Mark I prototype model at the Naval Postgraduate School. This model was
meant to paint a broad brush of Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) shipboard requirements,
both in port and at sea, in an attempt to establish a baseline. We then filled out the model
with tasks across the DDG.
In Phase II, we created the second edition of the model, theMark II, advancingMark I based
upon interviews with numerous subject-matter experts (SMEs). This model took a deeper,
more nuanced approach toward the administrative requirements, issues with personnel on
and off board the ship, training cycle specifics, the various maintenance requirements, and
additions to technology areas of concern.
Phase III consisted of a survey of Sailors’ gauges of their workload in order to obtain fleet
perceptions. This phase did not fundamentally change themodel, instead deepening insights
about Sailor tasks and concerns.
We then produced the Mark III model after a review of Navy Manpower Analysis Center
(NAVMAC) documents and through relating the data to instructions. We removed data
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related to in-port requirements and added some requirements to the model in the interim,
resulting in the Mark III model.
Phase IV produced the Mark IV, the final model. This phase required close coordination
with NAVMAC personnel, including command leadership, in order to determine exactly
which tasks within the Mark III are and are not included within Navy manpower models.
4.1 Limitations
An important caveat for Phases II and III is that they rely heavily on subjective data, therefore
they were potentially biased by the “availability heuristic,” i.e., a tendency to more readily
recall recent and/or emotionally charged events. A likelihood of inaccuracies or incomplete
information through Phases II and III exists. We attempted to determine the inaccuracies
from Phase III during the analysis, but some may still be present. The goal of this phase
was to report what Sailors stated, which may be the Sailor’s perception, instead of the
reality of the requirement. Meeting with a larger population of DDG and Guided Missile
Cruiser (CG) Sailors would help resolve some potential inaccuracies.
Phase II and Phase III had natural limits based on the number of personnel interviewed and
surveyed. The first of five ships examined were in port, either in the maintenance phase
or conducting workups in preparation for the next deployment. The final ship was at sea,
on deployment. The goal of ship diversity, a combination of DDGs and CGs, and varying
phases of the ship’s cycle was due not only to the limitations of the study as discussed in
Section 3.1, but also in hopes of reducing the availability heuristic.
4.2 Phase I: The Shipboard Workload Model
Appendix B, Figure B.1, provides the study’s Mark I model, the U.S. Navy Shipboard
Workload Model. We developed the Mark I model in December 2016 based on discussions
with Surface Warfare Officers at Naval Postgraduate School. The development of the Mark
I model established a baseline of DDG task requirements. Appendix B, Figures B.2 and
B.3 lend an up-close view of portions of the model.
We constructed the Mark I with the Navy Availability Factor (NAF)/Navy Standard Work
Week (NSWW) in mind. The tasking sections included service diversion, divided into
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“extra workload,” and “legal” deployment requirements; “personal,” originally considered
beyond the scope; “personnel,” presenting basic Sailor manning concerns; “training,” to
include pre-deployment training, shipboard drills, Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP),
and other forms of training. The model also included “engineering,” both planned and
unplanned, “technology,” a known shipboard issue at sea, operational “watchstanding,” and
the sources of DDG tasking, both administrative and operational. The branches of the Mark
I contained both at-sea and in-port requirements.
4.3 Phase II Data Collection: Subject-Matter Expert In-
terviews
To gain further insight into requirements, we interviewed DDG and CG SMEs. The SMEs
providedmore tasks required throughout the ship. Each ship SME had their own focus in the
interviews depending upon their individual background and experiences. The goals of the
interviews included identifying DDG tasks as well as those tasks taking a “disproportionate
amount of time,” defined as “more than average,” and “causing organization frustration.”
We limited the interviews to one hour in order to minimize impact on the ship.
We provided interview questions (Appendix C) and the NAF/NSWW (Appendix E) to the
SMEs. The NAF provided the baseline time allotment for the “average.” Interviewees
contributed areas of concern based on their own personal experiences in port and at sea.
The interviews yielded the same or similar topics of concern, encompassing most areas of
shipboard requirements.
TheMark IImodel reflected additional tasks identified by the interviewees (seeAppendix F).
Sample updated sections are provided in Figures F.2 and F.3.
4.3.1 Updating Mark I to Mark II
When creating the Mark II model, we removed some tasks from the Mark I model to create
a more global ship-based perspective.
Changed or Removed
We changed or removed the following items.
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1. We changed the model’s mission focus from geographic to operational. The opera-





2. We removed the emphasis on department-based technology and replaced it with
ship-based technology.
3. We removed specific training cycle requirements and replaced them with generalized
training team tasks.
4. We broke up task branches to specify in-port and at-sea requirements.
Added
We added the following items.
1. We added hours to NAF-specific task areas.
(a) Service Diversion: 4 hours
(b) Training: 7 hours
(c) Watchstanding: 56 hours
(d) Maintenance: 14 hours. (This was not technically correct as these hours also
apply to own unit support (OUS). We corrected this discrepancy in the Mark
III model.)
2. We added hours to NSWW-specific non-available (personal) time that are no longer
included in the NAF.
(a) Personal time: 14 hours
(b) Messing: 14 hours
(c) Sleep: 56 hours
(d) Sunday free time: 3 hours
3. Computer-based Technology
(a) We added technology concerns. These concerns primarily revolved around
connectivity, access, and usability.
(b) We added specific mandatory-use shipboard computer programs.
4. New and Old Technology
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(a) We added the adverse effects of technologies.
i. Duplicated reporting
ii. At-sea usability
iii. Decreased available hard drive space due to Consolidated Afloat Networks
and Enterprise (CANES)
iv. Manning changes that must be executed to accommodate new technologies
v. New technology on-the-job training (OJT) requirements
vi. New technology troubleshooting requirements
(b) Online tracking requirements
(c) Navy-provided iPads and Applications are not usable at sea
(d) Legacy Microsoft Software is not upgraded and no longer supported by Mi-
crosoft.
(e) Added “Special Access Program (SAP)”-labeled programs. Sailors are limited
as to who can access the program information. The associated workload cannot
be dispersed to more Sailors due to the nature of the program.
5. In-Port Watchstanding
(a) ATFP: Base requirements








(c) Operations (Combat Information Center)




i. Planned Maintenance System (PMS)
ii. Corrosion Control
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iii. Zone/Departmental Assessment preparation. (This task should have been
placed under Administration. We corrected this discrepancy in the Mark
III model.)
iv. Zone/Departmental Assessment. (This item was duplicated under Admin-
istration. The correct location would be Administration. We corrected this
discrepancy in the Mark III model.)
v. Spot Checks
vi. Corrections for the Zone Inspection Discrepancy List (ZIDL) and Depart-
ment in the Spotlight (DITS). (This item was placed in the incorrect loca-
tion. It belongs with unplanned maintenance as it is corrective in nature.






ii. Cold and Hot Work chits
iii. Current Ship’s Maintenance Project (CSMP) management
iv. TAGOUTs
v. Temporary Standing Orders (TSO)/Departure From Specification (DFS)
vi. Personnel Qualification Standard (PQS) training reports
vii. Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Pickup and Return
viii. Zone Inspection
ix. Availability Planning
x. Maintenance and Material Management (3M) Spot Checks
8. Training
(a) Navy-wide training
i. Absorbed the General Military Training (GMT) requirement
ii. Chart the Course / Full Speed Ahead (Bystander Training)
iii. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
iv. Emergent Navy training (e.g., Transgender, Blended Retirement, et cetera)
v. Personal Responsibility and Values: Education and Training (PREVENT)
vi. Alcohol and Drug Abuse Management Seminar (ADAMS)
100
vii. American Automobile Association–Driving for Life (AAA)









iii. Knowledge exams are required for specific rated / watch qualified personnel.
iv. We added Ship Training Teams to include the Integrated Training Team
(ITT) (absorbed the General Quarters (GQ) task), Damage Control Train-
ing Team (DCTT), Combat Systems Training Team (CSTT), Engineering
Training Team (ETT), Medical Training Team (MTT), and Seamanship and
Navigation Training Team (SNTT).




iv. Security Reaction Force - Basic (SRF-B)
(e) Petty Officer Leadership Course
(f) Chief Petty Officer (CPO) 365
9. Personnel
(a) Manning
i. Food Service Attendants (FSAs)
ii. Flight Deck Fire Fighting Team
iii. Search and Rescue (SAR) swimmer
(b) Off Ship
i. Detachment for cause
ii. Limited duty (LIMDU)
iii. Ready Relevant Learning
101
iv. Medical Evaluation Board (MEB). (This was marked as MEDBOARD on
Mark II.)
10. Service Diversion




iv. Personnel Support Detachment (PSD)
v. Leave
vi. Emergency Leave
vii. The following items were added but actually belong in personal. We
corrected this discrepancy in the Mark III model.
A. Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society (NMCRS)




(b) Admin/legal on board
i. Waiting “Do-Nothing” Allocation
ii. Email
iii. Very Important Person (VIP) visits
iv. Eight O’clock reports
v. Required reading
vi. Working party
vii. Physical Fitness Assessment (PFA)
viii. Fitness Enhancement Program (FEP)
ix. Professional Development Boards





xiv. Congressional delegation (CODEL)/Staff delegation (STAFFDEL). (This
item primarily applies to aircraft carriers (CVNs) and was removed in the
Mark III model.)
xv. Preparation/Practice for Boards, etc. (This item actually belonged in per-
sonal. We corrected this discrepancy in the Mark III model.)
xvi. The following items were added but actually belong in maintenance. We
corrected this discrepancy in the Mark III model.
A. Cleaning Stations
B. Compartment Cleaning
11. “Quality of Life” (Personal)
(a) Relaxing
(b) Letter writing
(c) Study for advancement
(d) Needs. Three hours for exercise were added due to the instructional requirement
for commands to allow for three hours of exercise per week for every Sailor
(Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 2011).
4.3.2 Interviews: Concerns Expressed
Sailors expressed concerns within the interviews that were not added to the Mark II model.
These are summarized below.
1. Personnel
(a) The “Personnel” pillar of the Defense Readiness Reporting System - Navy
(DRRS-N), indicates green (a computed capability of 80–100%) as a function
of the funded billets, billets authorized (BA), instead of the total requirements
as provided in the Ship Manpower Document (SMD).
(b) A 106% fill with a 92% fit still results in increased Sailor workload for the
division or department without the correct fit.
(c) Sailors are being pulled from their ships while in port for ratings that are hard to
fill due to sea/shore rotational friction or Navy Enlisted Classifications (NECs)
that are difficult to pass (e.g., Search and Rescue Swimmer). Pulling from
the ships in port discourages ship leadership from sending personnel to special
NEC schools, which works to the disadvantage of Sailors. The Sailor with the
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high-need NEC has an increased likelihood of being temporarily transferred,
resulting in increased in-port workload for the remaining Sailors.
2. Training
(a) ATFP
i. ATFP training is, at minimum, three weeks for non-engineering Sailors
who have prior ATFP qualifications. The basic qualification requirements
for a Sentry are expected to take nine weeks (Naval Education and Training
Command (NETC), 2014) for a Sailor without prior training. Increased
ATFP requirements have created a greater in-port burden.
ii. New Sailors arrive to the ship unqualified (or with lapsed qualifications) to
stand an ATFP watch. New Sailors may also have had minimal weapons
training prior to arrival.
iii. In San Diego, the shooting ranges are booked long in advance with local
ships vying for the four days of required range training. Both ranges offer
low-light training, however, the outdoor range only provides this condition
in the evening.
iv. Some Sailors fail to qualify their first time at the range (some have had
as many as three failures according to one leader) due to little firearms
training prior to range qualification. Extra training is not possible due to
range access wait times.
v. Requirements include annual re-certification and semi-annual refresher
training in addition to those qualifying the first time. The ship can ex-
pect approximately one-sixth of the crew to be qualifying at one time.
vi. There is no standardization for tracking required ATFP training. Tracking
the requirements becomes an in-port and end-of-deployment collateral duty
for a designated chief.
(b) The Navy’s surface Sailors are not provided the basic “Sailor” tools prior to
arrival in order to be a contributing member of the ship and workcenter. Unlike
the Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps declares and requires every Marine to have
the “Marine” basics: considered a “rifleman.” The Sailor must be provided a
training time line to qualify “basic” knowledge of requirements once on board
the ship. These basic requirements include Damage Controlman (DC) and 3M.
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As a result, the Sailor must be scheduled for further course work in order to
become the functioning “Sailor” the ship needs.
(c) Sailors do not arrive fully trained, having attended neither an “A”- or “C”-School
(i.e., they arrivemissing needed schools). The shipwill need to schedule a course
in order to meet the needs of the ship if a school is required. As a result, a Sailor
might miss significant portions of deployment as a result.
(d) A Sailor must be PQS qualified in order to be a “valid” member of the crew.
OJT creates a larger burden on the experienced Sailors above and beyond the
basic PQS requirements.
(e) Navy leadership has an expectation for ships to have “homegrown” NECs across
departments. Homegrown NECs require four to six months of OJT.
(f) Bystander intervention training must be logged on-line for each individual along
with deployment training requirements.
(g) A ship transfer requires a full PQS re-qualification, even when the Sailor is
transferring from one DDG to another with the same technologies. (Of note,
failure to conduct a proper re-qualification was noted as a concern in the Com-
prehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents, U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF)
(2017c)).
(h) The Petty Officer Leadership Course must be completed prior to being frocked
or promoted to Petty Officer Third Class, Second Class, or First Class. The
responsibility of providing the courses falls to the command due to the lack of
externally provided courses.
(i) Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) guidance requires CPO 365
training requirements for First Class Petty Officers. MCPON guidance is not an
instruction, but a recommendation. Some in the fleet see this as a requirement but
not officially mandatory. Phase I of CPO 365 training occurs from September
through August with Phase II commencing once CPO selection results are
released.
(j) The Navy’s Senior Enlisted Academy (SEA) is mandatory in order to promote
to Master Chief Petty Officer. This requirement applies to FY 17 Senior Chief
selectees who will have their first look for promotion in 2020. The course is
eleven consecutive weeks long, consisting of seven weeks online (with 12 to
15 hours of academic work per week), a one week break, and three weeks in
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residence in Newport, RI. The three weeks in-residence requirement can not
be completed during a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) due to conflicting
funding entities (temporary additional duty (TAD) vs. PCS orders). The one
exception is new Command Master Chiefs and Command Senior Chiefs who
have not already attended the course. They can complete the last three weeks of
training during PCS en route to their new command.
3. Maintenance
(a) A large portion of the ship is engaged during zone inspections, with a minimum
of three people per inspection team: one inspector (usually E-7 or above), a
divisional escort (usually an E-6 who is also the discrepancy recorder), and a
Sailor standing by who has ownership of the space. The Sailor standing by waits
within the space until the inspection team gets there. Assuming 150 personnel
involved in weekly zone inspections, the inspection adds up to a minimum of
150 man-hours per week.
(b) Sailors must follow up on zone inspection discrepancies with the CSMP and a
separate paperwork trail (ZIDLs). This results in a duplication of effort.
(c) Smaller workcenters tend to have a disproportionate number of quarterly 3M
spot checks to PMS requirements, further discussed in Section 4.7.3.
(d) Maintenance availability planning begins as soon as the ship is underway for
deployment (see Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1. Maintenance Phase Planning. Source: COMNAVSURFPAC and
COMNAVSURFLANT (2016).
Preparing for the availability includes weekly meetings as well as entry of all
expected hours of availability work into the CSMP.
4. Technology
(a) Accessibility
i. There are not enough computer drops to maintain one station per person.
Most senior personnel have an assigned computer, butmost junior personnel
have a 5:1 or 6:1 ratio of personnel to a single computer.
ii. CANES has restricted the availability of computers to less than the previous
numbers of “drops” for a given ship class. This has decreased computer
accessibility.
(b) Bandwidth
i. Numerous programs become slow (or even unusable) with a low bandwidth.
Various Navy leadership entities mandate their use, resulting in delays in
processing time while using the computer. In some cases, low bandwidth
causes applications to “time out” or reset, requiring rework.
ii. A recommendation was made to create an “afloat” version to reduce prob-
lems of sites with bandwidth issues.
(c) Usability
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i. Relational Administration (RADM)
A. All watchbills are required to be created, managed and maintained in
RADM. All individual level PQS, training, qualifications, and certifi-
cations are required to be managed through RADM as well (Comman-
der, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVSURFPAC) &
Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic (COMNAVSURFLANT),
2016).
B. To build a watchbill in RADM, each individual Sailor must be entered
one at a time. It can take up to five minutes for a single watch station
entry due to poor usability and processing delays.
C. Sailors do not receive official RADM training. Sailors either learn
through OJT, self-training, or by reviewing .pdf documents.
ii. The software used to link parts information to the maintenance system, Or-
ganizational Maintenance Management System-Next Generation (OMMS-
NG), is a slow process to use. One chief stated it takes eleven clicks to
approve one single part. The junior Sailor must do even more than that to
complete a single entry for review and approval.
iii. Maintenance documentation requires a Personal Identification Number
(PIN) entry when documenting maintenance. Each time a Sailor conducts
maintenance, the Sailor must then wait until a computer seat is available,
log on, and then log the maintenance. The Work Center Supervisor must
also log on and review the maintenance once a computer is available. This
becomes an onerous and cumbersome process.
5. Duplicated Processes
(a) Casualty Reports (CASREPs)
i. Sailors must enter every CASREP into a Maintenance Figure of Merit
(MFOM) Fleet CASREP Program.
ii. Though the program creates the required Naval message, the message must
then be routed through eight to nine people prior to release. Leadership
expected the MFOM Fleet CASREP program to streamline the process by
alleviating the routing requirement, but, in fact, it did not.
(b) Operational Report (OPREP)-5
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i. The Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) requires daily operational
reports; it takes one enlisted Sailor approximately three hours each day to
complete the report, resulting in a total of 21 hours per week.
ii. Ship personnel may also receive a message or email requesting the same
information received within the report.
(c) Online vs. Paper Tracking
i. The DDG must log all training online via either the shipboard RADM
program or Fleet Training Management Planning System (FLTMPS).
ii. Inspections require paper-based training jackets containing much of the
same information even though the Sailors have been reported as qualified
within the mandatory reporting system.
6. Own Unit Support (OUS)
(a) Explosive Safety Warfare Programs (collateral duty)
i. Each ship must have and keep a viable up-to-date Explosives Safety Man-
agement Program.
ii. The responsible Sailor must continue to assess andmanage the Ammunition
Hazard (AMHAZ), Radiation Hazard (RADHAZ), and Afloat Magazine
Safety programs.
(b) Legal
i. The legal officer is the person responsible for keeping the Commanding
Officer (CO) and Executive Officer (XO) out of “hot water.”
ii. The enlisted support for the legal officer (only in regard to paperwork) is a
Yeoman (YN) instead of a Legalman (LN).
iii. There is no direct Judge Advocate General (JAG) support from the ISIC.
Therefore, the ship must use Type Commander (TYCOM) support, unless
actively attached to the Carrier Strike Group (CSG), in which case they
may use the support of the JAGs on board the CVN.
7. In-Port Inspections
(a) Checklists
i. Inspection and certification checklists tend to change every 18 to 24months,
if not more often.
ii. Checklist changes are not pushed out to the ship via official message.
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iii. Ships do not directly receive checklists; instead the ship must pull the
checklists instead of the checklists being pushed to the ship. Additionally,
checklists found online may not be the most recent version.
(b) Confusion. Differences in entity assessments exist and cause confusion. Exam-
ples follow.
i. A ship with too few Sailors with a specific NEC requirement must get the
TYCOM and ISIC on the same page as their certifying agent. The TYCOM
and ISIC know about the NEC discrepancy, but the agency conducting the
inspection does not, resulting in confusion.
ii. The Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) and Afloat Training Group
(ATG) inspection criteria differ from each other. For example, INSURV
inspects to the Maintenance Requirement Card (MRC) while ATG inspects
to the Engineering Operational Sequencing System (EOSS).
(c) Often, certifications and assessments typically begin on a Monday. Sailors must
come in for a full day of work on Sunday for final pre-inspections, cleanliness
inspections, and set-up. Better scheduling and assessment time lines could
potentially alleviate the additional workday for personnel off duty.
8. Fleet Nuances: Different fleets have different training requirements, reporting re-
quirements, and reporting procedures. The document that must be reviewed (Fleet
Operations Order (OPORD)) is greater than 1000 pages. The OPORD must be read
and understood by multiple personnel prior to transit into a different fleet.
9. Whiplash
(a) Tasks or changes in requirements usually come from outside entities.
(b) DDG leadership must make a plan to complete the new requirement. The plan
is then passed to the divisional leadership who must likely make their own plan.
By the time the Sailors must complete the requirement(s), deadlines loom close
creating the “whiplash” effect.
(c) Due to an inability to plan, this whiplash creates a culture of reactive Sailors
instead of proactive Sailors.
10. Exercise Equipment
(a) The DDG class has limited gym space. SomeDDGs have two gyms; however, as
the previously lacking towed arrays are placed into their intended location, only
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one gym remains. Sailors must wait if they want to work out, either extending
workout time, or diminishing their workout prior to standing watch
(b) Of note, according to Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) (2016), two
facilities for a DDG are mandated based on the number of personnel for new
ship construction and ship modifications
4.4 Phase III Data Collection: Sailor Surveys
Sailors from two DDGs volunteered to take the surveys (see Appendix D). Fifty-three
Sailors volunteered, consisting of 14 officers, 22 senior enlisted, and 17 junior enlisted
Sailors. The feeling of being “stuck on ship” or “always at work” is prevalent throughout
survey responses. Therefore, there may be a tendency to keep working longer hours because
the Sailors cannot go anywhere while at sea.
4.4.1 Workload (Question 1)
The workload questions determined what tasks require a “disproportionate amount of time,”
what tasks are shed as a result of excess workload, and what Sailors believe can be removed
from the ship tasking requirements. The meaning of “disproportionate amount of time” was
the same as with the leadership interviews, relying upon the standards of the NAF/NSWW.
1. Workload Requiring a “Disproportionate Amount of Time”
(a) Wait times / white space
i. Waiting in line
ii. Waiting for a computer
iii. Waiting to meet with the CO / chop messages and documents
iv. Waiting for HAZMAT
(b) Attempting to find the single person with access for a specific requirement




(f) Duplicated inspection requirements
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i. Example: Due to the requirement to demonstrate a fuel safety valvemultiple
times for inspections to include the TYCOM Material Inspection (TMI),
the TYCOM Mid-Cycle Inspection (MCI), Engineering Readiness Assist
Team (ERAT), and INSURVReadiness Assist Team (IRAT), the fuel safety
valve now leaks. Sailors were not only required to demonstrate the same
requirement four times for inspections, but there was a resulting corrective
maintenance (CM) burden.
ii. An excess amount of time is used preparing and executing multiple inspec-
tions that review the same things such as those mentioned above as well
as the Damage Control Material Assessment (DCMA) and the Light Off
Assessment (LOA).
(g) Navy training requirements
i. Emergent Navy training (e.g., Transgender, Blended Retirement, et cetera)
ii. Bystander intervention training
iii. Safety training
iv. New technology training
v. Medical training
(h) Emergent tasking and requests for information (RFI) which are likely a compi-
lation of data that is available through different sources
(i) “We are overtasked, undertrained, under cared for, and expected to complete
everything proficiently.”
(j) Sources (not all inclusive) of tasks discussed.
i. Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
ii. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)




vii. Navy Personnel Command (NPC)














(a) “Anything that won’t result in [Non-Judicial Punishment]”
(b) Mentoring (either giving or receiving)
(c) Studying
(d) Training
(e) Painting and preservation of the ship
(f) Cleaning
(g) Routine tasks
(h) Career Development Boards






(o) Required Reading (such as CO’s Standing Orders (COSO), Rules of the Road
review, or for the Tomahawk–over 200 pages)
(p) Reviewing (or pulling) updated instructions – Instructions are not typically
pushed out to the ship as they change
(q) Poor or incomplete Navy-wide training
3. Safety tasks
(a) Following safety rules
(b) Ensuring appropriate safety checks are completed
4. Shedding personal, professional, training, and safety tasks can potentially result in:
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(a) An increase in LIMDU-status personnel
(b) Watchstanding errors
(c) PFA failures, and, therefore, a greater number of Sailors on FEP
(d) The outstanding Sailor who is working the hardest does not obtain the training
he or she needs
(e) Poor Sailor evaluations
(f) Decreased levels of knowledge
(g) Individual or training team remediation
(h) Failure to meet Navy standards
(i) Injury or death
Removal of Tasks (Question 3)
We asked Sailors what tasks they thought could be removed from their requirements. They
follow:
1. Mandatory physical training (PT), as many as three organizations require it at once
to include division, FEP, and the First Class Association
2. Reduce Force Revisions to twice per year
3. Drills (surprisingly, four people made this comment)
4. Khaki call every day
5. Mustering multiple times a day
6. Computer-based training
7. Waiting for supervisory personnel to begin quarters
8. Summer safety training while deployed
9. Using SKED 3.2 for PMS tracking but still printing everything
10. Visual Information requirements: one slide easily takes three to six people to generate
and about 36 hours to ensure it is a perfect submission
4.4.3 Technological Barriers to Work Accomplishment at Sea
There are multiple areas of concern in regard to technology. For computer technology,
the potential barriers reviewed included the number of computers available, the ship’s
connectivity, and Navy web-based programs (see Table 4.1).
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Online tracking requirements 19%
Network drive space 55%
Unsupported software 26%
Other Concerns 26%
There were several highly notated barriers in regard to technology. The barriers seen
by a greater percentage of Sailors included computer connectivity, number of computers
available, network drive space, and Navy-designed websites.
1. ComputerAvailability: Forty-two participants (79%) believe the number of computers
available is a barrier towork completion. The departmentswith the largest percentages
were Engineering (31%) and Weapons (17%).
2. Computer Connectivity: Forty-nine participants (92%) indicated connectivity as a
barrier for work completion.
3. Navy-designed Websites, Programs, and Online tracking requirements
(a) Twenty-four personnel believe Navy-designed websites are a barrier:
i. Sixteen (67%) of those personnel mention some attribute ofMyNavy Portal
(http://my.navy.mil/).
A. Logging into Navy e-Learning required “Hours upon hours of loading
and crashing”
B. The amount of logins required
C. Navy e-Learning accessed through My Navy Portal takes as many as
three Common Access Card (CAC) logins. Low connectivity speeds
cause CAC time outs.
ii. BUPERS Online (BOL)
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iii. Career Waypoints (C-WAY)
iv. Career Management System - Interactive Detailing (CMS-ID)
v. Navy Enlisted Advancement System (NEAS)
vi. Fleet Management & Planning System (FLTMPS)
vii. Defense Travel System (DTS)
viii. Training and Operational Readiness Information Services (TORIS)
ix. OneTouch (for Supply)
(b) Ten (18%) of the participants indicated issues with programs and online tracking
requirements. Specific programs noted include:
i. Haystack supply tracking site
ii. electronic Departure From Specification system (eDFS)
(c) Afloat programs appear to be highly regarded, and Sailors seem to believe that
more local databases with daily uploads would help with website interactions.
For example, as a result of being retooled for shipboard use, a Sailor noted that
“the Marine Gas Turbine Information System/Web-based Logbook (WEBLOG)
has improved 100% in regard to speed and use.”
4. Unsupported Software, and Other Concerns
(a) “CANES does not support FEDLOG.” FEDLOG Online allows the user to look
up National Stock Numbers (NSNs) and access the available data.
(b) The following programs have slowed considerably.
i. HAZWIN (the HAZMAT tracking program)
ii. OMMS-NG
iii. RADM
4.4.4 Perception of Task Requirements
The time it takes to accomplish a task (and be accurate about it) requires diligence in
tracking time for tasks from start to finish (task analysis). The survey asked Sailors how
long specific service diversion, training, and personal tasks take and how often they are
required to complete them. The responses are the perceptions of the participants. We asked
them to provide data on the following:
• Inspections
• Boards (giving or receiving)
• Quarters and muster







• Training team drills (preparing, brief-
ing, and debriefing)
• Watch stander required reading
• Study for advancement
• Warfare qualifications
• Job Qualification Requirements (JQR)
and/or PQS training
• CPO 365
• Petty Officer Leadership Training
• Navy-wide training requirements
• Higher education (classroom educa-
tion and studying)
From the responses, we assessed the perceptions of what takes the most time throughout
their workdays. The perceptions were reviewed for junior enlisted Sailors (E-1 thorough
E-6), senior enlisted Sailors (E-7 through E-9), and officers in order to (mostly) group
among peers and similar duties.






















Junior Enlisted Tasks (n = 17)
Average Hours per Week
0 2 4 6 8 10
Figure 4.2. E-1 through E-6 Task Perception.
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The junior enlisted task perceptions show the continued focus on training and keeping the
ship clean. The top five tasks (hours per week) were:
1. JQR and/or PQS (9.0 hours)
2. Warfare qualifications (8.2 hours)
3. Cleaning stations (6.2 hours)
4. Sweepers (6.3 hours)
5. Quarters (4.2 hours)
Senior enlisted (E-7 through E-9) tasks range across the ship from taking care of others to





















Senior Enlisted Tasks (n = 22)
Average Hours per Week
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Figure 4.3. E-7 through E-8 Task Perception.
The senior enlisted task perceptions show the focus on mentoring both junior officers and
junior enlisted as well as maintenance of knowledge. The top five tasks (hours per week)
were:
1. Mentorship (13.1 hours)
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2. Required reading (8.8 hours)
3. Cleaning stations (7.1 hours)
4. Sweepers (6.8 hours)
5. Training team drill preparations (6.4 hours)
Officer (O-1 through O-5) tasks focused primarily on their own training and then on lead-





















Officer Tasks (n = 13)
Average Hours per Week
0 2 4 6 8 10
Figure 4.4. Officer Task Perception.
The focus on training is not surprising due to the top priority of junior officers to qualify.
The top five tasks (hours per week) were:
1. Warfare qualifications (9.7 hours)
2. JQR and/or PQS (5.4 hours)
3. Required reading (4.8 hours)
4. Quarters (4.8 hours)
5. Inspections (3.8 hours)
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4.4.5 Adequacy of Time
Weasked five questions to assess the Sailor’s perception of time availability, on the following
topics:
1. Sailors have adequate personal time
2. Sailors have adequate time to exercise
3. Sailors have adequate time to study for advancement
4. Sailors get adequate sleep
5. In regard to maintenance, “good enough” is a typical Sailor attitude
The responses varied, but there were answers with high frequency rates.
Personal Time
For the question, “Do Sailors have adequate personal time?,” we used a scale of one through
five. The answer of greatest frequency was “2, Disagree” (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2. “Sailors Have Adequate Personal Time” Frequency Table.
Personal Time
1 Strongly Disagree 9 (16%)
2 Disagree 24 (45%)
3 Neutral 9 (16%)
4 Agree 8 (15%)
5 Strongly Agree 3 (5%)
Overall, this shows a general consensus that Sailors do not have adequate personal time.
Some of the comments included:
1. If you want personal time, you have to give up one of the below (exercise, studying,
sleep)
2. Less than 30 minutes per day
3. You have to sacrifice other needs
4. Not enough time
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5. It is the Sailors choice (n = 2)
6. To workout means less sleep and less qualification time
7. Depends on watch schedule/drills/inspection
8. Rate dependent (n = 2)
9. It varies between department
10. Could be better if schedules/events were better planned throughout the day
Exercise
For the question, “Do Sailors have adequate time to exercise?,” we used a scale of one
through five. The answer of greatest frequency was “2, Disagree” (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3. “Sailors Have Adequate Time to Exercise” Frequency Table.
Time to Exercise
1 Strongly Disagree 4 (7%)
2 Disagree 17 (32%)
3 Neutral 16 (30%)
4 Agree 15 (28%)
5 Strongly Agree 1 (1%)
Overall, this shows a general consensus that Sailors do not have adequate time to exercise.
Some of the comments included:
1. This is typically my personal time even though it is a requirement
2. They have to use their free time
3. You have to sacrifice other needs
4. Exercise or sleep
5. Depends on watch station
6. They fit it in when they can
7. PT is highly encouraged but reduces personal study time/qualification time
8. Sometimes but not always
9. Depends on the workcenter; Some have a lot, some have none
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10. My department emphasizes it
11. Engineering and Deck have the least
12. Officers have less than enlisted
13. Lack of facilities and demanding watch schedules often prevent this.
Study for Advancement
For the question, “Do Sailors have adequate time to study for advancement?,” we used a
scale of one through five. The answer of greatest frequency was “4, Agree” (see Table 4.4).
Table 4.4. “Sailors Have Adequate Time to Study for Advancement” Fre-
quency Table.
Time to Study
1 Strongly Disagree 2 (3%)
2 Disagree 13 (25%)
3 Neutral 11 (21%)
4 Agree 22 (42%)
5 Strongly Agree 4 (7%)
Overall, this shows a general consensus that Sailors do have enough time to study for
advancement. Some of the comments included:
1. I don’t study; all my knowledge is from OJT
2. They have to use their free time
3. Usually done on watch (if permitted)
4. Too many distractions
5. Study or sleep
6. Always time
7. I build study time into my Sailors’ daily schedule
8. Watch standing on rate-related equipment aids this
9. Divisional training can be used
10. If working their rate, yes
11. Especially on deployment; they just need initiative
122
12. It is dependent on the Sailor to use their time wisely
13. Training is emphasized throughout the command
Sleep
For the question, “Do Sailors get adequate sleep?,” we used a scale of one through five. The
answer of greatest frequency was “2, Disagree” (see Table 4.5).
Table 4.5. “Sailors Get Adequate Sleep” Frequency Table.
Time to Sleep
1 Strongly Disagree 16 (30%)
2 Disagree 18 (33%)
3 Neutral 10 (18%)
4 Agree 7 (13%)
5 Strongly Agree 2 (3%)
Overall, this shows a general consensus that Sailors do not get adequate sleep. Some of the
comments included:
1. Four to five hours average; If I get six, I feel like I missed something
2. Depends on your rate
3. Too many distractions
4. Some do; I personally have not
5. Just depends on how Sailors utilize that time
6. Everyone is always tired
7. This is getting better but we still need changes to the POD [Plan of the Day]
8. Engineers definitely don’t
9. Sailors in circadian rotations can work this
10. Depends on watch schedule and ship events
11. If no flight quarters or other special evolutions
12. Some rates more than others, but typically no
13. Even when time is given, noise, training, etc. impacts sleep
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14. In OPS (OD and OI), sleep is hard to come by due to watch schedule
15. Sleep and personal time are often considered the same thing
Maintenance–Is “good enough” typical?
For the question, “In regards to maintenance, is ‘good enough’ a typical Sailor attitude?,”
we used a scale of one through five. The answer of greatest frequency was “4, Agree” (see
Table 4.6).
Table 4.6. “In Regard to Maintenance, ‘Good Enough’ Is a Typical Sailor
Attitude” Frequency Table.
Maintenance is typically “Good Enough”
1 Strongly Disagree 0 (0%)
2 Disagree 14 (26%)
3 Neutral 12 (22%)
4 Agree 19 (35%)
5 Strongly Agree 8 (15%)
Overall, this shows a general consensus that Sailors, in regard to maintenance, have a “good
enough” attitude. Of note, all enlisted personnel who provided a written response to this
question (n = 9) noted that “yes, ‘good enough’ is typical.” The primary reasons provided
by the Sailors as to why it is typical are provided below.
1. If there is no time (n = 2)
2. Depends on how rushed it is
3. Maybe for some equipment but usually not
4. Sailors must complete all tasks; quality gets degraded with each task added
5. A lot of things are a “temporary fix” because of the supply system hassle
6. Manning driven
7. Only if you allow it
8. People need to care more about equipment
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9. Unless motivated by leadership/peers, Sailors will sometimes do the minimum that’s
expected because either they can get away with it or they just don’t have the time and
energy
4.5 Mark III Model: Preparation for the Navy Manpower
Analysis Center Review
Once interviews and surveys were complete, we updated the model and designed it specif-
ically for discussion with NAVMAC. We removed all in-port tasks, highlighted each task
block based on the best guess as to whether it was included or not in the planned workload
for the Sailors, and divided the blocks into specific NAF/NSWW terminology in order to
discuss tasks equivalent to planning practices. Due to further research necessary to place
requirements in the appropriate section in preparation for the visit, we also made some
additional changes (changes made at this point that were previously discussed in Section 4.3
are not included).
1. Changed or Removed
(a) We removed all in-port tasks.
(b) We separated training into Warfighter and Non-warfighter training.
i. Warfighter training included drills conducted while deployed.
ii. Non-warfighter training included all other training requirements.
iii. We removed duplicate training tasks to include advancement studying and
PQS qualification.
(c) We separated maintenance into Preventive Maintenance, Corrective Mainte-
nance, and Facility Maintenance.
i. Preventive maintenance included assessments, spot checks, and Combat
Systems “use” maintenance.
ii. Corrective maintenance included TSO/DFS, troubleshooting, casualty con-
trol, and ZIDL / DITS corrections.
iii. Facility maintenance included corrosion control, compartment cleaning,
and cleaning stations.
(d) OUS included low-visibility lookout, a consolidation of special evolutions, col-
lateral duties, FSAs, CSMP management, PQS training reports, MRC force
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revisions, availability planning, data recording for maintenance, medical / den-
tal, flight deck fire fighting team, SAR swimmer, and working party.
(e) Service diversion. We split up collateral duties between OUS for productive
collateral duties and left nonproductive collateral duties in service diversion. As
discussed in Section 2.2.3, productive collateral duties support the workcenter
and/or command mission directly, and, though the command may benefit from
the collateral duty, nonproductive does not support the workcenter or command
mission directly (NAVMAC, 2000).
2. Added
(a) Training
i. We added training team training and experience to warfighter training.
ii. We added higher education to non-warfighter training.
(b) Maintenance
i. We added spot Check preparation, Semi-annual andAnnual PMS, andmake
ready and put away to preventive maintenance.
ii. We added make ready and put away to corrective maintenance.
iii. We added make ready and put away, polishing bright work, and hull, deck,
and superstructure preservation to facility maintenance.
(c) We added Culinary Specialists (CSs) to OUS.
(d) We added haircuts, hangar bay integrity watch, business at the post office, ship’s
store, ship’s services, and exercise requirements to service diversion.
Once we updated the model to theMark III model, we added space for NAVMAC discussion
points (see Appendix G). Figures G.2, G.3, and G.4 provide close-ups of the changes made
to Figures F.2 and F.3.
4.6 Phase IV: Additional Input from the Navy Manpower
Analysis Center
We provided the Mark III model to NAVMAC personnel for review in order to verify what
is or is not included within Navy manpower models, methodically reviewing each task
listed on the Mark III model with NAVMAC Code 40, Afloat. We crated the Mark IV
model once the Mark III model was completely revised and appropriately color-coded upon
completion of discussions with NAVMAC Code 40 and NAVMAC command leadership
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(see Appendix H). Figures H.2, H.3, H.4, H.5, H.6, and H.7 are included to provide detail
of the final Mark IV shipboard workload model for DDG tasking.
The Mark IV provides color codes for what is included (green), what is partially included
(yellow), or what is not included (red) within Navy manpower models. The question to
justify inclusion within Navy manpower models follows. Would the task be executed if the
ship was actively at war?
4.6.1 Mark IV: Service Diversion Allowance
NAVMAC does not measure service diversion in workload reviews. NAVMAC provided
insight as to what would be included if they did measure service diversion workload (see
Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5. Mark IV: Service Diversion, February 2018.
Service diversion is applied as a singular value of four hours and is only measured when
the NAF/NSWW is studied for accuracy. A personal needs, fatigue, and delay (PF&D)
allowance is not applied to service diversion for this reason. The following administrative
changes were made to the service diversion section of the Mark IV model.
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Changed or Removed
We either changed or removed the following tasks from service diversion.
1. We moved personal property to personal.
2. We moved email to OUS.
Added
We added the following tasks to service diversion.
1. Disciplinary Review Board (DRB)
2. Messing and Berthing Inspections
3. We changed “PFA only” to “PFA weigh-in,” the portion that would be completed on
deployment.
4. CPO 365 (Senior Enlisted)
5. Underway gun shoot and required safety briefing
6. XO Maintenance Inspection (one person per division per week)
7. Maintenance assessment delay due to Sailor in place
8. Non-XO maintenance assessments
9. Planning Board for Training (PB4T) and Planning Board for Maintenance (PB4M)
Inclusion in Manpower Models
If service diversion was workload measured by NAVMAC, the following tasks would be
included in their task analysis.
1. CO and XO calls
2. Professional Development Boards (with senior enlisted for OUS)
3. Awards (with senior enlisted for OUS)
4. Interviews (with senior enlisted for OUS)
5. Boards (with senior enlisted for OUS)
6. Preparation, Practice, and Delay for Boards
7. CPO 365
8. Sailor advocacy
9. Meetings (in general)
10. Eight O’clock reports (Daily departmental updates)
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11. Sick call, medical and dental (medical personnel for OUS)
12. Mentoring, including basic life skills
13. Business at the post office, ship’s store, and ship’s service activities
14. Hangar bay integrity watch
15. Quarters, including personnel inspections
16. ZIDL: XO maintenance inspection (one person per division per week)
The following service diversion tasks would not be included in a task analysis but must still
be accomplished while at sea.
1. Waiting or “do nothing” allocation
2. Messing and berthing inspections
3. Required reading
4. DRB and Nonjudicial Punishment (NJP) (senior enlisted is provided OUS)
5. Morale events and planning requirements
6. Underway gun shoots and required safety briefs (range master and line coach are
included under OUS)
7. VIP visits
8. Maintenance assessment delays (personnel in compartment waiting for the assessor)
9. Emergency leave
10. Security clearance requirements (YN, NEC 9190, Special Security Assistant, is
provided under OUS)
11. Non-XOmaintenance assessments, including zone and departmental (Master at Arms
(MAA) is provided OUS for assessments)
12. PB4T (Only officers are listed in the Standard Organization and Regulations of the
U.S. Navy (SORM) for attendance at PB4T (CNO, 2012))
13. PB4M (The “core maintenance team” must attend PB4M (USFF, 2017b, p. VI-41-
23))
14. FEP
15. Collateral duties not listed within NAVMAC Afloat Programs Department Director
(2009a)
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4.6.2 Mark IV: Own Unit Support (OUS)
OUS depends on the type of work being accomplished. NAVMAC provided insight as to
what model tasks would is included in OUS task analysis (see Figure 4.6).
Figure 4.6. Mark IV: Own Unit Support, February 2018.
OUS is applied based on ship workload that is productive (i.e., directly supports of the ship’s
mission). A PF&D allowance is applied to OUS. The following administrative changes
were made to the OUS section of the Mark IV model.
Changed or Removed
We either changed or removed the following tasks from OUS.
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1. We split data recording for maintenance activities. The Work Center Supervisor
(WCS) is credited for OUS and maintenance data entry is credited as part of Make
Ready/Put Away (MRPA).
2. Special evolutions were combined into a single descriptive block.
Added
We added the following tasks to OUS.
1. Advancement exam proctoring. There is an allocation of one proctor to 25 exams
with a minimum of two proctors.
2. Maintenance assessments (XO and MAA)
3. MAA
4. Underway gun shoot. There is an allocation for a range master and line coach.
5. Security Clearance support (YN, NEC 9190, Special Security Assistant)
6. LIMDU support (Command Pay/Personnel Administrator (CPPA))
7. Drill brief, setup, and debrief (one Sailor per department for one hour per week;
Engineering and Weapons departments are allotted three Sailors each for one hour
per week)
8. Email, based on Occupational Standards (OCCSTDs) (30 minutes per day for E-6
and above; 15 minutes per day for E-5 and below). Some rates are allotted more time
per day
9. Command fitness leaders (CFLs)
10. Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA)
11. Command Financial Specialist
12. Non-evolution working parties and tiger teams
13. NJP support (one YN and MAA)
14. INDOC (training personnel)
15. CS requirement (workload based–each CS is expected to work only two meals per
day)
16. JQR/PQS senior enlisted support
17. FSAs (Workload based. Six for DDG – two Fireman (FN) and four Seaman (SN);
proportion of FN and SN to the ratings on board)
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Inclusion in Manpower Models
Workload measured by NAVMAC for OUS includes the following tasks.
1. Advancement exam proctoring. There is an allocation of one proctor to 25 exams
with a minimum of two proctors.
2. Maintenance assessments (XO and MAA)
3. MAA
4. Underway gun shoot for a range master and line coach
5. Security Clearance support (YN, NEC 9190, Special Security Assistant)
6. NJP support (one YN and MAA)
7. LIMDU support (CPPA)
8. Drill Brief, setup, and debrief (one Sailor per department for one hour per week;
Engineering and Weapons departments are allotted three Sailors each for one hour
per week)
9. Evolutions requiring a working party (connected replenishment (CONREP), vertical
replenishment (VERTREP), AMMO/Cargo Transfer, Flight Quarters, visit, board,
search and seizure (VBSS), Rescue and Assistance Planeguard, Low-visibility Look-
out).
10. Email (this is only partially captured in Navy manpower models: 30 minutes/day for
E-6 and above; 5-15 minutes/day for E-5 and below)
11. Collateral duties as notated in NAVMAC Afloat Programs Department Director
(2009a):
(a) Communications Security Material Custodian
(b) Ship’s 3M System Coordinator (3MC)
(c) NavalWarfare PublicationsCustodian (Part ofOperations Specialist (OS) rating;
used when appropriate for other rates)
(d) Supply/Repair Parts Petty Officer (RPPO)
(e) Departmental Yeoman
(f) Division Mail Petty Officer
(g) Division training petty officer (TPO) (preparation only)
(h) Damage Control Petty Officer (maintenance data by workcenter)
(i) Surface Rescue Swimmer (directed requirement for NEC)
(j) Workcenter Supervisor (maintenance related)
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12. MRC Force Revisions
13. INDOC training personnel
14. CS requirement
15. JQR/PQS senior enlisted support
16. PQS training reports (TPO)
17. Search and Rescue Swimmer
18. CSMP Management (WCS)
19. FSAs
20. Flight Deck Fire Fighting team
21. Data recording for maintenance (WCS)




3. Command Financial Specialist
4. Availability planning
5. Non-evolution working parties and tiger teams (note that this requirement is unpre-
dictable and challenging to include)
4.6.3 Mark IV: Maintenance
Maintenance tasks are completed by the entire ship, whether facility maintenance (FM),
planned maintenance (PM), or CM. NAVMAC provided insight as to what model tasks
would be included in maintenance task analysis (see Figure 4.7).
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Figure 4.7. Mark IV: Maintenance, February 2018.
Most maintenance tasks are included in the projected plan for work hours, but not all of
them. In some cases, NAVMAC makes a judgment call as to how much time might be
spent on an activity due to a lack of data. A PF&D allowance is applied to CM and FM. A
MRPA allowance is applied to PM. Thus, we made the following administrative changes to
the maintenance section of the Mark IV model.
Changed or Removed
We either changed or removed the following tasks from maintenance.
1. We removed Spot Check preparation. NAVMAC noted that preparation should not
be necessary for a spot check, a historical review to assure the maintenance was
completed.
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2. We removed assessment (e.g., ZIDL, etc.) preparation. Preparation should not be
necessary for assessments.
3. We moved assessments to service diversion.
4. A Combat System shoot was noted as requiring maintenance only when the system
was used. We absorbed this requirement into Semi-Annual and Annual PMS.
5. Casualty control was changed to “Unexpected events.” We added more unanticipated
events to the list.
6. We removed MRPA tasks from both Facility Maintenance and Corrective Mainte-
nance and only applied them to Planned Maintenance tasks.
Added
We added the following tasks to maintenance.
1. Spot Check Delay. A Sailor waits in place for the assessor(s) to arrive.
2. Corrective maintenance age multiplier, less than 20 years is a 1.4 ratio (40%), and
greater than or equal to 20 years is a 1.8 ratio (80%)
Inclusion in Manpower Models
Workload measured by NAVMAC for maintenance includes the following tasks.
1. Planned Maintenance
(a) 3M Spot Checks
(b) MRPA
2. Corrective Maintenance
(a) Troubleshooting (Electrical is 1:1 PM to CM; Mechanical is 2:1 PM to CM)
(b) Corrective maintenance age multiplier
(c) ZIDL/DITS Corrections (MRC only)
(d) ZIDL/DITS Corrections (Non-MRC)–partial inclusion. NAVMAC believes
these are captured due to the lack of Corrective Maintenance data.
3. Facility Maintenance




(d) Hull, deck, superstructure preservation
(e) Compartment cleaning
(f) Sweepers–partially captured. NAVMAC believes time for sweepers is partially
captured in existing sweeper activities.
The following are not included in NAVMAC task analyses of Maintenance but must still be
accomplished while at sea.
1. ZIDL/DITS Corrections (Non-MRC). Corrective Maintenance is based on a ratio
from PM, i.e., MRC-related maintenance only.
2. Sweepers. Cleaning time exceeding that provided by the square footage of cleaning
surface would be a self-imposed burden.
3. Unexpected events and casualties
4. Corrective maintenance cannot be determined unless Sailors accurately record and
update system data for hours spent on CM.
4.6.4 Mark IV: Training
NAVMAC does not measure training tasks during workload reviews. NAVMAC provided
insight as to what would be included in training workload if they measured it (see Figure
4.8).
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Figure 4.8. Mark IV: Training, February 2018.
Training is applied as a singular value of four hours and is only measured when the
NAF/NSWW is studied for accuracy. A PF&D allowance is not applied to training for this
reason. Thus, we made the following administrative changes to the training section of the
Mark IV Model.
Changed or Removed
We either changed or removed the following tasks from training.
1. We split INDOC between OUS and training. OUS is provided for trainers. Attendees
would be receiving training.
2. We moved higher education to personal time.
3. We moved advancement training to personal time.
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Added
We added the following tasks to training.
1. Deployment training requirements were moved to training.
2. Warfare qualification
3. N17/N9 Resiliency requirements
4. Training team PQS
5. Drills for readiness sustainment
6. Drill brief, setup (including safety checks), and debrief
7. Condition I and III readiness level Under Instruction watches
Inclusion in Manpower Models
If training was workload measured by NAVMAC, the following tasks would be included in
their task analysis.
1. General Quarters (ITT)
2. Related training team drills accomplished during a ship-wide drill
The following training tasks would not be included in a task analysis, but must still be
accomplished while at sea.
1. Deployment training requirements. These are expected to be completed in port prior
to departing for deployment.
2. Warfare qualification
3. N17 and N9 Resiliency requirements
4. Training team PQS
5. Other than ship-wide drills, including Condition III drills (assumed by NAVMAC to
be waived during a war)
6. Drill brief, setup (including safety checks), and debrief
7. Condition I and III readiness level Under Instruction watches
8. Navy training requirements to include: Safety briefs and stand-downs (two briefs
per month and one stand-down per year are mandated (CNO, 2007)), CPO 365
Phases I and II, Petty Officer leadership course, GMT, Chart the Course / Bystander
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intervention, SAPR, emergent Navy training (e.g., Transgender, Blended Retirement,
et cetera), PREVENT, ADAMS, and AAA
9. INDOC
10. JQR and/or PQS training that cannot be completed while on watch
11. On-the-job training (non-watch)
12. New Sailor training requirements: Fire fighting, Damage Control, 3M, and ATFP
13. PQS for drill positions
With the final Mark IV model, a red, yellow, and green color coding was used to identify
the inclusion or exclusion of tasks. The large amount of red, though not all warfare tasks,
provides a visual of the amount of risk placed on over-tasked Sailors.
4.7 Additional Findings
We investigated a few SME concerns in depth to see what might be causing the described
“excessive” workload. This includes the effect on Sailor working hours when not all
personnel are on board the ship, the FSA disparity between NAVMAC’s workload analysis
and the actual number of FSAs assigned by COs, 3M spot check concerns, and NAVMAC’s
assumption about semi-annual and annual maintenance requirements.
4.7.1 Manning Effects on Sailor Working Hours
Navymanpowermodels use theNAF/NSWWto determine theminimal number of personnel
needed to accomplish a ship’s workload (see Table 4.7).
Table 4.7. Navy Availability Factor / Navy Standard Work Week Summary.
Adapted from DCNO (MPT&E) (2016).
Navy Availability Factor
Standard Workweek (On-Duty Hours) 81 hours (12 hrs Mon-Sat and 9 hrs Sun)
Productive Workweek 70 hours
Training 7 hours
Service Diversion 4 hours
Non-Available Time (Off-Duty Hours) 87 hours
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We used the NAF/NSWW hours to illustrate the impact on working hours when Sailors
are not on board to help meet task requirements. The following current on board (COB)
manning configurations were used: 95%, 90%, 86%, and 81% of BA (see Table 4.8).
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Total working hours per 13.9 Hrs
enlisted Sailor per day (+ 2.3 Hrs)
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To simplify calculations, we used an average of 81 hours of work, equal to 11.6 hours per
day, seven days per week for the calculations, assuming all billets to be funded. Therefore,
the difference between manpower requirements as determined by NAVMAC and billets
authorized are not included in these calculations.
USFF Command enforces surface ship manning levels according to “fit” and “fill.” Fit is
the personnel’s ability to meet the skill set and pay band for the billets authorized. When
a ship has a lack of fit, it is due to the inability of a Navy community to provide enough
Sailors with the required NEC and pay band. Fill is the aggregate manning of the ship
without accounting for skill and pay band requirements. The target levels for the DDG-51
are 90% Fit and 90% Fill until about 15 months prior to deployment when the unit must
assure 92% Fit and 95% Fill prior to the start of the Basic Phase (USFF, 2015). The fill goal
is minimally 95% to assure most Sailors who will deploy receive the appropriate training
prior to the ship’s deployment. From the calculations, the effects of 92% fill on the Sailors
remaining on board can be seen, as well as the divisional corollary for fit, if not all required
ratings and trained personnel are on board.
4.7.2 Disparity in Food Service Attendants (FSAs)
Leadership noted that they primarily refer to the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAV-
SUP) Food Service Management Manual or the source document, the SORM, for the
required number of FSAs. The goal being the improvement of Sailor quality of life. The
SORM (CNO, 2012) states,
All departments ... shall transfer personnel to the Supply Department for
temporary duty as food service attendants ... Absent an approved SMD/FMD,
it is recommended that FSAs be provided at a ratio of 1 to 25 from ship’s enlisted
company ... the number of CPO mess attendants furnished will be on a 1 to 15
ratio, and that the number of wardroom rotational pool members assigned will
equal 12 percent of its officer population. (pp. 6-23–6-24, emphasis added)
If the DDGs are using these numbers to supply FSAs, then it is in excess of those provided
via the approved SMD (See Table 4.9).
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Table 4.9. Food Service Attendant Requirements NAVSUP vs. NAVMAC.
Crew Totals Adapted from U.S. Navy Chief of Information (2018).
NAVSUP NAVMAC
Mess Total
Required FSAs Required FSAs
Officer 32 3 (12%)
(2) FN
CPO 27 2 (1:15)
(4) SN
Junior Enlisted 270 8 (Remaining)
Total 270 Enlisted 13 (1:25) 6
There is a disparity of seven FSAs between NAVSUP recommendations and workload
measured by NAVMAC. NAVMAC’s FSA requirement of six listed in the SMD is expected
to cover the FSA workload for all DDG messes.
4.7.3 Maintenance and Material Management (3M) Spot Checks
Leadership expressed concern about 3M spot checks, stating that smaller workcenters tend
to have a disproportionate number of quarterly 3M spot checks to PMS requirements. A
spot check is “the tool that supervisory personnel utilize to determine the accomplishment
status of an MRC [Maintenance Requirement Card] that has been previously reported as
accomplished” (NAVSEA, 2015, p. 2-40). This means that, each time a spot check is
completed, it is in addition to normal planned maintenance.
There are differing requirements for spot checks depending on the entity’s instruction. As
an echelon creates its own instruction, the requirements can either be the same or more
restrictive than the parent instruction. NAVSEA (2015) indicates that “each Work Cen-
ter shall receive an audit once per quarter by a supervisory individual, (E-7 or above)”
(p. 2-40). Alternatively, USFF (2017a) takes the requirement one step further, identify-
ing a minimal percentage of 2% of “recent” randomly selected MRCs (p. VI-19A-10).
The TYCOM, provides the minimum, most restrictive, requirement for the surface ship.
COMNAVSURFPAC & COMNAVSURFLANT (2013) discuss the submission of quarterly
spot checks to the ISIC. The instruction does not mention a minimal percentage. In-
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stead, a table is provided with required periodicity checks for each management level. The
established minimum periodicity for each level is weekly (see Table 4.10).
Table 4.10. Mandatory Leadership 3M Spot Checks and Periodicities.







3MC Two (One will be ER09) Weekly
Command Master Chief (CMC) One Weekly
Department Head (DH) One Weekly
Division Officer (DIVO) One Weekly
Leading Chief Petty Officer (LCPO) One Weekly
Leading Petty Officer (LPO) One Weekly
When a division has only 12 quarterly maintenance requirements, the number of spot checks
becomes pretty large in comparison. The quarterly (every 13 weeks) spot checks required,
accounting for only the DIVO, LCPO, and LPO, would be 39. In total, there would be
51 overall maintenance requirements (PMS and spot checks). This is 4.2 times the actual
required quarterly maintenance.
A sample of the PMS checks compared to the required spot checks for a DDG’s departments
and corresponding divisions shows the disparity for smaller divisions (see Table 4.11).
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Table 4.11. Representative Sample of DDG Quarterly Planned Maintenance
System Checks to Spot Checks. Adapted from Sample DDG 3MC (2018).
Quarterly Quarterly
Department (Division)
PMS Checks Spot Checks
Ratio
COMBAT SYSTEMS (CA) 300 26 8.6%
COMBAT SYSTEMS (CC) 2976 52 1.7%
COMBAT SYSTEMS (CE) 1585.25 130 8.2%
COMBAT SYSTEMS (CF) 977.75 78 7.9%
COMBAT SYSTEMS (CG) 2281.5 104 4.5%
COMBAT SYSTEMS (CM) 514 52 10.1%
ENGINEERING (EA) 1399.75 52 3.7%
ENGINEERING (EE) 670 52 7.7%
ENGINEERING (EM) 1839.75 130 7.0%
ENGINEERING (ER) 5145.5 104 2.0%
HEALTH SERVICES (HM) 51 26 50.9%
NAVIGATION (N) 58 26 44.8%
EXEC (NN) 11.5 26 226.0%
OPERATIONS (OD) 2881 26 0.9%
OPERATIONS (OI) 119 26 21.8%
OPERATIONS (OT) 468 52 11.1%
SUPPLY (S-1) 23.5 52 221.2%
SUPPLY (S-2) 843 26 3.0%
SUPPLY (S-3) 212 26 12.2%
These numbers are derived from twelve months of data and averaged across the quarters.
The calculated ratio is:
Quarterly Spot Checks
Quarterly PMS Checks
Anything over 20% of quarterly maintenance checks being verified with spot checks are
highlighted. The Fleet Forces instruction requires spot checks for at least 2% of ship’s
maintenance requirements. The expectation of the TYCOM meets (and exceeds) that
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requirement. The data show an overall 21.0% quarterly spot check rate across the ship with
five divisions having a range of 21.8% to an astounding 226.0% quarterly spot check to
quarterly PMS check ratio. The disparities described by DDG leadership can easily be seen
through these calculations.
4.7.4 Annual and Semi-Annual Planned Maintenance System (PMS)
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, NAVMAC does not include annual and semi-annual PMS
within the calculations for ship manpower requirements due to the assumption that most
semi-annual and annual maintenance can be deferred until the ship is in-port or post
Condition III operations (i.e., a reduced threat environment).
COMNAVSURFPAC N43 provided the annual and semi-annual PMS data for 24 months
for all DDGs in service. After we reviewed the data, we removed any ships with less than
18 months of data due to a lack of records, 15 ships. We labeled the hours recorded as
either “at sea,” “in port,” or “none” within the official maintenance records. Ideally, all
maintenance recorded would have indicated either “at sea” or “in port,” but when SKED is
not transitioned from “none” to a different condition, recorded maintenance will be notated
as “none.”
We averaged the hours of semi-annual and annual maintenance hours per week by depart-
ment for DDG 51 Flights I, II, and IIA.We also calculated the number of personnel required
to complete at-sea annual and semi-annual PMS using the NAF/NSWW available working
hours of 70 hours per week (see Tables 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14).
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Table 4.12. DDG 51 Flight I 3M Annual and Semi-annual Requirements.
Hours 30% of Additional
Flight I (DDG 51–71)
per Week Total Sailors Required
Combat Systems 815.01 244.50 3.49
Engineering 1568.93 470.67 6.72
Nav/Exec/Med 95.60 28.68 0.41
Ops/Planning and Tactics 405.65 121.69 1.73
Supply 326.99 98.09 1.40
Weapons 479.54 143.86 2.05
Total 15.8
Table 4.13. DDG 51 Flight II 3M Annual and Semi-annual Requirements.
Hours 30% of Additional
Flight II (DDG 72–78)
per Week Total Sailors Required
Combat Systems 636.65 190.99 2.72
Engineering 915.04 274.51 3.92
Nav/Exec/Med 63.43 19.03 0.27
Ops/Planning and Tactics 362.07 108.62 1.55
Supply 247.91 74.37 1.06
Weapons 140.50 42.15 0.60
Total 10.1
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Table 4.14. DDG 51 Flight IIA 3M Annual and Semi-annual Requirements.
Hours 30% of Additional
Flight IIA (DDG 79 +)
per Week Total Sailors Required
Combat Systems 895.68 268.70 3.83
Engineering 1842.61 552.78 7.89
Nav/Exec/Med 48.73 14.61 0.21
Ops/Planning and Tactics 857.46 257.24 3.67
Supply 309.28 92.78 1.32
Weapons 118.61 35.58 0.51
Total 17.4
We totaled the hours per week of annual and semi-annual maintenance requirements due
to the lack of complete at-sea and in-port requirement data. COMNAVSURFPAC N43, in
personal correspondence on March 2, 2018, provided a swag for at-sea required annual and
semi-annual planned maintenance. He indicated at-sea maintenance requirements would
be about 30% of the total annual and semi-annual maintenance. We then calculated thirty
percent of the hours perweek, providing the averageweekly hours of annual and semi-annual
maintenance at sea. Using 70 hours of available working time (i.e., dividing by 70 hours),
we then recorded the total manpower required to conduct the annual and semi-annual at-sea
maintenance. The additional Sailors required to accomplish the annual and semi-annual
maintenance workload range from approximately 10 to 17 personnel. These Sailors are not
currently provided due to the assumptions made within Navy manpower models.
147




To change something in the Navy is like punching a feather bed, you punch it
with your right and your left until you are finally exhausted and then you find
the damn bed just as it was before you started.
- Franklin D. Roosevelt
(Eccles, 1951, p. 336)
5.1 Discussion
Policy and leadership decisions made throughout the past 25 years have greatly affected
U.S. Navy Sailors at sea. Decreased manning and increased tasking have placed the Sailors
at risk. The workload is increased, and, therefore, the risk put upon the Sailors at sea is
increased. The Navy is mandated to minimize manpower for the purpose of war. At sea, the
readiness condition that applies is Condition III, which is expected to be maintained by the
crew for, at most, 60 days. When tasks are being accounted for, there is a single question
that is always asked. Would the Sailors be doing the task if the Navy was at war?
Sailors have to do many tasks that are unaccounted for in Navy manpower models. Tasking
comes from multiple sources. They come from the chain of command as well as external
sources, such as Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Naval Supply Systems Com-
mand (NAVSUP), and Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP). They can also come through
indirect means, such as policy change that impacts ship workload in the future.
The critical issue of concern is whether Sailors at sea have the means to complete their
actual requirements without feeling overwhelmed or feeling the need to finish their tasks
only to the point of “good enough.” The Navy does a great disservice to its Sailors when
there is no centralized control for all surface ship requirements.
Initially, one would think that providing more personnel would ease the workload burden.
However, because sea/shore friction exists, the Navy needs more than just an increase in
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recruits. The Navy would be wise to undertake a review and analysis to determine how to
alleviate the sources of the friction discussed in Section 2.4.1.
The Navy uses fit and fill to determine manning levels for the surface ships, but a fill above
100% is not necessarily helpful if some of the departments with the greatest workload are
undermanned. In addition, funding is required in order to increase Navy end strength to
expand ship manning, requiring a higher level of congressional buy-in. Furthermore, the
Navy will need to plan appropriately while the fleet expands to 355 ships. The Navy must
rely on others to accomplish such changes due to the nature of military funding. The one
vital factor the Navy has the power to control is its own internal policies.
5.1.1 Pillars of Risk
Workload issues will not fully resolve through additional manning or Navymanpowermodel
adjustments. Ship leadership must know the actual risk undertaken because of this. Also
known as the “Readiness Gap,” Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC)’s “Levels of
Risk” from Figure 2.8 is just the start of the real gap (see Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1. “Levels of Risk,” Also Known as a “Readiness Gap.” Adapted
from NAVMAC (2017b).
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This is a revised version of NAVMAC’s illustration. This figure is the most common
representation of what happens to the minimal requirements for ship manpower as billets
are funded and personnel are assigned.
Difference Between Ship Manpower Document (SMD) and Actual Mission Needs
This thesis finds that the “Readiness Gap” is truly larger that what has been stated within the
Navy. This increase of the gap is two-fold. First, as discussed in Section 4.6, there are at-sea
Condition I or III requirements that are not included. Second, when the U.S. Navy began
shaving actual billets from the Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operational
Environment (ROC\POE) as described in Section 2.5.2, Optimal Manning Initiative: 2001–
2006, the gap grew larger (see Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2. The Actual “Readiness Gap”: Adding the Difference between the
SMD and Actual Warfare Workload. Adapted from NAVMAC (2017b).
This figure shows an increased readiness gap through wartime tasks not included in Navy
manpower models as well as the billet changes over the past 25 years. Though the gap
created due to tasks not planned for can be reduced or eliminated, once billet changes were
made, the gap was not noted or filed away. Therefore, the gap will not close without reversal
of billet decisionsmade in the past. The Navy undermines itself when cutting billets through
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the removal of billet requirements. When manpower billets are “just removed,” the Navy
cannot include the billets as unfunded requirements when asking Congress for funding.
The True Level of Risk
Once non-warfare workload is added, the true level of risk becomes even more obvious (see
Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.3. The Readiness Gap: True Level of Risk.
The additional unidentified gap includes non-warfare workload. This gap is not acknowl-
edged by the Navy due to the need to “minimize for war.” This readiness gap is the “True
Level of Risk.”
5.2 Recommendations
Recommendations are made based upon the findings of this thesis and review of DDG 51
at-sea tasks.
• Review analysis processes of overarching Navy policy changes and their effect on
Navy Sailors at sea. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
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(USD (P&R)) (2005) states, “New policy, including fiscal policy, shall be evaluated
before implementing to decide its effect on manpower and personnel performance.
Existing policies, procedures, and structures shall be periodically evaluated to ensure
efficient and effective use of manpower resources” (p. 2). Though changes to
CONDITION I and III requirements are expected to be completed, in part, through
the update of the ROC\POE for each ship class, such an update only accounts for
mission requirements. The Navy does not conduct these evaluations in accordance
with the directive (Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2017b).
• Update the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 1000.16,
Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, to include a requirement to
reassess the Navy Availability Factor (NAF)/Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW)
every ten years.
• Review fleet by fleet Operations Orders (OPORDs) with the goal of removing ineffi-
ciencies for transiting Navy vessels.
• Add departmental, divisional, and/or rate working hour differences using appropriate
statistical methodology as a part of NAF/NSWW reassessments.
• Review the disparity of Food Service Attendant (FSA) manpower NAVSUP recom-
mendations and NAVMAC manpower requirements, based upon workload analysis,
to determine the most appropriate manning for FSA workload and quality of life.
• Review funding processes to potentially allow non-Navy Personnel Command (NPC)
funding in the midst of a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) in order to allow for
school funding concerns for such school programs as Senior EnlistedAcademy (SEA).
• Provide training to new Sailors prior to arrival to their first command to include Ship-
board Firefighting, Damage Controlman (DC) wet training, basic Maintenance and
Material Management (3M) training, and Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP)
certification. Though not all may be able to be accomplished, as many as possible
would alleviate the workload once a new Sailor arrives.
• Train Surface Warfare Officers at the beginning of their career along with each
leadership training milestone as to how their ship is manned, from workload and
requirements to personnel on board.
• Review the Surface Force Exercise Manual to verify the required CONDITION III
drill time requirement over the course of a six month deployment. These drills are
not currently fully included in Navy manpower models.
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• Update the Surface Force 3M instruction (Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S.
Pacific Fleet (COMNAVSURFPAC) & Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic
(COMNAVSURFLANT), 2013), to account for divisional spot check to Planned
Maintenance System (PMS) ratios. This is not to necessarily decrease requirements
for other departments or divisions, but to create a more appropriate spot check loading
for each division.
• Provide a Type Commander (TYCOM) “pre-workup package” with the current check-
lists and standards expected to be used during the workup cycle. This will alleviate
the responsibility of the ship to pull workup requirements without knowledge of
changes or, in some cases, where to obtain them. This package should not change
throughout the workup process once it has begun in order to reduce “whiplash” to the
ship through changing requirements.
• Review TYCOM and Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) requests for informa-
tions (RFIs) and ensure existing systems adequately provide necessary information to
prevent duplication of administrative work.
5.3 Future Work
Further studies on the following topics could enhance this thesis. We suggest:
• The final Mark IV model should be validated with a larger sample size due to the lack
of time and available resources for this research.
• The sources of at-sea requirements should be traced in order to help the TYCOM and
ISIC maintain command and control over their fleet vessels.
• Tiers one, two, and three phase inspections, certifications, and assessments need to
be reviewed for duplication and inconsistencies, to include a comparison to Board of
Inspection and Survey (INSURV).
• Review ATFP requirements and determine potential unrealized efficiencies. This is
an in port function and was struck in order to focus on the at-sea model, however, it
is clear from surveys and data that this is a large workload growth area.
• As a part of the resiliency goals of the Navy, recommend statistical tracking of stress
score by command type.
• As current training changes take effect due to Ready Relevant Learning (RRL), we
recommend a review of the effects on the fleet.
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• Officer workload needs to be objectively reviewed. Alleviating officer workload and
long working days may result in improved attrition rates.
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APPENDIX A:
VCNO Memorandum: NSWW for Enlisted Personnel
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APPENDIX B:
Mark I: At-Sea/In-port Shipboard Workload Model
Figure B.1. Mark I, Shipboard Workload Model, December 2016.
161
Figure B.2. Example 1: Mark I Close-up of Service Diversion, December
2016.
Figure B.3. Example 2: Mark I Close-up of Training, December 2016.
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APPENDIX C:
U.S. Navy Leadership / Subject-Matter Expert
Interview Questionnaire
Subject-Matter Expert Survey/Interview Questions
For these questions:
1. Think “disproportionate amount of time” defined as more than the average and “causes
of organizational frustration”
2. The focus is on the Junior Enlisted Sailors. If there is anything to add in regard to Senior
Enlisted Sailors or Officers, please describe it.
A. Broad Scope Sources of Requirements
1. On what requirements do most personnel work longer than the average number of
hours to meet?
2. Is there a procedure that Sailors follow to prioritize requirements? If yes, what are
those procedures?




4. Are there extra requirements placed on the ship that are not required by regulation?
a. Are there any requirements that specifically take a disproportionate amount of
time for the Sailors?
b. What are they?
c. What are the source(s) of the workload increase?
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d. Do the source(s) of workload increase go through a central point of contact at
the ISIC, i.e. is the ISIC aware when extra requirements are placed on the ship?
e. Sources of consideration for requirements include: Commanding Officer,
ISIC, TYCOM, SURFOR, Big Navy, etc. Please expand this list to include other sources
for consideration.
B. Mission and Operational Requirements
1. Are there any regular or intermittent changes to the ship’s overall mission?
a. If so, what effect does it have on the ship’s Junior Enlisted Sailors?
b. What effect does it have on the Senior Enlisted Sailors or Officers?
2. Do changes in the operational environment change the number of requirements
placed on the Sailors? How often does this happen?
C. Technology
1. Are there any issues with connectivity either in port or at sea for Junior Enlisted
Sailors?
a. What is the effect on their day to day work?
b. What is the effect on their ability to train?
2. How are connectivity issues resolved to allow requirements to be met?
3. What new technology have Navy ships seen within the past 10 years?
4. What effect has this new technology had on Sailor workload?
a. Was the purpose of the technology to reduce Sailor workload?
b. Did the new technology reduce Sailor workload?
c. Are there any specific new technologies that reduced Sailor workload?
164
d. Are there any specific new technologies that did not reduce Sailor workload,
i.e. they either increased workload or maintained the status quo?
D. Sailor Qualification and Availability
1. Do Navy ships receive Sailors who are untrained?
a. Please provide examples of why they are untrained?
b. Do untrained sailors receiving training?
c. What ratings in particular tend to arrive untrained?
d. What causes the Sailors to arrive untrained?
2. Sailor Availability
a. What situations prevent Sailors from being on board the ship in port?
b. What situations prevent Sailors from being on board the ship at sea?
E. Personal Requirements
1. Are Sailors receiving the required personal time, workout time or sleep while at
sea?
a. If no, why not? If so, what are the causes; what is the source of these issues?
b. Are there repercussions for the ships when Sailors are not able to meet their
personal needs?
2. How do ships resolve issues with personal time?
F. Watchstanding
1. In Port
a. What effect do ATFP requirements have on the ships crew?
b. What effect do ATFP requirements have on Port watchstanding duties?
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c. What other in port watchstanding requirements have an effect on a ship’s
Sailors?
2. At Sea
a. Do Sailors work a disproportionate amount of time in their watchstanding
duties at sea?
1. If so, how are they overworked?
2. Why are they overworked?
b. Do specific departments have a larger percentage of overworked Sailors than
others?
1. If so, what departments experience this the most?
2. How do the departments deal with this overwork?
G. Maintenance
1. What situations cause the ship to fail to meet maintenance requirements?
a. What are the effects when a ship is unable to meet maintenance requirements?
b. Are requirements waived? If yes, why?
c. Are maintenance needs considered when extra requirements are placed on
Sailors?
2. What changes made over the past 10 years that affect a Navy ship’s ability to meet
maintenance requirements?
a. Have there been any changes in maintenance systems?
b. Have there been any changes in maintenance requirements?
H. Supply








1. Are Sailors able obtain legal services? What services, specifically, might a sailor
not be able to obtain?
2. What is the affect of a Sailors ability to obtain legal services on that Sailor’s available
time on the ship prior to deployment?
3. NJP
a. On average, how much time does NJP take out of the Sailor’s day?
b. What effects can NJP results have on the Sailor’s ability to continue to meet
shipboard requirements?
J. Extra Workload. Do any of the following take a disproportionate amount of time for







7. Mentorship (either giving or receiving)
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8. Evaluations
K. Training (Note: “Warfighter” training includes Damage Control, General Quarters and
Engineering Casualty training)
1. Of the different types of training, what takes a greater percentage of a Sailor’s day?
Why? Examples: Deployment, ATFP, GMT, Safety (inc motorcycle), Qualification, OJT,
In-Rate, cycle-related training (DC/GQ/Eng Casualties)
2. Are there any extra non-warfighter training requirements placed upon the Junior
Sailors? If so, what administrative authority do they come from?
3. What effect does the regular and (if any) extra non-warfighter training requirements
have on the Sailors?
4. How does connectivity affect the Sailors?
5. In regard to non-warfighting deployment training, when are the Sailors notified of
the requirements placed on the ship?
a. Are the Sailors notified while deployed or prior to departure on deployment?
b. If prior to departure for deployment, how soon prior?
L. Conclusion
1. Of everything asked, are there effects on shipboard performance due to any of the
issues or requirements?
2. Where are the effects on shipboard performance found?
3. Are there any other requirements placed on Navy ships that have not been discussed
or asked about? Please provide specifics.
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APPENDIX E:
Afloat (Wartime) Navy Availability Factor
Figure E.1. Afloat (Wartime) Navy Availability Factor (NAF). Source:
DCNO (MPT&E) (2016).
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APPENDIX F:
Mark II: Post-interview Workload Model
Figure F.1. Mark II, Post-interview Shipboard Workload Model, May 2017.
175
Figure F.2. Example 1: Mark II Close-up of Service Diversion, May 2017.
176
Figure F.3. Example 2: Mark II Close-up of Training, May 2017.
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APPENDIX G:
Mark III: At-Sea Model Provided to NAVMAC
Figure G.1. Mark III, At-Sea Shipboard Workload Model, September 2017.
179
Figure G.2. Example 1: Mark III, Close-up of Service Diversion, September
2017.
Figure G.3. Example 2: Mark III, Close-up of Non-warfighter Training,
September 2017.
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Figure G.4. Example 2: Mark III, Close-up of Warfighter Training, Septem-
ber 2017.
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APPENDIX H:
Mark IV: Final At-Sea Shipboard Workload Model
Figure H.1. Mark IV, At-Sea Shipboard Workload Model, February 2018.
183
Figure H.2. Mark IV: Service Diversion, February 2018.
184
Figure H.3. Mark IV: Own Unit Support (OUS), February 2018.
185
Figure H.4. Mark IV: Training, February 2018.
186
Figure H.5. Mark IV: Maintenance, February 2018.
187
Figure H.6. Mark IV: Personal Time, February 2018.
Figure H.7. Mark IV: Operational Manning, February 2018.
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